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INTRODUCTION
DIVINE PROVIDENCE TODAY
The doctrine of divine providence has had a place in Christian theology since the early
Church, but providence itself is not originally a Judeo-Christian concept. With the exception of
the apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon,1 providence is not developed in Scripture in either the Old
or New Testament.2 Rather, what Christians now call providence finds its origin in the Stoic
concept of fate.3 The gods of Stoicism were subject to the laws of nature in the same way as
human beings and the rest of creation.4 In other words, in Stoicism, the gods were also subject
to fate. By the time the early Christian Church was developing, the concepts of Greek Stoicism
were accepted principles of Hellenistic culture.5 Christian theologians, influenced by Hellenism,
found that the idea of a guiding principle was easily read back into Scripture as the guiding
hand of God over individual human lives, the chosen people of God, and creation as a whole. 6

1

See Wisd. of Sol. 14:3; 17:2.

2

A good overview of providential themes and passages in Scripture, which nonetheless never uses the
word providence, can be found in Gennaro Auletta, “Providence” in Encyclopedia of Christian Theology, ed. JeanYves Lacoste (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1307-1308.
3

See especially Cicero’s On the Concept of the Gods.

4

Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Providence,” in The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, ed. Adrian
Hastings, Alistair Mason, and Hugh Pyper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 574.
5

Gregersen, “Providence,” 574.

6

The first explicit development of providence in Christian theology was probably that of Clement of Rome
around 95CE. See Auletta, “Providence,” 1308; and Clement of Rome, Epistle to the Corinthians.

1

2

Of course, when Christians adopted the concept, fate/providence came to apply only to
creation. The Christian God is not subject to God’s own providence but freely chooses how to
guide the world.7 As Christian authors began to develop the term as a specifically Christian
doctrine, they also increasingly associated providence with the love and care of God rather
than merely the power and wisdom of God.8
The concept of providence continued to persist as an important doctrine within
Christian theology throughout the patristic, medieval, and reformation periods, 9 and belief in
providence continues to be an important aspect of Christian spirituality. From Julian of
Norwich’s “All shall be well” to the 73% of Americans who believe God has a plan for their
lives,10 providence has a strong hold on the average Christian’s imagination both historically
and today.
Despite the presence of providence in Christian spirituality, contemporary theology has
been comparatively silent on the subject.11 In 1963, Langdon Gilkey drew attention to this fact
in his article, “The Concept of Providence in Contemporary Theology.” In the article he notes
that theologians of his day have fallen short of explaining providence in a convincing way. He

7

Gregersen, “Providence,” 574.

8

John H. Wright, “Providence,” in The New Dictionary of Theology, ed. Joseph A Komonchak, Mary
Collins, and Dermot A. Lane (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1987), 816.
9

Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin are notable examples from each time period.

10

Paul Froese and Scott Draper, “How God Sustains the American Dream” in Wave III Baylor Religion
Survey, Baylor University, September 2011, accessed April 24, 2017,
http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/153501.pdf.
11

This is noted in Gregersen, “Providence,” 575; and Jean-Yves Lacoste, “Providence,” in Lacoste,
Encyclopedia of Christian Theology, 1311.

3

asks, “Why has Providence in our generation been left a rootless, disembodied ghost, flitting
from footnote to footnote, but rarely finding secure lodgment in sustained theological
discourse?”12 Of course, he has some ideas about why, namely that the doctrine of providence
in liberal theology depended on a notion of progress which seemed untenable by the mid-20th
century.13 He surmises that to many it now appears a mistake that providence was
incorporated into Christian theology from Stoic philosophy at all.14 Yet, according to Gilkey, the
consequences of removing providence would be dire. He writes that the mighty acts of God in
history would dissolve and God's only role in the world would be as an inward persuasion of
believers to make certain decisions "in an alien, meaningless world, and to have 'faith' in a God
who is sovereign only elsewhere."15
Is Gilkey overreacting? If theologians have neglected providence, perhaps it is time to
move onto something else. We should hesitate, though, because although Gilkey may be right
that theologians have neglected the doctrine, it is a doctrine with its fingers in so many other
doctrines. Even Gilkey admits that providence continues to show up in the footnotes! It affects
the way we understand hope, the incarnation, the resurrection, our purpose in life, our
relationship with God, and our connection to the rest of creation. Consequently, even

12

Langdon Gilkey, “The Concept of Providence in Contemporary Theology,” in Journal of Religion 43, no.
3 (July 1963): 171, accessed May 11, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1199932.
13

Ibid., 173.

14

Ibid., 184.

15

Ibid., 185.

4

theologians who do not speak directly of the doctrine of providence still tend to have a
concept of providence latent in their work.
While initially divine providence may not seem high on the hierarchy of truths in
Christian faith, a closer examination reveals that providence is foundational for Christian hope
and the participation of creation in the building of the kingdom of God. It is because of an
underlying belief in God’s guidance of each human person and all of creation that Christians
have a convincing foundation for hope. Christians are able to give an account of their hope16
because of divine providence.
Nevertheless, could it be possible that the Christian understanding of God has simply
changed too much for some theologians to hang onto providence? Postmodern theologians
influenced by continental philosophy of religion and the critique of ontotheology may be
especially likely to fall into this category. These theologians have rejected traditional attributes
of God such as omnipotence and omniscience, not to mention being and power. God, after the
critique of ontotheology, cannot operate as an agent in the way the God of classical theism
can. Consequently, this “weak”17 God cannot guarantee a good end for creation. The work of
John Caputo, considered “left” even among continental philosophers of religion, represents
this position well and will be the central focus of this dissertation.
The main objective of this dissertation is to determine what can be salvaged of the
doctrine of providence in Caputo’s weak God theology. A reimagined doctrine of providence
will be introduced which preserves the central functions of more traditional models without
16

1 Pet. 3:15.

17

This description comes from John Caputo.

5

falling back on an ontotheological God. I will demonstrate that although theories of divine
providence traditionally depend on a powerful God capable of bringing all to a good end,
providence remains essential to Christian hope and participation even if God is rethought as
weak. This new view of providence comes from an understanding of the Holy Spirit which is
non-totalizing and dependent on creation’s response. Hope, therefore, empowers human
action rather than ensuring victory despite our actions.
Over the course of defending this thesis, other questions will be addressed along the
way. To begin, we must ask what the parameters of a doctrine of divine providence are. How
much freedom do we have to reimagine what providence is? In which directions can it go? To
end, we will also ask what the implications might be of providence reimagined in a weak God
theology. What sort of ethical questions does this worldview present? Does it move us forward
in being able to deal with the actual struggles of the world today?
Method for Reimagining Providence
The goal of this dissertation is to reimagine divine providence in the context of weak
God theology. The following method will bring us to this goal. The first three chapters are
descriptive. In these chapters, three articulations of divine providence are presented in detail.
These theories of divine providence are all contemporary in order to ensure that they remain
on an equal playing field in regard to present scientific, philosophical, and theological
conceptions of the world. They also represent different varieties of Christianity: Calvinism,
Thomism, and process theism. An emblematic representative of each of these fields has been
chosen. Paul Helm’s work will be examined as representative of the Calvinist perspective. The
Calvinist model of providence draws on a reform understanding of providence and represents

6

the strongest view of providence of the three. Michael Dodds’ work will exemplify the
Thomistic tradition. The Thomistic model offers a Catholic, scholastic perspective on
providence which comes across more moderate than the Calvinist model due to its emphasis
on the harmony between divine and natural causes. Joseph Bracken’s neo-Thomist process
theology will be used as a model for providence in process theism. Process theism offers a
looser understanding of providence than most Christian theologies are willing to accept. These
theologians can be considered peers and have all published book length works on the doctrine
of providence within the last twenty-five years as well as chapters and articles dealing with
providence within the last seven years. Their models do not exhaust all possible models of
providence one can find within Christianity today. Instead, they are intended to reveal the
diverse understandings of Christian divine providence by representing a range of models from
strongest to weakest. The analysis of each of these conceptions of providence will focus on the
way providence functions in the theological system, what providence can and cannot do, and
the type of God required to carry out divine providence. Each analysis ends with a summary of
the central elements of providence in that model. Chapters one, two, and three present the
Calvinist, Thomist, and process models respectively.
After this descriptive step, a comparative approach will be taken in order to develop
criteria by which to recognize providence in other varieties of Christianity. First, the models of
providence will be discussed generally in terms of their overall function within the theological
systems. Then, criteria for a doctrine of providence will be developed inductively from the
central elements of each model. Characteristics of providence or God not found in all three
varieties will be deemed inessential to the concept of providence. Characteristics present in all

7

three models and which support the central functions of providence will be considered
essential criteria for any model of providence. Chapter four contains this comparison of the
three models and the function of providence as well as the criteria for a doctrine of providence
in any system.
Chapters five and six form the constructive portion the argument. In chapter five, weak
God theology and the critique of ontotheology are introduced. In order to reimagine
providence in the context of weak God theology, it must first be argued that there is good
reason to critique the ontotheology present in Calvinism, Thomism, and process theism. The
purpose of this step is not to show that there are problems with the first three interpretations
of providence. Rather, the "problem" is in the understanding of God which goes along with
these conceptions of providence. If there is good reason to think about God in ways which
critique ontotheology and describe God as weak, then providence must be rethought under
this alternative conception of God. However, little has been explicitly said about providence
that takes the critique of ontotheology into account. And, there is good reason to suspect that,
given the radical rethinking of God inspired by the critique of ontotheology, providence will
have to be largely re-imagined in this context. The work of Caputo is introduced in this chapter
to show both why God should be thought of as weak and the problems weak God theology
raises for a conception of providence.
In chapter six, the criteria developed to identify providence are applied to Caputo’s
weak God theology in order to show that an interpretation of providence is both possible and
appropriate within Caputo’s system. Each criterion for providence will need to be reinterpreted or adjusted to theology with a weak God. The reimagined providence will begin

8

with Caputo’s own description of God’s insistence or call to which human beings respond.
Insistence will then be re-described as the stirrings of the Holy Spirit by drawing on the work of
Michael Welker. The Spirit is experienced as a call to life, especially in service of others.
Responding to the Spirit offers the possibility of new life and resurrection. Consequently, the
Spirit is also an offer of grace and hope.
The final methodological step will be to briefly examine the ethical implications of the
reimagined divine providence. In other words, how does this understanding of providence
practically affect the way one responds to the world and how does it prove more adequate
than previous articulations of providence? The resistance and responses to the insistence of
God during and after Hurricane Katrina will be used a case study to examine the value of
providence reimagined in weak God theology. These implications are explored in the
conclusion.
Providence Today
Christianity needs a doctrine of providence which answers today’s questions. It is
unsurprising that the articulations of providence from Stoic philosophy, the patristic period,
medieval period, and reformation period no longer satisfy believers. However, even
contemporary articulations of providence from Calvinism, Thomism, and process theism fall
short today due to their reliance on an ontotheological conception of God. Christians who
desire to live responsibly in the world need an understanding of providence which holds them
responsible for the presence of God in the world while still offering hope. Caputo and the
reimagined providence of weak God theology will provide a reason to hope that tomorrow

9

might be better, that grace is possible, and that even tragedies such as Hurricane Katrina offer
an opportunity to respond to the call to build the kingdom of God.

CHAPTER ONE
A CALVINIST MODEL OF PROVIDENCE
The first model of divine providence which we will explore is that of the contemporary
Calvinist theologian, Paul Helm. John Calvin (1509-1564) is known for presenting a strong view
of providence from which double predestination logically follows, although Calvin does not
actually use this phrase.1 While Calvin’s views were not entirely unique to his day, as Helm puts
it, his work on providence “is perhaps unmatched in its clarity and trenchancy.”2
A model of providence from the Calvinist tradition is important for our discussion
because it presents providence at its most robust. This model retains much of the original Stoic
understanding of the word while thoroughly Christianizing the concept. Helm takes into
account the concerns and questions of believers and scholars today that Calvin himself would
not have encountered amongst his peers.3 Consequently, while Helm draws heavily on the
primary source material, Helm’s own interpretation of the Calvinist model provides us a better
means of comparison with other models than turning to Calvin’s work directly. After exploring
the central themes of this strong interpretation of providence, the central elements of Helm’s
work will be pulled out to begin the process of developing a definition of providence. The

1

Paul Helm, Calvin at the Centre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 146.

2

Paul Helm, Calvin: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 90.

3

For example, Helm addresses contemporary analytic arguments regarding time and eternity as well as
arguments for “chance” in quantum physics. One could not expect to find these discussions in Calvin’s work.

10

11

following examination will also allow us to relate the doctrine of providence to the doctrine of
God. Helm’s model reveals the God of classical theism: omnibenevolent, eternal, omniscient,
immutable, and omnipotent. In chapter four, these two elements of Helm’s theological system,
the definition of providence and the corresponding doctrine of God, will be compared to those
found in contemporary Thomism and process theism.
Introducing Paul Helm
Paul Helm is a British philosopher and theologian at Regent College. Coming from the
Calvinist tradition himself, Helm’s work in philosophical theology falls into two categories that
are relevant for our study. The first category is historical work on John Calvin and includes
several major works: Calvin and the Calvinists (1998), John Calvin’s Ideas (2006), Calvin: A
Guide for the Perplexed (2008), and Calvin at the Centre (2010). Helm has also edited a
translation of Calvin’s The Secret Providence of God (2010). The second category is Helm’s own
constructive work and includes The Providence of God (1994) and Eternal God: A Study of God
without Time (2011). Of course, many other chapters, articles, blog posts, and speaking
engagements also fall into these two categories. Since Helm’s own thoughts are thoroughly
shaped by Calvin’s writings and Calvin’s writings are presented through the lens of Helm’s own
thought, both of these categories of writings are used here to fill out a model of providence in
contemporary Calvinism.
Although John Calvin is known as a thoroughly biblically-based theologian, Helm is a
philosophical theologian. Helm’s background in philosophy of religion shapes his interest in
Calvin and colors his own theological writings. When writing about Calvin, Helm rarely refers to
the Scripture passages Calvin was reading and instead attempts to place Calvin within a wider

12

context of ancient and medieval ideas.4 One finds many comparisons between Calvin and the
Stoics, Aquinas, or Descartes, even when there is no evidence that Calvin read these works
directly. Helm’s point is not to suggest that Calvin was not as biblically inspired as he claimed,
but rather that no one’s ideas exist in a vacuum. 5 In his own constructive work, Helm of course
engages with other contemporary theologians alongside the theological greats such as
Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Calvin. He also draws heavily on arguments made in analytic
philosophy. While Helm is insistent that Christian theology must be biblically-based, he also
recognizes that no theology can be purely biblical.6 Consequently, his primary mode of
argument is philosophical rather than scriptural, although Scripture is still normative in his
work. Helm believes that theology is impossible without revelation; there can be no theology
based solely on reason.7 Rather, the two must work together. For example, if one looks for
insight into God in Scripture, one will find places which seem to present opposite perspectives;
God’s role in providence is a case in point. Therefore, one must create some sort of rule for
determining which presentation of God is primary or determinative of all the others. 8 For

4

Helm, Calvin at the Centre, 2.

5

Helm stands apart from the majority of contemporary Calvinist scholars in his philosophical rather than
exegetical approach to Calvinism. Consequently, John Calvin’s Ideas was described as “a book entirely without
precedent.” M. W. F. Stone, introduction to Reason, Faith and History: Philosophical Essays for Paul Helm, ed. M.
W. F. Stone (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 5.
6

Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 26-27, 28.

7

Helm, Providence of God, 27. For more on the use of logic in the interpretation of Scripture, see Paul
Helm, “The Role of Logic in Biblical Interpretation” in Hermeneutics Inerrancy, and the Bible: Papers from ICBI
Summit II, ed. Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984), 841858.
8

Helm, Providence of God, 51-52.

13

Helm, and for Calvin, the following rule is used: a description of God should be understood as
anthropomorphic if elsewhere in Scripture God is shown to transcend that same
characteristic.9 In other words, only what is most divine can describe God literally. Where God
appears to take on more human-like traits such as having an emotional life, a body, or a
physical location in heaven, God is accommodating our own weakness. We can come to know
God as responsive to our needs because of these accommodations.10 This rule is clearly at
work in Helm’s work even when he does not explicitly reference the relevant Scripture
passages. Although there has been some criticism of Helm’s infrequent use of scriptural
exegesis,11 his work in relating Calvin’s ideas to the wider history of thought has generally been
praised.12

9

Ibid., 51-54. See also John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion I.17.13. John Sanders critiques this
method asking what the rule is based on. John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 67-68. Helm believes the rule comes out of the language of Scripture. In a
statement which describes his own method as much as it does Calvin’s, Helm writes, “Common sense, that is,
natural, unregenerate reason is an unacceptable norm for interpreting Scripture, whereas the varied language
that Scripture uses about God provides us with normative theological models, ways in which God has chosen to
accommodate himself to human understanding.” Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), 113.
10

Helm, Providence of God, 52-54; and Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas, 113.

11

See for example Thomas P. Redmond, review of The Providence of God, by Paul Helm, Trinity Journal
16, no. 1 (March 1, 1995): 112-115, accessed May 19, 2015, ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, EBSCOhost;
and John M. Frame, review of The Providence of God, by Paul Helm, Westminster Theological Journal 56, no. 2
(September 1, 1994): 438-442, accessed May 19, 2015, ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, EBSCOhost.
12

See for example Stone, introduction to Reason, Faith and History, 1-7; Donald McLeod, review of Calvin
at the Centre, by Paul Helm, The Expository Times 121, no. 11 (August 2010): 573-57, accessed May 19, 2015,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00145246101210110903; Michael Parsons, review of John Calvin's Ideas, by Paul Helm,
Colloquium 38, no. 2 (November 1, 2006): 232-234, accessed May 19, 2015, ATLA Religion Database with
ATLASerials, EBSCOhost; and again Frame, review of The Providence of God, 438-442. A partial exception is
Randall C. Zachman, review of Calvin at the Centre, by Paul Helm, Scottish Journal of Theology 66 (2013): 109-110,
accessed May 19, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022046911000376.

14

Helm’s Model of Providence
When one looks into the doctrine of providence, one quickly finds that its reach
extends to a wide variety of theological topics. Helm’s model of providence is no exception.
Therefore, a full model of providence must be laid out in several steps. First, Helm’s notion of
general providence as it relates to all of creation will be presented. Second, God’s special
providence for the Church and individuals will be discussed. These three contexts for
providence (creation, the Church, and individuals) naturally lead to the problem of evil and the
question of human freedom. These auxiliary issues will be discussed third. While Helm
provides the strongest of the three models of providence that will be examined, providence
still has limits and misapplications. Some of the common assumptions Christians make about
providence, such as expecting to be able to see and understand the overarching trajectory of
one’s life, do not have a place in even this strong model. Therefore, what providence can and
cannot do in the lives of believers will be discussed fourth and fifth. Helm’s model of
providence is based on a particular conception of God consistent with classical theism. The
attributes of Helm’s God and the reasons they are necessary for Helm’s model of providence
will be discussed at the end of this section.
1. General Providence
Helm argues for a no-risk view of divine providence.13 This means that God is not taking
a risk with creation. There is no possibility that things will not turn out as God has planned.
While other Christian theologians have proposed risky versions of providence in which God

13

Helm, Providence of God, 15.
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does not know exactly how things will turn out or what the path will be to the good end God
has planned, Helm believes that a no-risk model is most consistent with Scripture and the
teachings of the Church.14 In order for there to be no risk in providence, God must have full
control of creation, all the way down to the atomic level (or whatever the smallest element of
God’s concern could be).15 God has full governing rights because God is the Creator of all that
exists.16 Yet, God’s governance over creation is undetectable through science.17 There is no
direct view of God in the movement of an atom. While God is the primary cause of all that is
and is hierarchically prior to all that is,18 God is neither a part of the physical world nor in
time.19 As Calvin writes:
The sun rises day by day; but it is God that enlightens the earth by his rays. The earth
brings forth her fruits; but it is God that giveth bread, and it is God that giveth strength
by the nourishment of that bread. In a word, as all inferior and secondary causes,
viewed in themselves, veil like so many curtains the glorious God from our sight (which
they too frequently do), the eye of faith must be cast up far higher, that it may behold
the hand of God working by all these His instruments.20
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Therefore, according to Calvin, the diverse acts of nature we witness both obscure and point us
toward God. There is an orderliness to creation, which Calvin calls “common grace.”21 Common
grace ensures that events have predictable consequences through which God sustains
creation. Despite the predictability of the world, God’s providential hand ordains each act
specifically, allowing for each act’s uniqueness.22 Nevertheless, not all acts are equally
providential.23 In other words, not all acts contribute equally to God’s eternal plan for creation.
Some moments or events, such as the Incarnation, are more important to God’s providential
work than others, such as the pair of socks I wore today.
There are at least two loopholes that commonly get built into this view which Helm
rejects. The first comes from William James. James proposes that although God has willed the
ends, God has not determined the means. So, while God may have a plan for every last atom,
God may not know all the intermediary steps and even more so for human beings. God, then,
is like a chess player who knows what it looks like to win and has the skills to win every time,
yet still must respond to the other player’s moves. Although the other player has a finite
number of possible moves, and God knows them all, God still does not know what course the
game will take.24 Helm finds this analogy impressive, but ultimately contrary to Scripture.
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Helm’s reading of Scripture indicates that God ordains the ends and means to those ends.25
The second loophole comes from physics and argues that chance is built into nature and
provides an opening for freedom. Helm believes this is a misinterpretation of chance and that
it actually does not make a case for freedom at all.26 He notes that to “arrive by chance” is not
to have arrived uncaused; it just means we do not know what the cause is or perhaps, more
strongly, that the cause was not physical.27 If a theologian were to suggest there are actually
events without a cause, that theologian could only hold a risk-view of providence, which Helm
rejects on biblical grounds.28
As previously mentioned, the Calvinist view of providence actually retains much of the
original concept from Stoic philosophy. Helm argues that although Calvin went to great lengths
to reject Stoic fate, Calvin actually agrees with most of it. We will see his agreement when we
discuss the question of human freedom below. However, it is on the more cosmic level that
Calvin has a problem with fate. While the Stoic gods acted as primary causes in much the same
way as the Christian God does, Stoicism had a pantheistic understanding of God rather than a
classically theistic understanding.29 In Stoic pantheism, since the gods are a part of the world,
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they are subject to fate just as everything else is.30 God, however, is not subject to God’s own
providence but freely chooses how to guide the world. The place of God is compromised in the
use of the word fate.
2. Special Providence
While providence extends to all of creation, human beings, especially those who make
up the Church, hold a special place in God’s plan.31 God’s special revelation includes God’s
providence as extended to individuals and the Church. Helm’s model of special providence
cannot be understood apart from the Fall. Since all acts are ordained by God, the Fall and the
crucifixion must be understood providentially.32 Both of these events play an indispensable
role in redemption and salvation which is the end God provides for the elect. Consequently,
understanding special providence involves an explanation of the Fall, the crucifixion of Christ,
and the meaning of predestination.
Helm understands the Fall in a historic way, even if it is not literally historical.33 He
claims scientific accounts do not really matter for a theological understanding of providence.
Theologically, he claims, Scripture tells us that sin entered the world through a fall rather than
through immaturity or some other means.34 The concluding curses that God places on creation
are now a natural part of our world, although the goodness and orderliness of the world,
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known as common grace, were not completely abolished.35 Common grace enables human
beings to make responsible or irresponsible decisions because the outcomes are predictable.36
Despite the presence of common grace, one cannot help but wonder why the Fall happened if
God’s providence is all-encompassing. Helm argues for an “O Felix Culpa” view of the Fall. This
means there are greater goods which come from the Fall that could not have come otherwise.
The greater goods are two-fold. First, evil is a means of human development. On the whole,
there is more good in the world because of temporary suffering.37 As Helm writes, “Without
weakness and need, no compassion; without fault, no forgiveness, and so on.”38 Second, since
the world is orderly, good should be rewarded and evil punished.39 Some evil in the world,
then, is meant as a consequence or punishment of previous ill deeds.40 While more will be said
about the presence of sin in the discussion of the problem of evil below, Helm hopes to
reconcile both ideas in Christ.41
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If the Fall and its aftermath was a time of heightened providential activity,42 the
incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of Christ are the supreme act of providence.43 Christ
redeems humanity from both of the effects of the Fall. By living as a model of righteousness,
Christ undoes the need for suffering as a means for human growth. By conquering sin and
death, Christ restores the full order of the world and removes the need for punitive evil in the
world. The Fall becomes a “Happy Fall” in the resurrection of Christ, and the resurrection
would lose its meaning without the Fall.44
Of course, not everyone receives the full benefit of Christ’s redemptive work. Not every
person is saved. No person can be saved on his or her own, but since providence includes
predestination, God can ensure that a given individual is saved.45 Calvin writes, “All are not
created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation;
and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has
been predestinated to life or to death.”46 While one naturally speculates about whether or not
one is part of the elect, Calvin and Helm point out that it is important to remember that not
only one’s end, but also the means to that end are providential (see Helm’s response to James’
chess player above). Therefore, rather than wondering about our end we should focus on
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whether we are currently living out God’s commands in communion with Christ.47 Since
providence is teleological, meaning events build on one another toward an end, the claim that
one’s actions do not matter because the future is fixed is untenable.48 In the end, it is our
sinfulness that condemns us, not God’s will.49 Therefore, while the logical consequence of
Calvinism is double predestination, God is responsible for salvation whereas human beings are
responsible for their own damnation.
3. The Problem of Evil and the Question of Freedom
While we have already pointed in the direction of the problem of evil and the question
of human freedom several times, these two topics need to be addressed directly. The problem
of evil is partly explained by the “O Felix Culpa” interpretation of the Fall and Resurrection of
Christ. Still, the Fall remains an unsatisfactory explanation for human sinfulness today in light
of God’s providential guidance over all their actions. How could God allow this, or even cause
this? Calvin and Helm rely on “the secret providence of God” to address this problem. God’s
complete control raises a further question, though. Even when acting righteously, are a
person’s actions really free? Does a no-risk view of providence rule out the possibility of
human freedom? Helm believes human freedom is compatible with divine determinism when
each are properly understood, and he attributes this position to Calvin as well.
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If God is good, then God’s will should bring about goodness in the world. Yet, the
Calvinist model of providence insists that all acts are ordained by God, not just good acts.
There is nothing that providence fails to reach. Happenings in the world which do not seem to
follow God’s commands are part of the secret providence of God. Ultimately, we do not know
God’s plan. All we know is that it is good and is for the good of the Church. We also know
God’s revealed will, which includes the commands of God found in Scripture. These commands
do not tell us all the details of God’s plan, though. Like the Fall, sometimes God’s will includes
things which break God’s stated commands, but actually contribute to a greater good.50 In
these cases, a person breaks God’s revealed commands and therefore sins, but God’s will is
still upheld.51 This view is necessary to ensure that sinful acts do not bring about any risk that
God’s plan will be thwarted. The doctrine of two wills (revealed and secret) is not an invention
of Calvin’s, although it caused much confusion for Calvin’s readers.52 While God wills what God
commands in a general sense, God also wills certain evil acts in a particular sense. If God did
not, they would not occur. Note that God does not just permit evil, but willingly permits evil.53
However, when God willingly permits evil, God’s intentions are still good. Helm explains, “God
decrees evil by a wise and all good intention that is hierarchically higher than the evil intention
of the creature’s,” and so, “what God decrees is an evil intention that is not his own intention,
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for his intention in decreeing evil is not itself evil.”54 God’s providence is always fulfilled in the
name of goodness and justice, but the particular course it takes is often surprising, or even
disquieting, to us.55
Providence guarantees that evil has meaning, but God’s willing permission does not
free human beings of responsibility. This is possible through compatibilism. Compatibilism is
the position that human freedom is compatible with “some form of determinism.”56 In
compatibilism, freedom is defined as the ability to do what one wishes, not the ability to
choose between two options.57 So long as one has knowledge of possible consequences,
considers the action one’s own, and has the hypothetical ability to do otherwise had the
conditions been different, the person can be held responsible.58 A lack of awareness (perhaps
due to being asleep), being forced against one’s will, or being asked to do something which is
impossible are all conditions which remove responsibility.59 Note that actually being able to
choose another course of action is not a requirement for responsibility in compatibilism. This

54

Helm, editor’s introduction to Secret Providence of God, in Calvin, Secret Providence of God, ed. Paul
Helm, 27-28.
55

Peter Byrne harshly critiques Helm’s attempts to remove God’s responsibility for the presence of evil.
See Peter Byrne, “Helm’s God and the Authorship of Sin” in Stone, Reason, Faith and History, 193-203. However,
reviewer Andrew Moore finds that Byrne’s commitment to philosophy (rather than theology/revelation) has led
him to completely miss the point. Without the O Felix Culpa, without grace, without the particularity of Christ,
trying to make sense of providence is a futile effort. See Andrew Moore, review of Reason, Faith and History:
Philosophical Essays for Paul Helm, ed. M. W. F. Stone, Journal of Theological Studies 61 pt. 1 (April 2010): 473474, accessed May 19, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jts/flp177.
56

Helm, Providence of God, 161.

57

Helm, Calvin at the Centre, 228; and Helm, Providence of God, 67.

58

Helm, Providence of God, 186, 187, 188-189.

59

Ibid.

24

conception of human freedom does not sit easily with most people today. It sounds as if God is
manipulating people, but still holding people responsible for their actions. While Helm does
not want to portray God as manipulative or coercive, he does not believe that influence
removes responsibility so long as one consents to the action. Some, such as John Sanders and
J. R. Lucas, have argued that a personal relationship with God is not possible if God acts in such
sufficiently influential ways.60 Helm counters by arguing that all of our relationships entail
varying degrees of manipulation.61 While sometimes manipulation is harmful, often it is not.
He lists words such as “rescue,” “rehabilitate,” “cure,” and “free” as ways of manipulating
another positively.62
The Stoics held a very a similar view of human agency. As stated, the gods were
personified scientific principles, and fate was the working out of those principles.63 The Stoics
still had a concept of human responsibility, though. All actions are partly influenced by external
causes. However, one can still be held responsible if the action was at least partly caused by an
inherent desire. One does not have the ability to choose between various outcomes, but
neither is one coerced because the cause came from within.64 Here Christian providence and
its ancestor, Stoic fate, find common ground.
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There is an imbalance between good and evil which allows all good human acts to be
attributed to God while the human remains responsible for evil. Helm explains:
According to Scripture, there is an important asymmetry between acts of moral evil and
acts of goodness. In the case of evil, whatever the difficulties may be of accounting for
the fact, God ordains evil but he does not intend evil as evil, as the human agent
intends it. In God’s case there is some other description of the morally evil action which
he intends the evil action to fill. There are other ends or purposes which God has in
view. In the case of goodness, God not only ordains the goodness, he is the author of it,
not only in the sense that he ordains it, but in the sense that he is the cause of it.65
This asymmetry has important ramifications for human beings. Since all good acts are the work
of God, humans are not praiseworthy for their good acts. A person’s actions may be
praiseworthy, but the credit goes to God for providing the grace necessary for the action.66
However, since humans are responsible for breaking God’s commands, although ordained by
God, humans are blameworthy for their evil acts. This is because Calvin and Helm have an
overall negative, if hopeful, view of human nature.67 Helm explains that when it comes to
accepting God’s grace, human beings are neither inclined toward acceptance nor neutral in
their approach. Rather, “the position is more serious than that, not a position of neutrality, but
of indifference or hostility, not of being able to say either Yea or Nay but of invariably saying
Nay until inclined by grace to say Yea.”68 Calvin attempts to explain this seeming unfairness
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through the story of Job. He asks how it can be that Satan and those who robbed Job are guilty
while God is not, and he answers that we distinguish acts by their intention and end. Those
who committed the evil acts are condemned based on the end toward which the act was
committed. God, however, only has good ends and stands as judge, bringing goodness out of
sin.69
4. What Providence Can Do
Helm highlights a number of benefits for believers in the model of providence which he
proposes. He explains that providence brings about “humility, adoration, soberness, trust in
God, gratitude for favorable outcomes, patience in adversity, incredible freedom from worry
about the future, submission to God, confidence in him, relief, freedom from anxiety,
fearlessness, comfort and assurance.”70 These are the reasons that Calvinists see providence as
a central doctrine and one that brings meaning and hope to life. According to Helm, to believe
in God’s providence is to understand life in new ways.
First, a belief in providence frees one from anxiety. A risk model of providence can lead
to distress over whether a good end will come. Even in the chess-player analogy one never
knows whether an event is working towards God’s checkmate or prolonging the game. In a norisk model of providence, one can be sure that every single thing that happens was ordained
by God.71 Not only that, but every single thing that happens is for our good. “We know that all
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things work together for good for those who love God, who are called according to his
purpose.”72 It may not be until one’s life is over that one can see how everything worked for
good, but one can still take comfort in knowing that it is good because Scripture tells us so.73
This means that, in a sense, even one’s sins ultimately work for the good. They do not as sins,
but the results of those sins do still work providentially.74 The same can be said for evil more
generally. Helm writes, “Christians can rest assured that the evil is part of the ‘all things’ which
work together for their good, to further their conformity to the image of Christ.”75 Our
experience does not always show this to be true, but Helm insists that a Christian’s belief in
providence should come from a reliance on Scripture, not empirical data.76
Second, a belief in providence motivates one to action. This counter-intuitive view is
shared by both Calvin and Helm. While it may seem that a foreordained future would lead one
to complacency, Helm reminds his readers that not only the end is foreordained, but also the
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means.77 The end can only come about along with the means. Since we do not know what the
future holds, we cannot rebel against the future that God has foreordained. 78 Christians are
simply called to live out the commands of God, God’s revealed will, to the best of their
ability.79 This means that Christians should live as if providence does not extend to the future
but rather only provides meaning for the past.80 Calvin writes, “Wherefore, with reference to
the time future, since the events of things are, as yet, hidden and unknown, everyone ought to
be as intent upon the performance of his duty as if nothing whatever had been decreed
concerning the issue in each particular case.”81 When we remember that the providence of
God is secret, idleness is not an appropriate response to belief in providence.
Third, a belief in providence increases one’s hope for the future. Although the
providence of God is secret, the Christian does have knowledge that the end will be good.82
This knowledge increases the Christian’s hope for the coming kingdom revealed in Scripture.83
Calvin was concerned that people were too dazzled by earthly matters. He worried they might
cling to their earthly life but saw hope in the greater good of providence as an antidote to their
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obsession with earthly affairs.84 Helm notes that a contrary perspective on life is also possible:
people may look to heaven as a way to cope with the sufferings of earthly life.85 Either way, a
belief in providence can help put life in perspective.
5. What Providence Cannot Do
Despite the benefits of following Helm’s model of providence, providence cannot do all
things. There are limitations to what providence can provide to the believer as well as
misapplications of the doctrine. The main limitation, which is frequently overlooked by
believers and is therefore also a misapplication, is that providence does not provide an
overarching plan for one’s life. A second limitation/misapplication is that one cannot change
the course of God’s plan through prayer.
The seemingly most common use of the doctrine of providence by Christians is actually
a misapplication of Helm’s Calvinist model. Providence is frequently cited when something
unexpected or fortuitous occurs. These moments are sometimes referred to as
“Godincidences.”86 Helm calls these cases of “immediate providence”87 and strongly cautions
against this kind of thinking. An example that Helm provides shows why. A salesman misses his
train. As a result, he begins talking with an old friend who ends up placing a large order. The
salesman might describe missing the train as providential because it enabled the sale. Later on,
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the salesman takes his increased sales as a sign that he should expand his business.
Unfortunately, he expands too quickly and goes bankrupt. At this point, the salesman may no
longer view the missed train as providential (although he still might).88 On the one hand, some
events that initially seemed fortuitous are later viewed negatively. Likewise, many moments
that we come to see as blessings only appear that way long after the fact. Helm calls this
“retrospective providence.”89 On the other hand, and more importantly, we should not expect
to be able to recognize God’s providential work in our lives. There is no guarantee that
providence will be born out in prosperity, happiness, health, or freedom from tragedy.90 If
God’s providence extends to all things, then even those moments which seem completely
benign or even the opposite of providential are working for our good and are in that sense
blessings. Therefore, we may not see any pattern to God’s work in our lives.91 Negatively, this
means that if we do see pattern in our life, we can only hold onto it in a tentative way, but
positively, not seeing a pattern is no reason to lose faith.92 Helm suggests the story of Job as a
source of comfort – when our lives do not make any sense, God’s providence is still at work.93
To call something like missing a train “providential” should not mean that it was lucky
or brought about temporary good fortune. Missing a train can only be providential in the sense
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that it contributes to a much larger framework which encompasses not only the resulting sale
and bankruptcy (in the example above), but also one’s eternal end and the glory of God.94 The
vast majority of the time we are not in a position to see how missing a train contributes to
eternal values. In theory, since things of eternal value are already known and ordained by God,
the future can be known. But, for human beings, that kind of knowledge would require special
intervention by the Holy Spirit, which Helm says we have no reason to expect.95
The second limitation or misapplication of providence has to do with petitionary or
intercessory prayer. If prayer is understood as a dialogue, it requires that both parties be
indeterministically free.96 To engage in prayer is to presume that one or both parties might
change one’s mind or actions as a result of the prayer.97 At its most extreme, God becomes a
“sugar-daddy” who gives us blessings because we asked for them.98 However, a no-risk view of
providence does not allow God to respond in that way. All future actions are already
foreordained. Still Helm insists that the efficacy of prayer is clearly supported by Scripture, and
so must play a part in a Scripture-based model of providence.99 Helm’s solution is to move
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away from an understanding of prayer as a spiritual (magical?) force and instead view prayer
as any other part of God’s revealed will with which a person might engage.100 If a person prays,
then that prayer has been ordained by God just like any action. Oftentimes, our prayers fulfill a
previously established warrant.101 For example, God might establish a warrant which says, “If
Sarah prays for rain during a drought in the summer of 2015, it will begin to rain.” Then, God
may also foreordain both the praying and the raining. The prayer, in this case, does not
physically cause the rain but is a necessary foreordained condition. The potential upside to
Helm’s view is that it does not suggest that the drought was ever Sarah’s fault. If rather than
sending rain God continues withhold rain, this is not due to a lack of fervent prayer on Sarah’s
part because prayer does not function as a direct cause.102 In a no-risk model of providence,
prayer is just one of the ways that God brings about what God has already decided.103 If God
has already decided not to send rain, praying harder will not help.
Most of the time, petitionary prayer asks God for something about which the reception
is uncertain. I pray for healing because I do not know when or if healing will come. However, in
some cases a Christian might pray for something which is certain, such as praying for the
kingdom of God. In this case, the warrant model that Helm favors makes less sense. The
coming of the kingdom of God is not conditional, it is inevitable. Helm gets around this by

100

Helm, Providence of God, 153; and Helm, “Asking God,” 23.

101

Helm, Providence of God, 156; and Helm, “Prayer and Providence,” 111.

102

Helm, “Prayer and Providence,” 110.

103

Helm, Providence of God, 159.

33

suggesting that this type of prayer is not really petitionary at all. Rather, it is an expression of
desire for what is to come or an affirmation that one submits to God’s will.104
6. Doctrine of God
All of the basic elements of Helm’s Calvinist model of divine providence have been
presented above. Of course, a doctrine of providence never exists in isolation from other
Christian doctrines. Most important for this project is the way the doctrine of providence is
related to the doctrine of God. In order for Helm’s no-risk providence model to function, God
must have certain attributes. Helm’s conception of God is that of classical theism. Therefore,
God is omnibenevolent, eternal, omniscient, immutable, and omnipotent. God’s
omnibenevolence must be questioned in any doctrine of providence because of the presence
of evil. However, in Helm’s model, God’s intentions are always good. Helm insists time and
time again that God is good and that God’s goodness is the motivation for what God wills. 105
Therefore, God’s providence is for the good. Furthermore, since all that happens is ordained by
God, God’s goodness is also effective. Helm points to a number of Scripture passages in
support of this claim (Rom. 1:6, 9:11; 1 Cor. 1:9; 2 Cor. 4:6; Eph. 2:5, 2:8, 4:4; 1 Thess. 1:4; 2
Tim. 2:25; 1 Pet. 1:23), although counterexamples can also be found.106 The remaining four
attributes will be discussed in turn.
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For Helm, God is an eternal timeless being, in the tradition of Augustine, Aquinas, and
Calvin.107 In Eternal God: A Study of God without Time, Helm hopes to distinguish his position
from process theologians, theologians like Jürgen Moltmann, analytic philosophers of religion,
and other Christians who have argued that God is in time or at least operates in time, some of
the time.108 To be eternal means that God only “acts” in a timeless way. Although God’s
eternal purpose is enacted through time, the whole of creation is sustained through a single
timeless decree.109 God’s eternity is important for providence because “only a timeless God
can be both strongly immutable and omniscient.”110 We will see below that omniscience and
immutability are both necessary for Helm’s model of providence.
God’s omniscience is complete in Helm’s model and prevents risk from playing a role in
providence. Weaker versions of omniscience suggest that God knows all there is to know
(which might not include the future), that God can see all future possibilities (the chess player
analogy), or that God can see the future. In Helm’s model, omniscience is stronger than all
these options. God not only foreknows the future, but actually foreordains the future.111 This
means that God does not merely know what is going to happen but also effectively wills it to
happen. Divine foreordination is what distinguishes Christian providence from fate, an
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important point for Calvin and Helm.112 If Jane is currently watering plants, it does not follow
that her fate was to water plants. Jane is not forced to water plants because God could see
into a predetermined future and that is what Jane was doing. Rather, God knows Jane is
watering plants because “Jane is watering plants” is only true if God foreordains it. The
difference is not so much in the person, as it is in God. Jane does not have indeteministic
freedom in a fatalistic model or Helm’s providential model.113 However, in the fatalistic model,
God is also bound to fate; whereas in the providential model, God is free. While Helm admits
that here the Scriptural evidence is less clear,114 following his own rule, the characteristic
which transcends human qualities should be given precedence. In addition, Helm claims that
omniscience is a prerequisite for providence. He writes, “For even if it is possible to argue that
what is future to us is indeterminate, it is not possible to couple this with a belief in the divine
control of the future. So that in so far as theism requires belief in divine providence, the
indeterminacy of the future, a future indeterminate to both God and his human creatures, is
inconsistent with it.”115
God’s immutability logically follows if God is eternal and omniscient. If all that happens
is foreordained by God from eternity, then God’s mind will never change. If God’s mind did
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change, it would imply that something occurred that led God to take into account something
new. 116 This is impossible if God is eternal. A timeless God does not learn, and what God has
foreordained will not change.
God’s divine foreordination, rather than divine foreknowledge, implies that God also
has power. There is no place for dualism or uncertainty about whether God or Satan will win in
Helm’s model of providence.117 Since God’s decrees are always effective, God can rightly be
called omnipotent and free. To say that God is free does not mean that God interacts
unpredictably with the universe. Instead, it means that God is not subject to any external force
apart from God’s own goodness. God’s freedom does not come from being able to choose
between various possibilities, as it does not make one freer to be able to choose what is
wretched. Rather, God is free because God cannot be coerced or hindered.118 Furthermore,
God is self-sufficient; God does not need creation in order to be God.119
What, then, can be said about the Scripture passages which describe God as weak?
Helm says that there is a “divine weakness in providence” which is why human experience
does not plainly show God’s providence.120 However, God is not weak in the sense that God
can suffer or be corrupted.”121 The weakness of divine providence is found on the cross (See 1
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Cor. 1:18-31).122 There is a power of God that is manifest in weakness; it is a strength found in
the refusal of power. This does not mean that all instances of weakness reveal God. Helm
writes, “It is mistaken to claim, therefore, that the power of God is seen manifested through
what Gutiérrez refers to as ‘the power of the poor in history’.”123 Political weakness (or
political power) does not express God’s power because God’s power is precisely not political –
that is why it looks foolish to us.124 Yet, “the ‘weakness’ of God is power” and “it has the power
of God as its presupposition.”125 Consequently, when Helm speaks of divine weakness, it in no
way challenges God’s omnipotence.126
Elements of a Doctrine of Providence Drawn from Helm
A number of elements form the framework of Helm’s Calvinist model of providence. In
chapter four, these elements will be compared to those drawn from a Thomistic model and a
process model. Elements shared by all three of these of models of providence will be deemed
essential to any doctrine of providence, unless a convincing argument can be supplied for why
the element is not necessary to maintain a doctrine of providence within a particular

122

Ibid., 225.

123

Ibid., 227-228. Helm goes on to say, “To suppose that such poor, simply in virtue of their poverty, are
not corrupted by self-interest is sheer sentimentality.” Helm, Providence of God, 228. This is a mischaracterization
of Gutiérrez and the preferential option for the poor. As Elizabeth Johnson puts it, “The sole reason for this
partiality is divine love, which freely sides with the poor not because they are more saintly or less sinful than
others, but because of their situation. The purpose of this divine partiality is to heal, redeem, and liberate the
situation so that the dehumanizing suffering will cease. Precisely in this partiality is the goodness of divine love
revealed to be truly universal, because it includes the nonpersons whom the powerful and wealthy thought did
not count.” Elizabeth A. Johnson, Quest for the Living God: Mapping Frontiers in the Theology of God (New York:
Continuum, 2007), 74.
124

Helm, Providence of God, 227.

125

Ibid., 228.

126

Ibid., 224.

38

theological framework. While we will find that not all elements drawn from Helm’s model are
shared by Thomistic and process models of providence, at this point we will list all possible
elements drawn from Helm’s model alone (summarized in table 1 and explained below).
Table 1. Elements of a Calvinist Model of Providence
Category

Elements of Doctrine

Source of the doctrine

1. Providence is biblically-based and requires revelation

God and the meaning
of providence

2. God can be described with classical attributes: omnibenevolent, eternal,
omniscient, immutable, and omnipotent
3. Providence is motivated by God’s goodness
4. Everything is for the good and there can be no ultimate tragedy
5. God not only foreknows, but also foreordains
6. There is no risk or chance
7. God’s providential plan will not change

Range of providence

8. Providence includes all things (down to atomic level)
9. Providence includes the Fall
10. Providence includes predestination
11. Providence includes the means as well as the end
12. Christ is the supreme example

Effect of providence on
human beings

13. Humans are responsible for sin
14. Providence provides freedom from anxiety
15. Providence provides hope for the future
16. Providence leads to action

Elements not required
by model

1. Not all acts must be equally providential
2. Humans do not need indeterministic human freedom
3. Providence does not need to be observable

There are sixteen elements which make up this model of providence. The first is that
providence must be biblically-based. One cannot gain an understanding of providence without
the aid of revelation. The remaining fifteen can be broken down into three categories:
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elements related to God and the meaning of providence, elements related to the range of
providence, and elements related to the effect of providence on human beings.
The meaning of providence in Helm’s model is closely tied to who God is. In this model
God takes on the classical attributes. God is omnibenevolent, eternal, omniscient, immutable,
and omnipotent. Helm finds these attributes to be both supported by Scripture and necessary
for providence. Since God is omnibenevolent, providence is motivated by God’s goodness.
Consequently, everything that happens as a result of God’s providence is for the good which
rules out the possibility of ultimate tragedy. Since God is eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent,
God not only foreknows what is going to happen (meaning God can see the future), but also
foreordains what is going to happen (meaning God effectively wills what is going to happen).
There is no risk in this model of divine providence since all has been ordained from eternity.
Finally, since God is immutable, God’s providential plan will not change.
The range of providence in this model is fully extended. Providence guides all things
and all parts of things down to their atomic make-up. Providence also includes all events, even
those which appear to thwart God’s plan (although God’s plan can never really be thwarted in
a no-risk model of providence) such as the Fall. In fact, for Helm the Fall is a central
providential moment because of its role in allowing for human redemption. Providence also
includes predestination. However, not only the end but also the means are provided by
providence. Therefore, one is not predestined in isolation from the actions of one’s life. First
and foremost, though, providence includes Christ. Christ is the supreme example of divine
providence.
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Providence has several effects on human beings. First, it holds human beings
responsible for sin. When God’s commands are broken, even though the action is ordained by
God, the human being is still responsible for the evil act. While God’s intentions are always
good, the intentions of human beings are not. Nevertheless, providence has several positive
effects for human beings. If one knows that everything is ordained by God and working for the
good, one is freed from anxiety in this life. Furthermore, by orienting one toward one’s final
end, providence provides hope for the future and the right perspective on the value of earthly
life. Lastly, providence should lead to action rather than idleness because both the means and
ends are ordained by God.
Notably, Helm leaves out some possible elements from his model of providence. These
are perhaps as instructive as the elements he includes. According to Helm’s model, all actions
or events do not need to be equally providential. Some events play a greater role in God’s
overall providential plan than other events. Helm also argues that human beings do not need
indeterministic freedom. It is enough if humans are simply free in the sense that they are able
to act as they wish. Although all of one’s acts are foreordained by God, they are foreordained
in accordance with one’s will. Therefore, actual alternatives are not necessary for one to do
what one wills to do. Finally, providence does not need to be observable. Since the source of
the doctrine of providence is Scripture rather than experience, one does not need to see a
pattern in one’s life to have faith in providence. In fact, in this model one should not expect to
see observable evidence of God’s providence.
Some theologians are uncomfortable with the use of compatibilism in Calvinist
theology. These theologians find other ways of articulating God’s providence in relation to
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human freedom. From the Catholic, Thomistic tradition, Michael Dodds argues that genuine
choice and chance do not have to compromise God’s providential guidance of the world. We
turn to his articulation of providence next.

CHAPTER TWO
A THOMISTIC MODEL OF PROVIDENCE
The second model of divine providence comes from the Thomistic tradition. Thomistic
theology is grounded in the work of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), although Paul Helm already
made some use of Aquinas in his Calvinist approach. Unsurprisingly, then, this chapter will have
many themes in common with the previous chapter. Nevertheless, the particular concerns of
Aquinas and our primary interpreter of Thomistic theology in this chapter, Michael Dodds, open
up important new directions in providence especially concerning chance and human freedom.
The Thomistic model of divine providence presented here does not represent the entire
field of Thomism/Neo-Thomism, much less the even wider variety of perspectives which have
come out of Catholicism as a whole. Nevertheless, the particular version of Thomism presented
here through Dodds’ work provides a helpful middle position between Helm’s Calvinist model
and the process model which will be presented in chapter three. While the sources and types of
interpretation do not allow for a perfect one-to-one comparison between this model and the
previous one, as much as possible the presentation of the central themes follows the same
order as in the previous chapter. A new collection of elements of the doctrine of providence will
be built out of the Thomistic model of providence at the end of this chapter.
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Introducing Michael J. Dodds, O.P.
Michael J. Dodds, O.P. is a Dominican priest and theologian, ordained in 1977, who
teaches theology at the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology in Berkeley, CA. His
focus has been primarily on theories of divine action and the relationship between theology
and contemporary science. His work in relating science to theology informs his work on
providence, and consequently this model utilizes a unique frame of reference to address the
question of providence. Even where Dodds agrees with Helm, his approach to the question of
providence is different. Furthermore, Dodds stands apart even amongst Thomistic scholars for
his use of the whole corpus of Aquinas’ writings rather than just the Summa Theologiae and
Summa Contra Gentiles.1
Dodds has two book-length works that relate to the question of providence. The first,
The Unchanging God of Love: Thomas Aquinas & Contemporary Theology on Divine
Immutability (2008 – 2nd edition) is primarily a work on the doctrine of God but includes a
section on the implications of divine immutability for providence. The second, Unlocking Divine
Action: Contemporary Science & Thomas Aquinas (2012), likewise includes a chapter on the
implications of a return to an Aristotelian/Thomistic approach to divine causality for
providence. Both these works, as well as his other writings in the form of booklets and articles,
are grounded in Dodds’ reflections on the relationship between theology and science. His work
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is based on three assumptions about the world and theology. First, he says we must assert that
knowledge of the world is possible. If we do not, science is impossible.2 Second, the fields of
science and theology can dialogue with one another.3 In general, Dodds agrees with those who
argue that science answers “how” and theology answers “why.”4 However, he does not go so
far as to say that by asking different questions they fail to dialogue. Rather, Dodds suggests
that the categories of “how” and “why” are not hard and fast. “How” is intrinsically related to
“why,” and theology sometimes goes beyond “why” questions when it makes factual claims
(for example, about the historical reality of Jesus).5 Third, Dodds claims that “there can be no
fundamental contradiction between truth as discovered by reason and as revealed by God.”6
This last assumption informs the interpretation of Scripture. While Scripture can and does
reveal information that goes beyond the realm of science and reason, any interpretation of
Scripture which directly contradicts science must be a misinterpretation.7 With these three
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assumptions in mind, Dodds seeks a renewed portrayal of Aquinas which speaks directly to the
scientifically oriented minds of the 21st century.
Dodds’ Model of Providence
In Dodds’ model of providence, general providence is discussed through a retrieval of
Aristotle’s four causes: efficient, material, formal, and final. Dodds’ theory of general
providence explains how God can be the primary cause without infringing on causality as
described by contemporary science. God’s particular plan for human beings, special
providence, will then be discussed. The reflections on divine causality in relation to human
causality raise important questions about the presence of evil in the world and the nature of
human freedom, which will be discussed next. As in the previous chapter, this section will end
with a clarification of what providence can and cannot do in this model as well as how
providence relates to the doctrine of God.
1. General Providence
Dodds approaches the question of providence through a love of Aquinas and the
insights of contemporary science. Influenced by Aquinas, Dodds interprets the question of how
God guides creation as a question of causality. While today many people tend to think of
causality only in the form of direct efficient causes which are observable and predictable,
Aquinas did not understand causality so narrowly and offered an expanded notion of causality
based on Aristotle. Dodds finds that a review of Aristotle’s four causes is a helpful way to open
one’s mind to the variety of causalities encountered in the world, which are not only of
philosophical interest but are also increasingly accepted by the scientific world. First, efficient
cause is expanded beyond the immediate agent to also include those who guided the agent.
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For example, a sculptor is the cause of the sculpture, but so is the sculptor’s teacher.8 Second,
the efficient cause works in view of the final cause, or the intended end. Although the final
cause is a cause, it is in no way a force.9 Third, the material cause holds the potential for all
that a thing is capable of being or becoming.10 Finally, the formal cause determines what a
thing is.11 For Aquinas, the formal cause of all things resides in God.12 One of Dodds’ main goals
in his writings is to recapture an expanded notion of causality for the present day.
While Helm only mentions quantum physics in passing, Dodds offers a sustained
engagement with the possibilities opened up by quantum physics, chaos theory, the Big Bang,
evolution, genetics, and emergence.13 Contemporary science has allowed for a re-expansion of
our conception of causality. What is genetics but a formal cause?14 Is not the Big Bang the
material cause that provides the potential for all that is? By looking to expanded forms of
causality, one can better imagine how God can be the cause of all things without infringing
upon creaturely efficient causes. However, there are two main ways these new scientific
insights, in conjunction with Aquinas’ use of Aristotle’s theory of causality, can be used
theologically, and Dodds is very clear about which he prefers. Many theologians have tried to
8
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insert God into new scientific frameworks in such a way that natural causes are still able to
function as science predicts. As an example, some have turned to the uncertainty principle of
quantum physics as the place where God may be the final arbiter.15 Dodds points out that it is
unclear whether intervention at the sub-atomic level would really allow God to guide the
world in a meaningful way.16 Furthermore, if no natural cause is needed, perhaps making God
the efficient cause is problematic.17
According to Dodds, this kind of approach does not fully take into account that, as the
source of all creation, God is not a cause alongside other causes. Consequently, instead of
inserting God into the scientific framework, Dodds uses the scientific expansion of causality
analogically to think through how God might work in the world. In other words, God does not
work through the causal gaps of quantum physics, but understanding the indeterminacy of
quantum physics can help us to understand how God does work. Dodds writes, “The primary
mode of divine causation is creative and constitutive, not controlling and compelling. God is
not rival or auxiliary to created causes, but rather the One who makes all causes be causes.”18
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Since God is a transcendent cause rather than a natural cause, God can only be spoken
of analogically.19 However, analogically, divine causality can be thought of as simultaneously
final, formal, and efficient. Although final causality does not involve any force, God is present
as the final cause because everything acts in accordance with its nature.20 In other words,
everything moves toward its natural end which is to participate in God’s goodness. With
Aquinas, Dodds places the formal cause in the mind of God. The formal cause prevents
reductionism, ensuring the whole is more than the sum of its parts.21 God working as an
efficient cause poses the most potential difficulties. Here Dodds takes the separation of
theology and science seriously. Science, he says, cannot make any claims about God acting as a
transcendent efficient cause.22
There are two models that together describe the way God acts in the world as a
transcendent efficient cause. First, God can be thought of as the primary cause who works
through secondary causes. In this model creatures have their own causality and act in
accordance with their own potential. Still, the primary cause enables the secondary as the
source of the creature’s being and causality.23 When an action has a primary and secondary
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cause, the act belongs fully to both agents.24 Second, God can be thought of as the principal
cause who acts through instrumental causes. In this model, the act of the instrumental cause
goes beyond the natural potential of the instrument.25 Dodds gives the example of a piece of
chalk which can naturally make a mark. Used as an instrument, though, a piece chalk can write
words, which is beyond the natural capacity of chalk. The cause of the words lies wholly in the
chalk and wholly in the author.26 Since God’s causality is always mediated through secondary
and instrumental causes, the shape of God’s providential plan remains hidden from us. We are
unable to directly see God working in the world or determine the final ends of God’s
creations.27
In sum, God guides the world providentially as primary and principal cause in addition
to providing a final and formal cause. God is present in these ways in every single action that
takes place. On this point, Dodds agrees with Helm. Providence runs all the way down to the
atomic level. However, Dodds and Helm are about to part ways sharply. For Helm, the logical
consequence of risk-free providence was determinism. Dodds is unwilling to go that route and
maintains a space for chance and freedom. While the topic of freedom will be dealt with more
fully below, a brief word is important here to get the basic direction of Dodds’ model of
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providence. Again turning to Aquinas, Dodds explains that the use of secondary causes by God
includes chance and freedom because God determines not only what will happen but also how
it will happen.28 In one of Aquinas’ commentaries on Aristotle, Aquinas argues that because
God’s will is different from our human wills, God can will an event without removing its
contingency:
There is likewise a difference to be noted on the part of the divine will, for the divine
will must be understood as existing outside of the order of beings, as a cause producing
the whole of being and all its differences. Now the possible and the necessary are
differences of being, and therefore necessity and contingency in things and the
distinction of each according to the nature of their proximate causes originate from the
divine will itself, for He disposes necessary causes for the effects that He wills to be
necessary, and He ordains causes acting contingently (i.e., able to fail) for the effects
that He wills to be contingent. And according to the condition of these causes, effects
are called either necessary or contingent, although all depend on the divine will as on a
first cause, which transcends the order of necessity and contingency.29
Simply put, God not only wills each event but also whether it will happen by necessity, by free
choice, or by chance. This proposal is foundational for Dodds’ model of providence.30 It
maintains both free will and chance despite also ensuring that everything happens according
to God’s will. In a sense, then, there is no chance from the perspective of God, but chance is
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real in the world.31 Similarly, nothing happens by necessity from the perspective of God,
although God’s will is unfailing. Dodds says these are category mistakes rather than
inconsistencies; necessity and contingency apply only to the realm of beings.32 Dodds is
insistent that chance is not an illusion or due to ignorance.33 Likewise, one can speak in a real
sense of being “lucky” when human choices result in an unforeseen but happy consequence.34
Neither chance nor luck is properly a cause.35 However, God can still work through the noncausality of chance as a secondary cause without any harm to providence.36 In a similar
fashion, God can use human freedom as a secondary cause without risking the providential
plan.37
2. Special Providence
While God can use all of creation as a secondary cause, human beings hold a special
place in the doctrine of providence for both Aquinas and Dodds. Dodds writes, “If God’s love
reaches out to all, it reaches out most especially to his human creation for whom God wills
nothing less than his own goodness.”38 Providence extends to all of creation in so far as all of
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creation is sustained by God. However, all of creation is sustained with the eternal end of
human beings in mind.39 While providence is granted to humans for their own sake, the rest of
creation is guided for the sake of humanity.40 The part of providence which pertains to eternal
life, known as predestination, only applies to human beings.41 This special relationship and
special goal of providence is made possible through our union to God as the body of Christ.
The union of human beings and God in the body of Christ begins with the Incarnation.
The Incarnation is the central event of God’s providential action and “the highest expression of
God’s will to share his goodness with creatures.”42 When God becomes a human being, all the
attributes of God remain intact in the divine nature of Christ. God does not really “become” in
the sense of changing. Since God is immutable, the divine nature of Christ is immutable, and
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the Incarnation does not change God.43 However, by uniting with a human nature, humanity is
changed.44 There is no experience of humanity closer to God than that of Jesus,45 but all of
humanity can find similar union with God. Dodds points to the story in Matthew 25: 31-46 to
explain this change.46 When Jesus identifies himself as the hungry, the thirsty, etc., it is not
God who has changed and become a person in need. Rather, the complete unity of God with
the suffering means that the situation of the suffering is new. Humanity has been elevated.
Since Christ’s love unites humanity as the body of Christ, our own human experiences are also
Christ’s.47 This unity makes Dodds’ model of providence inherently anthropocentric.48
Humanity holds a special purpose and end in which the rest of creation is merely instrumental.
3. The Problem of Evil and the Question of Freedom
Since Dodds hopes to maintain both freedom and chance while insisting that God has a
risk-free providential plan, the problem of evil and the functioning of human freedom are
important topics to address. On the problem of evil, Dodds’ model of providence looks similar
to Helm’s. However, on the question of human freedom, Dodds explicitly rejects Helm’s turn to
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compatibilism. Dodds’ understanding of freedom includes real choice, although the decisions
we make are only properly free when they are oriented to God’s goodness.49
Dodds’ ultimate answer to the problem of evil is that it must remain a mystery which
we encounter in the cross.50 Still, he offers a few suggestions on directions and dead ends as
he sees them. With Helm, he affirms that in some way evil must contribute to a greater good, 51
although he is less specific about what that greater good might be. Dodds rejects any
interpretation of evil that suggests a limit to God’s power, either by God choosing selflimitation or by necessity.52 Any limitation on God would put providence at risk. As a possible
direction for understanding evil, Dodds turns to the preservation of creaturely causality,
including human freedom. Natural evil can be seen as a byproduct of creaturely causality.
While it is not intended by God, God allows it for the greater good of real causality in the
world.53 Moral evil, or sin, is a more complicated matter. Dodds, along with Aquinas and
Augustine, understands evil to be a privation of the good. It is a lack which has no actual being
of its own. Consequently, God, as pure act, has no part in its production.54 When a person sins,
the act, as an action, can be attributed to God and is under God’s providential control.
However, the act, as a sin, cannot be attributed to God because it does not have its source in
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being but rather in the person alone.55 Dodds is not willing to go as far as Helm in saying that
God “willingly permits” evil. Rather, God permits evil, but neither wills it nor prevents it.56
Although Dodds has already insisted that permitting evil in this way will not disrupt God’s
providential plan, we must still ask why God would permit evil if it is not intended. Dodds
answers that God’s intention for human freedom takes precedence.57 God refuses to impinge
on creaturely causality even though human freedom acted upon in accordance with human
nature inevitably leads to moral evil.
Helm’s model of providence offered only a severely modified version of human
freedom. A person is free only in the sense that one can do what one wants, not in the sense
that one can choose. There is no indeterministic freedom in Helm’s model. This view is in part
driven by the concern that if people acted freely, God would learn what they did and therefore
change. Dodds, citing Helm, rejects this position.58 According to Dodds, since God is
transcendent and eternal, God’s knowledge is not like ours. While our knowledge comes only
after the fact of the object of our knowledge, God’s knowledge comes prior and creates the
object of knowledge.59 Dodds explains, “Because he is eternal, he sees past, present, and
future in a single intuition. Regardless of how things may change in time, therefore, his
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knowledge of them does not change.”60 Dodds believes that we are faced with real choices,
but just as we know what we chose after the fact, God knows what we chose for eternity
because God exists outside of time.61 In other words, God knows the future in the same way
we know the past. So, human freedom does not imply that God gains new knowledge.
Furthermore, the contingency of events remains intact. A free choice remains a free choice
even after a decision has been made and can no longer be changed.62 The free choices of
human beings as instances of indeterministic freedom (at least from the perspective of
creation and human beings) are secondary causes which follow God’s providence as readily as
any other type of act. Dodds’ model of providence rejects the idea that the providential plan
can change as a result of human choice.63
For Dodds, losing indeterministic human freedom creates too many new problems. He
notes that our own self-reflection leads us to recognize instances where we could have acted
differently or not acted at all.64 Even acts which are sinful, and therefore not properly speaking
free, are a hint or an indication that we are actually free.65 Furthermore, both day-to-day life
and Scripture are filled with “counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and
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punishments”66 which would lose their meaning without the freedom to act differently.
Without freedom, what would be the purpose of rewards and punishments?67 Nevertheless,
while Dodds insists we make many choices along the way, he ultimately agrees with Helm that
the human will is not free in regards to its final end. Since the will is created by God, it has a
natural inclination to the good.68 This means that with a perfect vision of God, we would
always choose God. However, since we lack the beatific vision, our actions are often lacking in
goodness and we are capable of rejecting God.69 Although our natural and rightful end is in
God, Dodds suggests there are several paths to that end. While God already knows which path
we will choose, the choice remains a real choice on our part. Still, for those who favor a model
of providence like that of William James’ chess player analogy, Dodds’ sense of freedom may
not be strong enough.70
4. What Providence Can Do
Dodds’ model of providence offers an especially helpful take on two issues that have
not been fully explored in the categories above. First, Dodds’ understanding of divine action
offers an explanation for what miracles are and how they can be understood in the 21 st
century world. Second, Dodds explains how providence is a source of hope for the Christian
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and the related implications for how believers in God’s providence should understand the
world.
Miracles raise questions for any theologian who takes science seriously. To believe in
miracles is to believe that science cannot explain everything that happens in the world. This is
a stronger statement than merely not being able to predict what will happen due to chaos
theory or quantum physics. Theologians must also contend with the unevenness of miracle
stories. Why are there so many in the Bible and so few miracles today? Were they just
misunderstanding what was happening? Or, was God more active back then? Dodds attempts
to answer these questions by again turning to God’s causality in the world. Recall that
according to Dodds, God acts through secondary and instrumental causes. A secondary cause
is simply an agent with its own natural causality which acts according to its nature. An
instrumental cause, however, acts beyond its natural capacity. Dodds suggests that a miracle
occurs when God uses nature as an instrumental cause.71 An object or person used as an
instrumental cause does not break the laws of the universe, but does push them beyond what
would normally be possible. A piece of chalk will not naturally ever write words, although it
can make a mark. Likewise, an aggressive cancer will not usually heal itself, although the body
does have a natural capacity for being cancer-free. The dignity of the instrumental cause is
maintained by never acting in direct contradiction to the instrument’s nature. While this does
not satisfy every question one might have about the presence or absence of miracles in the
world today, it does explain the lack of certain divine interventions we may have hoped for.
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God will not remove human freedom, chance, or the ability of creatures to act according to
their natures in order to rearrange the universe.
The doctrine of providence’s most important function in Christianity is as a source of
hope. In Dodds’ model of providence, hope is secured by positing an end for all things,
although we often do not know what the end will look like for ourselves, much less for rocks or
atoms.72 The fact that everything will reach its end is a reason to hope, not despair. For Dodds,
a hopeless world would be one of endless progress, which is really no progress because
progress can only be measured relative to an end.73 He imagines Sisyphus pushing the boulder
up the mountain, time and time again.74 In the world of Sisyphus, God may empathize with
human suffering, but God does not offer a way out. Providence brings about an end and
promises a final victory of good over evil. The end is not an end like death, though, where
everything stops and loses its being. The end is dynamic. Dodds calls it the “dynamic stillness of
abiding love.”75 In this state, nothing can shake, frighten, or disturb us. Dodds ends with the
poem “Nada te turbe” by Teresa of Avila to describe what the “dynamic stillness of abiding
love” might be like.76 Her vision is the end of providence and the source of Christian hope.
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5. What Providence Cannot Do
There is one topic that Dodds repeatedly clarifies throughout his works: how God
responds to humanity. Dodds’ model of providence allows God to act in the world through
secondary causes and even act in miraculous ways through instrumental causes. In addition,
Dodds’ model grants human beings real freedom to choose between options. Given that, one
might assume that God also acts in response to human freedom. One might assume that God
responds to a person’s freely offered prayers or that God could intervene to mitigate human
suffering. Yet, Dodds says that to say God responds is misleading. There is never a change of
plans from God’s perspective. Furthermore, while creation depends on God’s providence for
existence, God does not depend on humanity and remains unchanging even when addressed
through prayer or confronted with suffering.
If God does not respond to prayer, why do Christians pray? Aquinas addressed this
same question in regards to the Epicureans and Stoics who felt prayer was useless if it had no
effect on God.77 Dodds understands prayer in the same way as Helm. Prayer is one of the
secondary causes which God works through. Therefore, from the perspective of God’s
transcendence, all prayer finds its primary cause in God. It is really God who prays in us. 78 From
the perspective of the person praying, prayer may still be freely chosen. Still, the prayer can
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never change God, only the person. Dodds says that prayer reveals our dependence on God
and conforms us to Christ.79 It is a way of cooperating with God’s providential plan.80
More problematic for contemporary theologians, even those who are otherwise
sympathetic to the Thomistic tradition, is the question of whether or not God responds to
human suffering. Edward Vacek writes that if God loves us, God’s actions must be modified by
our actions.81 Elizabeth Johnson suggests that the God of pathos from the Hebrew tradition is
at least sometimes a more adequate model of God than the God of impassibility from the
Greek philosophical tradition.82 However, Dodds answers “no” in order to preserve God’s
immutability. If God never changes, then God cannot respond to human beings. For Dodds this
does not mean God is unloving or absent in our suffering.83 Rather, Dodds argues, the most
empathetic and loving presence comes when a person forgets him/herself. When a child is in
danger, a parent forgets his or her own safety and thinks only of the child’s suffering. The
parent does not suffer with the child; the child’s suffering is the parent’s suffering.84 Likewise
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with God. God does not suffer with us and in that sense have an emotional response to our
suffering, but God certainly does know our suffering through the humanity of Jesus and our
union with Christ in the Church.85 Dodds further explains, “In speaking of Jesus, we will not
predicate of God some hypothetical sort of ‘divine suffering,’ itself alien to our human nature
and experience. We will rather predicate of God a human suffering like our own.”86 There is no
advantage, according to Dodds, to a God who suffers as a divine being because that has
nothing to do with suffering as a human being. Comfort can only come from a God who
understands human suffering. Therefore, there is no reason to abandon the immutability of
God’s being for the sake of a loving response. God’s immutability actually perfects God’s
love.87
Dodds’ model of providence does not include a response to human beings in any sense
that implies a change in God due to the actions of human beings. God’s providential plan
remains unchanging despite the free choices of human beings, their sufferings, and their
prayers.
6. Doctrine of God
The development of Dodds’ model of providence comes after his commitment to
certain divine attributes, not the other way around. Notably, his book on divine immutability
was written before his book on divine action. Consequently, understanding Dodds’ doctrine of
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God is crucial to understanding the conclusions he draws about providence. Since Dodds and
Helm are both influenced by Aquinas, it is unsurprising that they discuss the divine attributes in
similar ways. Again, God will be described as omnibenevolent, eternal, omniscient, immutable,
and omnipotent, albeit with some discrepancies on what those terms mean.
Dodds’ describes God’s omnibenevolence as an agapic love freely given to creation. It is
not a merited love given in accordance with a creature’s goodness, but a love which is
constant.88 In other words, God’s love is not a response to goodness, but rather a part of God’s
essence. This is seen most clearly in the Incarnation which, while not changing God, allows
human being to unite with God.89 God’s agapic love is a central theme running through all of
Dodds’ work, and Dodds rejects any notion of providence which would restrict God’s love. In
this way, omnibenevolence is the motivation for maintaining real human freedom in the world.
To restrict freedom would restrict the love God shows for intelligent creatures. In Dodds’ own
words, “Ultimately, to tell the story of divine action, we must use the language of love.”90
Nevertheless, Dodds’ description of God’s love is focused on love for human beings. Without
denying that God loves all of creation, he is direct in stating that both God’s love and God’s
providence are directed especially at human creation.91
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Since God is transcendent, we can only understand God’s being analogically. While our
being exists within a continuum of time, God’s being is eternal. Eternity is a simultaneous
whole, but we are not capable of fully imagining it because only God is eternal.92 God’s
existence outside of time is important for Dodds’ model of providence because it ruptures the
univocal understandings of causality which have led to conflicts between science and religion
in the past. For Dodds, God’s eternity gives God the freedom to act through secondary causes
rather than alongside or in competition with them. For providence, this means we will not see
blatant acts of God in the world, but we can still rest assured that not only necessary acts, but
also free choices and events which happen by chance are contributing to God’s providential
plan.
Dodds and Helm both affirm that God is omniscient, but here their understandings of
the term carry very different implications for providence. Both agree that since God is outside
of time, there is no past and future for God. Consequently, God knows everything that is going
to happen. Both also agree that God’s providential plan is unchanging and ordained by God.
For Helm, this means that all events happen by necessity. Dodds disagrees that compatibilism
is the best way to understand God’s causality. Instead, Dodds maintains that God ordains not
only what will happen, but how it will happen. God can ordain an event as necessary, free, by
chance, etc. Although God knows what will happen, within the order of secondary causes real
freedom and chance still exist without altering God.93 Dodds is aware that theologians such as
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Helm find indeterministic freedom in conjunction with an omniscient God to be illogical. 94
Nevertheless, Dodds insists that just as people know what will happen after the fact, by
extension, if God is outside of time this same type of knowing could apply before a free event
happens.
While Helm preserves God’s immutability through a deterministic view of divine
causality, Dodds attempts to preserve immutability while maintaining indeterministic human
freedom. Dodds writes, “God can know changeable things without changing.”95 Dodds also
suggests that there is no reason for us to hope for a God who changes. Since God is an eternal
being who transcends our order of causality, we have no way of knowing what divine
mutability would even be. It would not make God more relatable. Furthermore, because of the
Incarnation, God already relates to us fully. Immutability is essential to Dodds’ model of
providence because it provides an end point. Resting in God is only possible because God is
constant. Nevertheless, God is also dynamic, and there is a sense in which God could rightly be
said to be mutable for that reason.96 However, Dodds believes immutability serves as a better
description because those who speak of God as changing tend to limit God, often by arguing
for a God who is self-limiting.97
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Finally, God is omnipotent. As primary cause, all events are ordained by God in their
particular mode. In addition, providence is ordered toward an end point in which all evil, the
absence of being and goodness, will be defeated. Like Helm, Dodds also addresses the
question of God’s weakness. Is there a sense in which God can be thought of as weak? Dodds
says “yes,” but only in the human nature of Christ. Through Christ, God experiences human
weakness as God’s own, while God’s divinity remains omnipotent. It is paradoxical, but it is the
only way for God, with the classic divine attributes, to become human while still remaining
fully God. Dodds expresses this paradox:
One in Christ in the power of his love, we are led into the mystery of God: the wholly
transcendent God who is completely immanent in his people; the omnipotent God
whose strength is made manifest in weakness; the impassible God who ‘suffers and
dies’; the unchanging God who identifies himself with each of his suffering people,
making their suffering truly his own in love.98
Consequently, while it would be inappropriate to describe God as weak in God’s own nature,
through the Incarnation God does know human weakness. Nevertheless, this understanding of
weakness has no effect on God’s ability to carry out providence. Dodds’ inclusion of weakness
does not suggest any risk or lack of control on God’s part.
Elements of a Doctrine of Providence Drawn from Dodds
Dodds’ model of divine providence draws on a Thomistic understanding of God as well
as a sophisticated exploration of the meaning and varieties of causality. These elements work
together to form a model which is less deterministic than Helm’s but still risk-free. The
elements of Dodds’ model are summarized in table 2 and discussed below. We will see that
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certain elements of Helm’s model are deemed unnecessary by Dodds while new elements are
also added.
Table 2. Elements of a Thomistic Model of Providence
Category

Elements of Doctrine

Source of the doctrine

1. Providence is based on revelation but cannot conflict with contemporary
science

God and the meaning
of providence

2. God can be described with classical attributes: omnibenevolent, eternal,
omniscient, immutable, and omnipotent
3. Providence is motivated by God’s agapic love
4. God’s causality operates on a transcendent level, not in the gaps of
scientific causality
5. There is no risk
6. God’s providential plan will not change

Range of providence

7. Providence includes all things (down to atomic level)
8. But, all providence is for the sake of human beings
9. Predestination includes general providence
10. Providence includes actions as well as their mode: necessary,
contingent, free, by chance, etc.
11. Christ is the supreme example

Effect of providence on
human beings

12. Humans are responsible for sin
13. Humans experience real chance and indeterministic freedom
14. Providence provides hope for the future

Elements not required
by model

1. God does not need to “respond” to human beings

The fourteen elements essential to Dodds’ model of providence are divided into the
same categories as Helm’s. First, the source of the doctrine can be again found in Scripture
although, for Dodds, dialogue with contemporary science is also important. The meaning of
providence, range of providence, and its effect on human beings make up the remaining
thirteen elements.
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In this model of providence, the classical attributes of omnibenevolence, eternity,
omniscience, immutability, and omnipotence are used to describe God although we can only
understand their meaning in an analogical sense. The agapic love of God is an especially
important attribute of God. All these terms help to position God as transcendent which
prevents God from becoming a God-of-the-gaps, even as contemporary science reveals new
gaps for God to fill. God’s transcendent causality is the primary cause of all that is, even free
choices and chance events, so there is no risk in this model. Providence cannot be thwarted,
and there is no need for it to adapt to the decisions made by human beings.
Providence’s reach extends to all of creation because God is the primary cause of all
being. However, God guides the world for the sake of human beings. The eternal end of human
beings is the real purpose of providence. Consequently, one could say that general providence
is actually a subcategory of predestination in this model. God guides the world by working
through secondary causes which God wills in both their end and mode. God not only wills what
will happen, but also how it will happen. In this way, freedom and chance are maintained. The
primary example of God’s providential action in the world is the Incarnation. Since Christ
unites human beings with God, and providence is for the sake of human beings, all providence
hinges on Christ.
Since God is a transcendent cause, human beings do not experience providence in a
flashy way. Human beings are still responsible for sin and still experience free decisions,
chance, and lucky encounters. However, providence does ground Christian hope because it
offers the assurance of an end in which good will conquer evil and human beings will be able to
rest in God.
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Interestingly, in Dodds’ model of providence, which is motivated by agapic love, God
does not respond to human beings on account of their prayers or suffering. Any changes that
occur can only occur in creation or in the human nature of Christ.
While both Helm and Dodds adhere to the traditional attributes of God, some process
theologians have challenged conceptions of God’s omnipotence and omniscience by claiming
they are inconsistent with both experience and scripture. Joseph Bracken offers us an
alternative with his Trinitarian process model of providence. His model providence is explored
in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE
A PROCESS MODEL OF PROVIDENCE
The third model of divine providence is a variation of process theism. Process theism
includes a range of theological perspectives which all draw inspiration from the philosophical
work of Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). Whitehead’s philosophy, which is driven by
creativity, novelty, and attention to contemporary scientific principles, is inherently open to risk
and consequently stands at the opposite end of the spectrum from a Calvinist model while still
offering a robust concept of providence.
The process model of divine providence presented here, that of Joseph Bracken, is most
accurately described as an amalgamation of Thomism and process philosophy. His continual
reference to traditional Thomistic themes facilitates comparisons between this model and the
previous models. It also ensures that this model is an explicitly Christian process theism. Again,
the material will be presented under the same headings as previous chapters with essential
elements highlighted at the end.
Introducing Joseph A. Bracken, S.J.
Joseph A. Bracken, S.J. is a Jesuit priest, theologian, and professor emeritus at Xavier
University in Cincinnati, Ohio. His life’s work is dedicated to developing a Trinitarian process
theism by combining insights from Aquinas and Whitehead. Where Michael Dodds attempts to
present a contemporary Thomistic model which remains as faithful as possible to Aquinas,
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Bracken freely revises both Aquinas and Whitehead for his own constructive project.
Bracken has written many books and even more articles over the course of his career
spelling out various facets of his Trinitarian process theism. In his writings, he has two primary
goals in mind. First, Bracken attempts to articulate why process theism offers a good corrective
to Thomistic metaphysics. Bracken is aware of critiques coming out of continental philosophy
which have questioned the use of metaphysics in relation to God altogether. While
sympathetic to their concerns, Bracken believes it is not metaphysics per se that is
problematic; Christian theology has just been using the wrong metaphysical framework.1
Second, as a Catholic theologian, Bracken is concerned with addressing the traditional
Christian doctrines that many articulations of process theism (such as those of Charles
Hartshorne or John Cobbs) dismiss or alter beyond recognition for the average Christian. These
doctrines include the Trinity, the Incarnation, and eschatology. Three recent books in particular
are used in this chapter’s presentation of Bracken’s process model of divine providence:
Christianity and Process Thought: Spirituality for a Changing World (2006), Does God Roll Dice?:
Divine Providence for a World in the Making (2012), and The World in the Trinity: Open-Ended
Systems in Science and Religion (2014).
Bracken hopes his model will be consistent with contemporary science and tries to base
all his arguments on a dialogue between faith and reason rather than faith alone. Yet, his belief
in divine providence and thus his motivation for articulating a coherent model of providence
comes from his faith. In defense of including a chapter on providence he writes:

1

Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., The One in the Many: A Contemporary Reconstruction of the God-World
Relationship (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2001), 24-25, 178.
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While I concede that there is no direct empirical verification for belief in God and
workings of Divine Providence in this world, I would argue that there is also no direct
empirical evidence that belief in God and the workings of Divine Providence is false.
From a strictly empirical point of view, neither belief can be vindicated as obviously
true.2
Consequently, like the models of Paul Helm and Dodds, this model ultimately relies on
revelation.
Bracken’s Model of Providence
Bracken’s model of providence is based on a revised understanding of Whitehead’s
actual occasions, societies, and divine initial aims. These three concepts form the foundation of
general providence in this process model and will be explained in the first part of this section.
The following sub-sections answer more particular questions about human beings, the
presence of evil and freedom, and what providence can or cannot do. Here, Bracken rethinks
traditional Thomistic doctrines in light of process theism in order to show that Christian
doctrine is strengthened by a process understanding of the world. Of particular importance for
Bracken is explaining how a Trinitarian God can be understood in process terms. The
relationship between providence and Bracken’s doctrine of God is described at the end of this
section.
1. General Providence
Despite being a strong advocate for process theism, especially among Catholics,
Bracken is still willing to revise Whitehead’s work in order to better explain Christianity in
terms of this new metaphysical framework. Still Bracken’s foundation remains firmly process-
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oriented and begins with Whitehead’s actual occasions, societies, and initial aims. The biggest
obstacle to understanding Bracken’s process worldview is the vocabulary which Bracken
modifies from Whitehead and revises throughout his own writings. I have indicated in the text
and footnotes where several terms refer to the same concept.
The central shift in thinking that Whitehead’s process philosophy introduces is that
actions are more real than things. The basic building blocks of all there is are not super tiny
things, but what Whitehead calls “actual occasions.”3 An actual occasion is a momentary
existence at the subatomic level. Bracken also refers to actual occasions as “momentary
subjects of experience.”4 Because we are in time, an actual occasion never persists for more
than a moment. Just as I am not quite the same in this moment as I was a moment ago (my
state of mind takes all my previous states of mind into account, cells have died and been built,
blood and oxygen have shifted their location within my body, etc.), nothing, whether alive or
not, is static.5 Everything is in process: a succession of actual occasions. The biggest intellectual
leap that Whitehead and Bracken ask us to make is that actual occasions, in their moment of
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existence, make a decision on how to act.6 The spontaneity and unpredictability physicists find
at the subatomic level is evidence of this decision-making capability. Of course, Whitehead is
not suggesting that electrons are self-aware. Whitehead explains, “The principle that I am
adopting is that consciousness presupposes experience, and not experience consciousness. . . .
Thus an actual entity may or may not be conscious of some part of its experience.”7 So, while
we expect a conscious creature to have experiences, act, and decide, Whitehead does not
believe this precludes the possibility that non-conscious creatures also have a minimal, but
sufficient capacity to respond to their environment.8 As Bracken explains in simple language,
“Tables and chairs, to be sure, are not alive, but their subatomic components are in their own
way alive, passing on a given pattern of existence and activity from moment to moment so as
to guarantee that the table or chair does not collapse when we put something on it or sit on
it.”9
Tables, chairs, and any other objects larger than a subatomic particle are really
collections of actual occasions which Bracken calls societies or “structured fields of activity.”10
In Whitehead’s philosophy, the world is made up of societies. Each society remains organized
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basically the same from moment to moment, but it is never identical to its past self. The
passing of each actual occasion which makes up the society results in typically minute changes
that allow societies to maintain their identity while still slowing evolving over time.11 This same
process accounts for the changes we see in both living and non-living aspects of the world. A
caterpillar in a chrysalis changes rapidly compared to the slow erosion and transformation of a
mountain, but each is changed through the same process—momentary occasions which
maintain the organization of the whole while still slightly altering it.
Societies take on a life of their own in Bracken’s process theism.12 The actual occasions
from moment to moment organize the society, but the society becomes more than the sum of
its parts.13 The society develops its own agency in concert with its individual members,
allowing the society to combine with other societies into a complex hierarchical system.14 In
the human body, for example, each atom is already a society, but the atoms are also subsocieties of cells, which are sub-societies of organs, and so one. These are societies which
overlap vertically. However, the resulting person is also part of societies such as a family, a
nationality, and a work-place. These societies overlap horizontally.15 While the actual occasions
11
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which makeup these overlapping societies only last for a moment, the societies maintain an
identity over time (for example, a foot remains a foot). Of course, as the actual occasions or
sub-societies change, the unifying element of the society may also change.16 The result of
these overlapping systems is both a bottom-up and a top-down causality.17 The actual
occasions act on the whole through bottom-up causality; they sustain the whole and make it
what it is. At the same time, the society itself takes on its own agency and acts top-down on
the individual members by limiting and directing their possible actions. It is, after all, the
society which persists through time and which allows us to identify a nation or person as in
some sense the same nation or person as five minutes ago. In Bracken’s own words:
The constituent actual entities of the moment exercise efficient causality by reaffirming
or slightly revising the ‘common element of form’ already present within the society to
which they belong. The society in virtue of that same common element of form,
however, exercises formal causality by imposing necessary constraints upon the activity
of each new set of actual entities.18
The whole is determined by the parts, but the whole also determines the possibilities of the
parts.
The vertically highest society in which we participate is what Christianity calls “the
kingdom of God.”19 The kingdom of God is where the worldly societies of atoms, people,
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nationalities, planets, etc. overlap completely with God’s field of activity. Consequently, we
“live and move and have our being” within God,20 while remaining distinct from God and God
from us.21 Since the kingdom of God, like all things, is understood by Bracken as a society or
field of activity, it necessarily remains dynamic while maintaining its identity over time.22
Furthermore, since the kingdom of God overlaps with God’s own field of activity, it shares in
what could be called God’s omnibenevolence, or consistently good use of creative potential.
The participation of all societies in the vertically higher society of the divine is what Bracken
calls providence.23 Since the kingdom of God includes all societies, nothing in this world is
excluded from eternal life.24 Furthermore, since societies are made to join together, “all
creatures will be incorporated into the divine matrix in terms of their relations to one another
during life.”25
The final concept, initial aims, brings us to the workings of the doctrine of providence in
Bracken’s model. In order to act, an actual occasion must have creativity—the ability to bring
about something novel. For Whitehead, creativity is a given; it is a fact of the universe present
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in each actual occasion as an “initial aim.” For Bracken, creativity is given by God; it is grace.26
In other words, creativity is the creative force of God. Although creativity itself is morally
neutral, God and God’s initial aims are inherently good.27 God provides each actual occasion
with an initial aim which is two-fold. First, the initial aim offers the awareness of the possibility
of creativity. Second, the initial aim provides a direction, luring us and all societies toward a
good use of creativity rather than an evil use.28 Nevertheless, actual occasions, whether they
contribute to a human society or rock society, have a measure of freedom in their actions. This
means that all of creation is responsible for evil uses of creativity.29 More will be said about
this below in the discussion of evil and freedom. For now, it is sufficient to understand that
through the luring power of initial aims and the top-down causality of societies, in particular
the top-down causality of the kingdom of God which overlaps all societies, God is constantly
reordering the world to prevent chaos and bring about a good end.30 Bracken explains God’s
guidance:
God does not maintain order within the world of creation by making things happen one
way rather than another in terms of divine efficient causality. God maintains order by
continually reconfiguring the pattern of finite events within the world of creation in
terms of divine final causality. Thus, while creatures, finite subjects of experience, have
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the final say in terms of what de facto happens within the world of creation, God has
the final say in terms of what it all means both for the present and for the future.31
This on-going providential work often remains hidden to us even while we are its primary
agents. Trust is required because “something eminently worthwhile is being worked out
through the cosmic process even if we human beings, with our strictly limited goals and values,
often find it hard to realize and properly appreciate.”32
2. Special Providence
Since all of reality is composed of actual occasions coming together in different
societies, human beings are not as distinct from the rest of creation as they are in the two
previous models. Consequently, Bracken does not make any reference to a “special
providence” for human beings. Still, something can be said about the particular type of society
that human beings are. Furthermore, Christian process theologians must make some sense of
God’s incarnation as a human person. Although these factors do not make up a unique
providential path in this model, the human person will be focused on in this section, as it was
in the previous two chapters. The next section will discuss evil and freedom as it relates to all
of creation.
Like all complex creatures, human beings are a collection of societies which emerge out
of the momentary subjects of experience known as actual occasions.33 While the actual
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occasions hold the bulk of agency, the societies themselves set parameters for the actual
occasions and allow for continuity of identity over time. The actual occasions which make up a
person are also guided by God’s initial aims which attempt to lure the actual occasions and
society as a whole toward a good use of creativity.34 In a human being, the pull of divine initial
aims is one’s conscience and one’s actions take on moral significance.35 The initial aims cannot
determine our actions, and in any instance we can accept, reject, or modify the initial aim we
received.36 Whatever we decide, our own field of activity continues to overlap with that of the
kingdom of God, although we cannot see it in its fullness. That means God is present with us
and suffers through our failures.37 Bracken writes, “There is no predestination in view of a
divine plan for ourselves as individuals or as members of the human race.”38 In fact, in
Bracken’s model, there is no heaven or hell “out there” to which one could be predestined.
Bracken has not done away with eschatology, though.
The lack of an individual eschatology is one of the central challenges to developing a
Christian process theism out of Whitehead’s ideas. Bracken is dissatisfied with Hartshorne’s
Whiteheadian conception of the afterlife which is as an immortalized contribution to God’s
memory without any individual subjectivity.39 Instead, Bracken attempts to reconcile a more
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traditional Christian eschatology with Whitehead’s metaphysics. Since our own fields of activity
already overlap with the kingdom of God, one joins the kingdom by being opened to its already
present reality upon death.40 Those who have allowed their lives to be guided by God’s initial
aims will experience the beatific vision to the extent they have prepared themselves to love
God.41 Those who consistently reject the divine initial aims throughout life will have developed
themselves into a society whose identity is based in that rejection. Therefore, the rejection will
continue after death despite God’s continued presence.42 With no promise of a good end for
ourselves or others, Bracken’s worldview could be scary, but he sees it as hopeful. Although
change is typically slow, while we are alive, every moment is an opportunity for something
new.43
Just as Bracken reconciles Christian eschatology with process theism, he also
redescribes the incarnation in process terms. The human and divine natures of Christ are two
overlapping fields of activity in which Christ participates.44 Since these fields perfectly
overlapped throughout Jesus’ life, while other humans periodically (or often) stray from God’s
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initial aims, Jesus always accepted them.45 The purpose of the incarnation in Bracken’s model
finds its roots in the theologies of Abelard and Duns Scotus.46 God’s great desire to share in our
lives was the impetus for the incarnation and Jesus heals the rift between fallen creation and
God through his example and transformative love. By creating new communities, new
societies, during his time on earth, Jesus set the stage for good use of creativity in the world.47
As those communities continue to spread, and mutually influence one another, new actual
occasions are increasingly likely to continue to follow the pattern.48
3. The Problem of Evil and the Question of Freedom
While one might expect the problem of evil to be less of a problem in a process model,
the questions of theodicy still arise. So long as God is understood as Creator, we will ask why
God did not create the world differently. As in the previous chapters, the problem of evil is
closely related to the free choices that are made. In this model, freedom, albeit in a limited
form, is extended to all of creation, both living and non-living.49 It is with freedom, then, that
we will start.
As mentioned in the discussion on general providence, all actual occasions can act
either in accordance with their environments or against their environments. An actual occasion
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is not free to do absolutely anything because of the environmental limitations. Most often a
given actual occasion will act in accordance with its environment.50 For example, an actual
occasion which is part of a foot will usually contribute to the foot society. Sometimes though,
modifications are made and the whole society is affected. This may happen because a divine
initial aim was luring the actual occasion, or the society as a whole, in another direction. Or,
the modification may have been a rejection of the divine initial aim in favor a personal goal,
conscious or unconscious.51 Human beings follow basically the same process, except we are
more aware of the options before us. We do not just experience our environments, but also
consciously reflect on them.52 The difference is a matter of degree, not kind. Human beings are
more responsible for their actions than rocks, but both have responsibility.53
Extending responsibility to non-living things raises questions about how one can
distinguish between good and evil. How can one tell when a rock is a good rock? Bracken does
not provide a full morality here, but he does suggest that, most of the time, a good use of
creativity is an unselfish use. When we do things for others and build relationships, that is
good.54 When we do things only for ourselves, that is evil.55 For the rock, then, it is good when
50
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it contributes to other vertically and horizontally overlapping societies. This is because the
whole is more than the sum of its parts. Good overcomes evil when we collaborate with God
on the highest society—the kingdom of God.56 Nevertheless, it is not easy to distinguish
between natural evil and natural good. 57 This is in part because events which look evil in the
short term can look different when a longer view is possible.58
In our lives, though, we will all encounter evil in our societies. Since societies have a
top-down influence on their sub-societies/actual occasions, they tend to perpetuate the evil
that is already inherent in the system.59 Bracken calls this original sin.60 However, while the
cause of original sin is usually seen as individual, Bracken’s original sin is inherently communal,
more akin to social sin.61 He describes it as the origin of racism and sexism—structures of sin in
which one participates without being solely responsible.62 Our response to evil in the form of
social sin, natural evil, or tragedy is meant to be a self-giving love. Bracken cautions that a good
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end does not justify tragic means, but he also recognizes that tragedy has a way of bringing out
novel depths of love one might not otherwise have reached.63
But what about God’s responsibility? Since Bracken has reframed creativity as a grace
rather than a fact of the world, God is the cause of all creativity used for evil.64 However,
Bracken claims that God does not have to agree with how that creativity is used. God does not
know whether the initial aims will effectively lure a society.65 The future is open in a way that is
not possible in Dodds’ Thomistic model. Rejecting Thomism, Bracken writes, “Hence, even
though the creature in question is making what it considers to be free decision, that free
decision is incorporated into a world order which is not free because it is known and willed by
God in its entirety without any possibility of alteration.”66 In Bracken’s model, one is free not
only from one’s own perspective, but also from God’s perspective. Nevertheless, Bracken is
forced to admit that God is partly responsible for evil in the world.67 Bracken believes the evil is
worth it because it allows us to bring novel goodness into the world.68 “Creativity is what
makes us (and indeed all of creation) godlike.”69

63

Bracken, World in the Trinity, 195.

64

Bracken, “Response to Elizabeth Johnson,” 729.

65

Ibid. See also, Bracken, Society and Spirit, 64.

66

Ibid., 728.

67

Bracken, Christianity and Process Thought, 25.

68

Bracken’s model has no conception of evil as punishment from God, as we saw in Helm’s model.

69

Bracken, Christianity and Process Thought, 27.

86

4. What Providence Can Do
While Bracken’s process model of providence initially appears to be a weaker
understanding of providence, the flexibility of this model is apparent in what providence can
do. Since God’s providential plan is not preordained from the beginning of time, there is room
for interventions. In Bracken’s model, God organizes the chaos that could result from too much
novelty and sometimes performs miracles for the good of the community. People, too, can
affect the plan through prayer for themselves and others.
Since our own fields of activity overlap with God’s, and since creativity is a gift from
God, there are several ways in which God can influence the path of creation. The divine initial
aims lure us in the right direction, the top-down causality of vertically higher societies places
limits on our choices, and God can act more directly through miracles. Consequently, Bracken
assures his readers that “unexpected events do happen in this world of ours simply by chance,
but in the end God’s will and whatever we creatures spontaneously choose to do will be
reconciled, and all will be well.”70 However, it should be noted that while Bracken speaks
confidently of an ultimate triumph of good over evil throughout his works, he does admit in
Christianity and Process Thought that we cannot really know whether or not God’s plan can be
foiled.71
Although they are not the normal working of things, miracles are a way in which God
can redirect a community toward its initial aims. Quoting Keith Ward, Bracken writes, “Divine
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miracles, in other words, are not so much expressions of divine power but of divine wisdom,
using unusual events in the natural order to manifest ‘in an extraordinary way in the physical
realm the underlying spiritual basis and ultimate purpose of the cosmos.’”72 While God
respects the physical properties of the world, God also has a goal for the end which physical
science cannot grasp.73 If miracles are a possible component in divine providence, what kind of
miracles might we expect? And, why do some people experience miracles while others do not?
Bracken repeats his refrain here that the whole is greater than its parts. Therefore, God
doesn’t grant miracles based on individual need, but rather only when the miracle will
contribute to the whole. The purpose of the miracle always transcends the individual, even
when we cannot clearly discern its ripple effect.74 Speaking of the healed leper, Bracken writes,
“That is, Jesus was giving him on the occasion of a healing miracle a much deeper faith in the
long-term Providence of God for himself and for others whom he knew and loved.”75
While God may be able to intervene in miraculous ways, “the normal pattern of divine
activity in the world seems to be that of urging creatures to make the more sensible decision,
to take the more prudent course of action in a given set of circumstances.”76 In order to do
this, human beings can pray. The purpose of prayer, then, is not to change the circumstances
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but rather to better hear the divine initial aims—in other words, to better listen to one’s
conscience.77 While attending to the gentle lure of God is not an easy task, it is also not an
impossible one.78
Prayer which motivates one’s own change of heart is typically the easiest to
understand. Bracken’s model also offers a rationale for praying for others. Prayer for others
works when we tap into the kingdom of God which is the society in which we all participate. 79
Our prayers are fresh energy for the divine initial aims. Nevertheless, “the power of God’s love
works through persuasion, not coercion. Even with the help of our prayers for others, initial
aims from the divine persons do not overpower the free will of human beings, but only
persuade and inspire them to move in a certain direction.”80 Our prayers have a real effect in
this model and can actually alter one’s ability to follow the divine initial aims.
5. What Providence Cannot Do
Despite the power of prayer and the possibility of miracles in this model, there are
limitations to providence. As in the previous models, divine providence does not ensure that
one will be able to see, in one’s own life, the guidance of God. Unlike the previous two models,
in Bracken’s process model, God cannot not see the path of providence either.
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God has a plan to lure all societies to the good. However, the exact path that plan will
take remains unknown even to God because any given actual occasion may or may not follow
the divine initial aims. This is a plan with risk. So, God has the long-view, but exercises very
little efficient causality. In contrast, human beings, as conscious creatures, exercise a lot of
efficient causality. But, we have very little ability to see where we are going.81 Bracken writes,
“So the divine persons exercise providence over our individual lives and over the direction of
the cosmic process as a whole, but they do it indirectly through the provision of divine initial
aims with which we must cooperate if we are to gain a stronger sense of purpose and direction
in our lives.”82 The result is that providence is meandering—which, Bracken points out, is
pretty much the way it appears when we look at history.83 Believers are tasked with trying to
trust God. Just as Job was unable to understand the calamities that befell him, we will often be
as challenged by our relationship with God as we are comforted.84
6. Doctrine of God
Bracken’s writings on providence actually start with his attempt to develop a Trinitarian
process doctrine of God. Bracken’s model of the Trinity continues the concepts of societies and
fields of activity which we have already seen. Each person of the Trinity is like a society with its
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own field of activity. These three fields overlap and are mutually influencing.85 All of creation,
through grace, can also participate in the Trinity through the shared field known as the
kingdom of God. Bracken calls this a panentheistic model because all of creation is
encompassed by the kingdom of God while both God and worldly sub-societies maintain
independent agency.86 This is, of course, only a model and not a literal description of the
Trinity. Using this model, we can see how Bracken modifies each of the classical attributes of
God included in the previous two models, namely, God as omnibenevolent, eternal,
omniscient, immutable, and omnipotent.
In Bracken’s model, God is omnibenevolent, although Bracken does not actually use
that term. God’s omnibenevolence comes from God’s always good use of creativity.87
Creativity is the driving force of life and novelty for the world and for God, but while creation
uses creativity for both good and destructive ends, God’s use of creativity is always positive
growth.88 Furthermore, God’s divine initial aims lure creation into participation in that
goodness. Bracken writes, “God is the Ethical Ultimate, that transcendent personal being who
consciously steers creativity in the right direction for all other finite beings.” 89
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Bracken does describe God as eternal, depending on what one means by eternal.
Bracken means that for God, past (which extends before the Big Bang), present, and future
(which extends beyond the collapse of the universe) exist simultaneously.90 God can also
interact within time. Eternity and time are simply two different fields of activity for God.91
However, even eternity remains dynamic. The past, present, and future all mutually influence
one another.92 Operating in eternity allows God the perspective to see the long-view of
providence which we are unable to see from within the perspective of time.93 Nevertheless,
God cannot determine precisely what will happen in the future because it is constantly revised
by the present.94 Likewise, God’s initial aims for each new actual occasion are constantly
revised.
As is probably clear by now, in Bracken’s model God is neither omniscient nor
immutable. While God knows and sees far more of the world and possible consequences of
actions than we can or any other entity can, God does not know how a particular actual
occasion will use the gift of creativity. God has a very good understanding and control of what
is going on, but Bracken falls short of using the word omniscient.95 God is mutable in two
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senses. First, God is changed by the changing world in ways in which God cannot predict.96
Second, God continues to grow in positive ways through God’s own use of creativity. Bracken’s
God is infinite in potential, but grows and changes in actually.97 Still, Bracken suggests in a
footnote that there may be a sense in which the persons of the Trinity are immutable.98 The
possibility of an immutable aspect of the Trinity is also mentioned in Bracken’s review of
Dodds’ book The Unchanging God of Love: A Study of the Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on
Divine Immutability in View of Certain Contemporary Criticisms of This Doctrine (1986).99
Bracken, critical of Dodds’ belief that love without mutability is possible, writes:
Perhaps the divine "to be" should be rather understood as the divine nature, the source
of the divine being and activity, whereby the three divine persons are subsistent in
their relations to one another. In this way the divine persons could be considered
mutable, capable of growth, in their relations with one another and with their
creatures, even as the divine nature is still conceived as immutable in its mode of
operation.100
This compromise with Dodds is consistent with Bracken’s description of God as infinite in
potential while finite in actuality. God’s essence may be immutable while God’s Trinititarian
existence as three persons is mutable.
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In Bracken’s model, God only persuades and lures, and thus is not omnipotent.
Comparing his view to that of Aquinas, Bracken writes:
God, accordingly, is clearly not omnipotent in the classical sense of unilaterally making
some thing happen. But God is still powerful insofar as God can be and presumably is in
many cases persuasive with respect to the self-constituting decision of an
independently existing finite subject of experience.101
God does not engage in shows of power nor does God force any creature or thing to act in a
particular way. In fact, Bracken speaks of a God who suffers with us and is often frustrated by
our actions.102 Influenced by Jürgen Moltmann, and in contrast to Dodds, Bracken understands
self-giving love as inherently a suffering love.103 To love is to be vulnerable to the pain of
others and to the pain of experiencing one’s love rejected. Therefore, if God were unable to
suffer, God would be unable to love us.104 In the end, though, Bracken never seriously doubts
God’s ability to lure creation to a good end.
Elements of a Doctrine of Providence Drawn from Bracken
Bracken’s model of divine providence modifies both traditional Christian doctrines as
well Whitehead’s process philosophy for a unique approach to providence. The elements
below constitute a model in which God and creation cooperate toward a good end without a
planned path. Therefore there is risk along the way which we did not see in the previous two

101

Bracken, “God’s Will or God’s Desires,” 75-76.

102

Bracken, “Trinitarian Spirit Christology,” 756.

103

Bracken, World in the Trinity, 194. See also, Bracken, review of Unchanging God of Love, 357.

104

Bracken, World in the Trinity, 194. To suffer-with is to express empathy. Consequently, to love
someone also means to share in their joy. For more on self-giving love between the persons of the Trinity and
between people on earth see Joseph A. Bracken, "The Challenge of Self-Giving Love," Theological Studies 74, no. 4
(December 2013): 856-871, accessed July 14, 2016, ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, EBSCOhost.

94

models. The elements of Bracken’s model are summarized in table 3 and discussed below. We
will see that this model is more flexible and less anthropocentric than the previous models.
Table 3. Elements of a Process Model of Providence
Category

Elements of Doctrine

Source of the doctrine

1. Providence requires acceptance of Christian revelation

God and the meaning
of providence

2. God can be described as omnibenevolent and eternal
3. Providence is motivated by God’s loving use of creativity
4. God lures through divine initial aims, but does not directly cause
5. There is risk
6. God’s providential plan is only an end, the path is undetermined

Range of providence

7. Providence includes all things (down to actual occasion level)
8. All societies (not just humans) are brought into the kingdom of God
9. Providence cannot reach its end without creaturely cooperation
10. Christ is the supreme example of following the initial aims

Effect of providence on
human beings

11. Humans and non-humans are responsible for sin/evil
12. Humans and non-humans experience real chance and indeterministic
freedom
13. Providence provides hope for the future
14. Prayer can help one follow the initial aim
15. Prayer can increase the good energy of a society

Elements not required
by model

1. God is not omniscient, immutable, or omnipotent
2. Actions of actual occasions are not pre-ordained or willed by God

The fifteen elements essential to Bracken’s model of providence are categorized in the
same ways as the previous models for ease of comparison. First, the origin of the doctrine of
providence can only be found in a pre-assumption of Christian faith. In other words, it requires
a prior acceptance of revelation. The meaning, range, and effects of providence make up the
remaining fourteen elements.
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Only two of the classical attributes of God remain in this model, and eternity is
understood differently here. God as eternal does not exist outside of time, but rather God
exists both within time and in a field where past, present, and future coexist. Nevertheless, the
role of creativity is what really sets this model apart. God’s use of creativity is always good, but
ours is not. Consequently there is risk in this model and the path to the ultimate victory of
good over evil is constantly being revised.
Like the previous models, God’s providence extends to all things, which in this case
means all actual occasions and the societies they form. All societies are oriented toward the
same end, which is incorporation into the kingdom of God. Since the divine initial aims are
merely persuasive, reaching that end requires the cooperation of societies and especially
human beings who are capable of making conscious choices. We can look to Jesus Christ as an
example of perfectly following God’s divine initial aims.
Since human beings are societies just like all other things, the effect of providence on
human beings is not very different from the effect of providence on all other types of societies.
Freedom is available to greater and lesser extents in human and non-human societies, but all
societies are responsible for their actions and thus responsible for the sin and evil in the world.
Extending the kingdom of God as well as freedom and responsibility to all things makes this the
least anthropocentric of the three models we have seen. However, providence also effects
human beings in a unique way as a source of hope and impetus to pray. God’s luring
providence is a source of hope in spite of the selfish actions of societies. Through prayer for
ourselves and others we can learn to follow the divine initial aims and bolster the good use
creativity in our societies.
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In this model, God is not omniscient, immutable, or omnipotent and the actions of
societies and actual occasions are not willed by God. Rather, God is responsive to the freely
used creativity that God has provided for the world. The providential plan changes as a result
of the choices made and God’s reacts to both our triumphs and our failures. God’s love for
creation is expressed by sharing in both our joy and our suffering.
Bracken’s process model of providence, Dodds’ Thomistic model of providence, and
Helm’s Calvinist model of providence offer three different Christian articulations of how God
guides creation. The next chapter explores how the elements of each model compare and
develops a set of criteria which are necessary for any Christian doctrine of providence based
on the shared elements between the three models. The criteria are meant to illuminate how
providence functions within a theological system and, therefore, the value of providence
within theology.

CHAPTER FOUR
CRITERIA FOR A DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE
Many writers on the doctrine of providence turn to the story of Job as an example of the
central tension providence creates in a systematic theology. The story of Job suggests that
although God may have a plan for creation, human beings are neither privileged to know that
plan nor able to look back and see evidence of the plan. Righteousness is no guarantee of a
good life and neither is a supposedly omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. As Gennaro Auletta
writes in his encyclopedia entry on providence, “The horrible events of the 20th century
encourage a view of history that is more tragic than providential. We must still answer Job, and
understand the response given to him in Jesus Christ.”1 Since providence is difficult to see and
understand, it must serve an important purpose within theology. There must be good reasons
this doctrine has persisted despite the frequent tragedies of finite existence.
The previous three chapters examined three different models of Christian divine
providence, each relying on a different strand of the Christian tradition, namely, Calvinism,
Thomism, and process theism. These models offer answers to the question of the function of
providence within a theological system. By examining the function of providence, we hope to
move beyond the incidental similarities and differences of each model to uncover the purpose
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of providence in Christianity. The second section of this chapter returns to the main elements
of the doctrine in each model in order to develop a general set of criteria for identifying the
doctrine of providence in line with the function of providence discussed in the first section.
Where all three of these otherwise diverse models coincide and contribute to the function of
providence, we have an element of the doctrine of providence which we can also use as a
criterion to test for the presence of providence in other theological systems. There are two
main goals for this chapter. First, examining the function of providence in the three models will
reveal why providence is important in a theological system at all. This section will discuss the
close relationship between providence, eschatological hope, and participation. Second, the
criteria culled from the three models of providence will later be used to develop a doctrine of
providence within John Caputo’s theological system2 (see chapter six).
The Function of Providence: Eschatological Hope and Participation
To make use of our three models of providence, we must look beyond mere description
to analysis and comparison. For that, we must ask a question that is deeper than we have
asked thus far: What is the function of the providence within a system? The question is deeper
because it requires more than a detailed description of the theory of providence under
discussion. Understanding the function of providence requires understanding the motivations
for describing providence in particular ways.
The starting point for answering our question—what is the function of providence
within a theological system?—is one of the central answers given by the models themselves.
2
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All three models agree that providence is related to eschatological hope. Paul Helm, describing
the Calvinist take on providence writes, “In a way which is largely foreign to modern Christian
spirituality, Calvin believes that the ills of this life should prompt us to hope for the life to
come, not of course to prompt us to project a life to come out of thin air, in the sense
proposed by Feuerbach and Marx, but to intensify hope for what the Christian is convinced on
good grounds is to come.”3 Michael Dodds approaches the question from another direction
describing the hopelessness of a world without the providential victory of good over evil. He
gives a vivid yet bleak depiction of that world:
[God] must continue to exist forever, without power or hope of vanquishing evil
completely. Indeed, he has no guarantee that he himself will not one day be overcome
by evil. So, he lives on, sharing in the ephemeral joys of his passing creatures, but
carrying as well the ever more oppressive memory of every tear-stained face, of every
cry of fear of pain, of every fallen sparrow. He is perhaps the ‘fellow sufferer who
understands,’ but has precious little hope to offer his unhappy friends.4
Joseph Bracken adds that if “we do our best to remain faithful to divine guidance,”5 we can
hope that things will work out for ourselves, those around us, and future generations.6
The hope is “eschatological” because it is primarily a hope for the end—the end of
time, struggle, sin, etc. While the fact that God is guiding the actions of creation now could
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already be comforting, providence provides hope due to the anticipated destination more than
the journey. Too many have a life reminiscent of Job’s for providence to provide hope of
immediate amelioration. Thus, a journey filled with the “ills of life” that Calvin mentions is no
reason to stop hoping.7 Put another way, providence does not imply that things will go well for
one right now. Even if all things are for the good, there may be tragedy in the short term. None
of the models of providence from the previous three chapters claims that God provides an arc
for life that one can see.8 Referring to the story of Job, Bracken notes that “we cannot always
fathom how God is ordering what happens in this world in terms of a larger scheme of
things,”9 but we can learn to trust in God’s mysterious presence.10 Helm similarly writes, “Even
if Christians can discern no overall meaning to their lives, or to any part of them, it would be
unwarranted to conclude from this that all things are not working together for their good.” 11
According to Helm, the story of Job, especially read in conjunction with the crucifixion and
resurrection, is a reminder that God is in control of even chaos and wickedness.12 Given that, I
believe the eschatological focus of providence is fairly obvious. What is less obvious is the
“hope” part of “eschatological hope.”
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The word “hope” is typically used in situations of expectation before the outcome is
known. However, it is more than wishful thinking. To hope means that one believes the
outcome is possible—often to the point that one behaves as if the outcome is already certain.
But we never hope after we already know the outcome and, consequently, we never hope for
something we know with certainty will occur. Imagine a woman who strongly hopes that she
will get pregnant this month. While she is unlikely to share her hoped-for pregnancy with many
others, she might buy pregnancy books, arrange travel plans around her expected due date, or
perhaps even start a gift registry with desired baby items. She will act as if the pregnancy is
inevitable before it really is, yet she will not keep hoping for it after a positive pregnancy test.13
Then, she is certain and celebrates in gratitude. Yet, the theological hope that Helm, Dodds,
and even Bracken describe is a hope with certainty.
The hope that Helm’s model offers seems to have more in common with the woman
after the pregnancy test than before. Helm’s theological hope is a mix of gratitude that one has
been put on a good path and anticipation for the good end to come. In Helm’s model of
providence, the eternal God foreordains all that is to come in time from a stance outside of
time and hierarchically prior.14 All those predestined to share in eternal life with God are
already predestined. Furthermore, since God foreordains the means as well as the end, I can
have confidence, even certainty, that if I have faith in God and live out God’s commands, I am
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predestined to a good end. Within this model, to say, “I hope to participate in the kingdom of
God” does not make sense unless “hope” is understood as certain. Recall that when Helm
discusses prayer for the kingdom of God, he says it is not really a petitionary prayer because it
is inevitable.15 For eschatological hope in an uncertain sense to exist, we would have to
suspend God’s goodness and suppose that God has foreordained that some people who
genuinely have faith are still at risk of damnation. God’s relation to time, that is, completely
outside of it,16 requires that one hope with certainty for the eschatological vision and act in
accordance with what one perceives as the means to the desired end.17 Certain hope is a
certainty in the form of a promise, since we exist within time and cannot actually see the end,
but it is a promise made by one who by definition never breaks a promise.
Dodds offers a slightly different understanding of God’s relation to creation although
the description of eternity is the same. In a Thomistic model of providence, God’s eternity
allows us to experience our actions as free although God knows what will happen and has, in
fact, willed it. God’s eternity is a part of God’s transcendence which allows human beings and
God to function as non-competing causes. Nevertheless, although human beings experience
freedom and chance in the world, the end is no less determined from God’s perspective. As
Jean-Yves Lacoste writes in an entry on hope:

15

Helm, Providence of God, 158.

16

Helm writes, “I have tried to articulate and to defend the view that God is timelessly eternal, existing in
a state in which there is for him no before and after, who creates and sustains the universe by a timeless act of
will. By implication, this view is inconsistent with the idea that God is purely sempiternal, existing for all times,
backwardly and forwardly everlasting.” Helm, Eternal God, 218.
17

Helm, Providence of God, 134.

103

Thomas does of course acknowledge that a certain insecurity (anxietas, angustia)
affects the hoping conscience (ST Ia IIae, q.40, a.8). The absolute future to which
theological hope is related is nevertheless promised with enough strength for hope to
hope “certainly”: the reasons for hoping are rooted in the reasons for believing; thus,
hope is as reasonable as it is virtuous.18
Again, we see certainty only in the form of a promise, such that one may still experience
anxiety over the unknown future. But, in the end it is not really unknown if one believes. As
Aquinas writes, “Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but on God's
omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to
eternal life. Now whoever has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.”19
One might expect Bracken’s process model of providence to be the deviation from the
norm. Here God stands with one foot in time and one foot out of time. 20 Consequently, while
God knows the future, the future is constantly under revision as it is continually shaped by the
past and the present. Despite the evolving future, the theological hope Bracken describes
remains certain. In the end God’s persistence in providing new initial aims will win out. 21
In sum, divine providence in Helm’s, Dodds’, and Bracken’s models promises certain
eschatological hope. However, hope should not be reduced to merely a pleasant inner
disposition. Recalling the initial non-technical definition, to have hope means to believe
something is possible and act accordingly. To have hope in providence changes one
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existentially and allows one to act in the world towards that end. Ian Barbour makes the same
move from eschatology to hope to action. He writes, “The basic experience involved in
eschatology is our orientation toward the future and our need for hope.”22 He later adds, “Our
hope is based on the conviction that God is at work in the world and that we can cooperate in
that work."23 In other words, we have hope because of God’s providence but that hope also
allows us to participate in God’s providence. If providence provides hope, the function of
providence within a theological system must also include enabling human participation in
bringing about the victory of good over evil.
However, if the function of providence includes enabling participation, a bit more
explanation is needed. It is precisely the doctrine of providence which is sometimes accused of
encouraging quietism! Helm deals with this quite directly, as he understands that Calvinist
models of providence are easily accused of encouraging quietism, but all three of the models
address this issue. In Helm’s Calvinist model, participation is enabled because both the means
and ends are foreordained by God. One cannot partake of eternal life with God without living
the sort of life that brings about that end.24 In Dodds’ Thomistic model, participation is likewise
enabled through God’s will in both necessary and free acts.25 In addition, while Dodds does not
directly comment on this passage, Aquinas explicitly connects hope and the motivation to act
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in ST I-II q40 a8 which asks, “Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?”26 He suggests
that nothing is more motivating than a good which is difficult but possible, and hope allows us
to believe the good is possible.27 Finally, Bracken’s process model most clearly enables
participation. In his model, overlapping fields of activity mutually influence each other
horizontally, top-down, and bottom-up.28
The word “participation” carries added baggage, though, which could still make one
worry about quietism. In classic Thomistic theology, which all three models are influenced by
to varying extents, participation has a very specific meaning. Human participation in God is the
ground for analogical language. Since all being comes from God, who is Being Itself, “to be” is
to participate in God. Positively, this kind of participation highlights how all creatures are
related to the Creator.29 Unfortunately, to participate in this sense is not very active. As Rudi
Te Velde writes of participation, “It has been treated often as a merely verbal construction
which entails no more than the fact that finite beings depend for their existence on an extrinsic
cause.”30 Here, humans, and all creatures, participate by receiving being; it is a receptive role.
Participating is passive; creating is active. In contrast, Te Velde argues that even in the
particular use of the word “participation” by Aquinas, a more active aspect should be
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reclaimed. He suggests that to receive being or participate in God’s being is to be “set free” as
an individual who is “really distinct from God.”31 To be distinct from God is to take one’s being
and make it one’s own by acting; it is to move beyond a merely receptive role. Therefore, to
participate in God’s being is not just to be dragged along by God’s power but to operate one’s
own independent power in the world.32 Likewise, to participate in providence is not just to
receive the good end but to actively contribute to its arrival.
For human beings, eschatological hope and participation serve to augment each other.
Human beings participate in the providential plan because of the hope they have that their
actions are not futile. Without hope, there is no motivation to participate, as Aquinas notes. At
the same time, the promise of providence is the reason to hope. Since providence includes our
actions, our actions are, in part, the source of our hope.
This circular relationship between hope and participation reveals two remaining issues
regarding how we describe eschatological hope. First, while Helm’s, Dodds’, and Bracken’s
models describe eschatological hope as certain, certainty may not be necessary for providence
to function as they describe. In other words, providence may be able to provide sufficient hope
to motivate action without that hope being certain. Human beings, of course, act all the time
without knowing for certain what the outcome will be. In fact, not knowing the outcome can
itself be motivating so long as one does not perceive the situation as certainly futile. So we can
return the definition of hope to its more everyday usage as a belief that something is possible
before it is known. Whether or not eschatological hope will be certain in a given theological
31
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system does not depend on the doctrine of providence. Rather, it depends on the doctrine of
God. A God who is incapable of failing to keep a promise will provide certain hope. If, however,
there were a Christian theological system in which God was not omnipotent, the system could
still include providence, but God would only provide an uncertain hope.
Second, hope is a poor word to describe the motivation of non-human creatures to
participate in providence. While human beings naturally hold hope for non-human creation
(most obviously pets) in addition to human creation, non-human creation cannot properly be
said to hope for itself or for us. Two options then remain: either providence is solely for human
beings or providence is for all of creation but only humans require hope. While Helm, Dodds,
and Bracken all affirm that God’s omnipotent guiding hand reaches all parts of creation, Dodds’
position comes the closest to the first option. As the most anthropocentric model, the rest of
creation participates in providence only to secure a good end for humanity.33 Even in this
model, though, all creation does participate to a degree. Furthermore, theologians, such as
Elizabeth Johnson,34 Francisco Benzoni,35 and Ryan Patrick McLaughlin36 to name a few, have
been critical of the anthropocentrism found in many Thomistic models of providence. While it
is true that Aquinas’ own writings on providence are anthropocentric, Johnson suggests that
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had Aquinas known what we now know about evolution and our connection to creation, he
would not have made the gap between humanity and the animal kingdom so large.37 She
argues that contemporary use of Aquinas needs to adjust for this new understanding38—a shift
which is lacking in Dodds’ work.39 In fact, she confidently writes, “A case can be made that for
God to love the whole means to love every part. Hence to save the whole means to save every
individual, every bear.”40 If the logic of God’s love depends on the salvation of every bear,
option two—providence is for all creation, but only humans require hope—appears more
promising. Without rationality to guide one’s free will, the motivation to act that human beings
require is not necessary for the rest of creation. Consequently, while all of creation participates
in God’s plan and our eschatological hope may include non-human creation, providence does
not provide eschatological hope to all of creation because non-human creation does not have
the capacity to experience hope. Bracken’s model is a slight exception. In his model, actual
occasions do respond to their experience in an amoral way.41 Hope, in this model, could be a
part of the luring divine initial aims which God provides in that moment of experience.
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In addition to eschatological hope (for human beings) and participation (for all of
creation, we might note several other functions of providence in the three models. Focusing on
the “What Providence Can Do” sections reveals that we have already covered the main
functions for Helm: motivating action and increasing one’s hope.42 Helm also mentions freeing
one from anxiety. However, as noted above, it is not clear that even a certain hope will free
one from anxiety completely. Dodds also notes that providence is a source of hope and adds
that a proper understanding of providence can help one to understand miracles.43 The
potential conflict brought up by miracles is that they indicate God can impose something
supernatural on the world without regard for natural processes, in other words, without the
participation of creation. Dodds explains that miracles in fact do not conflict with creation’s
participation.44 Consequently, for our purposes, understanding miracles is a part of
understanding participation. Finally, Bracken discusses how providence can adapt and rework
what freely or spontaneously happens in the world to move creation toward a good end.45
Understanding how God uses miracles, prayers, and other means to reshape the meaning of
events and provide fresh initial aims helps one to understand why one should still hope when
the future is uncertain.
The doctrine of providence ultimately affects many doctrines, as can be seen in the
models. It is impossible to offer a complete description of the doctrine of providence without
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also talking about free will, sin, Christ, redemption, and the nature of God. However, the heart
of the function of providence can be found in providing eschatological hope and ensuring
creation’s participation.
From Elements to Criteria
At the end of chapters one through three, a table summarized the main elements of
each particular model. In order to facilitate comparison between chapters, the elements were
divided into four main categories. Those categories are used again here in order to uncover the
common ground between the three models. The common ground will be used to inductively
develop criteria for recognizing the doctrine of providence in a system. Helm’s no-risk,
compatibilist approach, Dodds’ no-risk approach with indeterministic freedom, and Bracken’s
risky approach with indeterministic freedom offer an array of perspectives, which, while not
comprehensive, are generally representative of the varieties of Christian doctrines of
providence. Consequently, one can reasonably assume that elements of the doctrine of
providence which are shared by all three models are likely to be found in any Christian model
of providence. Nevertheless, the shared elements must also contribute to the function of
providence. If an element is shared by all three models but is not related to eschatological
hope or creaturely participation in bringing about the kingdom of God, it is extrinsic to the
question of providence rather than a criteria for identifying it. The elements are discussed in
the same order of presentation as the previous chapters.
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1. Comparing the Source of Providence
Table 4. Source of the Doctrine
Helm’s Calvinst Model

Dodds’ Thomistic Model

Bracken’s Process Model

1. Providence is biblically based
and requires revelation

1. Providence is based on
revelation but cannot conflict
with contemporary science

1. Providence requires
acceptance of Christian
revelation

The source of providence is an element where Helm, Dodds, and Bracken are in total
agreement (see table 4). As theologians living and writing in the 21st century, all three are
aware of current trends in science: quantum physics, indeterminancy, the human genome, etc.
Furthermore, all three are committed to a theological method which takes science and reason
seriously and in which theology as Truth cannot conflict with truth in other fields.
Nevertheless, none attempts a purely natural theology in which the doctrine of providence
could be read off the events of history or the workings of the physical world. All three find that
while a robust doctrine of providence does not conflict with reason or science, and can even
learn from models of causality in science, it cannot be proven on rational grounds.46 One must
turn to revelation for faith that God is guiding creation. Revelation, here, means there has
been or is a disclosure of God through Christ, Scripture, and/or present experience, although
the experience of God cannot be proven. This insight, then, constitutes the first possible
criterion for a Christian doctrine of providence: providence comes from revelation and cannot
be proven empirically. While our inability to see providence due to the meandering nature of
history does not provide hope or confirm our ability to participate in God’s plan, revelation is
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still necessary as a sort of prerequisite for a Christian doctrine of providence precisely because
providence is hidden. There is no reason to ask the question of providence without revelation,
much less answer that question affirmatively. Furthermore, if one hopes to identify a Christian
doctrine of providence, as opposed to some other variation on fate, one must accept Christian
revelation. Therefore, holding a prerequisite status, providence relies on revelation is the first
criterion.
2. Comparing God and the Meaning of Providence
Table 5. God and the Meaning of Providence
Helm’s Calvinist Model

Dodds’ Thomistic Model

Bracken’s Process Model

2. God can be described with
classical attributes:
omnibenevolent, eternal,
omniscient, immutable, and
omnipotent
3. Providence is motivated by
God’s goodness
4. Everything is for the good
and there can be no ultimate
tragedy
5. God not only foreknows, but
also foreordains

2. God can be described with
classical attributes:
omnibenevolent, eternal,
omniscient, immutable, and
omnipotent
3. Providence is motivated by
God’s agapic love

2. God can be described as
omnibenevolent and eternal
Not required by model: God is
not omniscient, immutable, or
omnipotent
3. Providence is motivated by
God’s loving use of creativity

4. God’s causality operates on a
transcendent level, not in the
gaps of scientific causality

6. There is no risk or chance
7. God’s providential plan will
not change

5. There is no risk
6. God’s providential plan will
not change

4. God lures through divine
initial aims, but does not
directly cause
Not required by model: Actions
of actual occasions are not preordained or willed by God
5. There is risk
6. God’s providential plan is
only an end, the path is
undetermined

This category, God and the Meaning of Providence, outlines providence from the
perspective of God, including God’s view of the plan and divine action (see table 5). All three
models highlighted the importance of God’s omnibenevolence for understanding providence.
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Whether referred to as goodness,47 agapic love,48 or loving use of creativity,49 all three saw
God’s omnibenevolence as the primary motivation for God’s guidance of creation. God’s
goodness is necessary if we are to trust in our ability to participate and place our hope in the
promise of the kingdom of God. Consequently, an all-loving God is the second necessary
criterion for a doctrine of providence.
The only other classic divine attribute that all three models could endorse was that God
is eternal. While ‘eternal’ meant different things for each theologian, the attribute’s relevance
for the doctrine of providence was largely the same. God has a different perspective than we
do and can see more of the plan than we can see in time. Whether God is only outside of time,
experiences all time at once, or acts within time varies from model to model and is not part of
the criteria for a doctrine of providence. Given these varying understandings of God, divine
action operates differently in each model. Recall that in Helm’s model, God foreordains all
actions while human beings still remain responsible and free in the sense that they do what
they wish.50 In Dodds’ model, God, as a transcendent cause, operates through secondary
causes without competing with them or compromising their freedom.51 Lastly, in Bracken’s
model, God does not cause at all, but rather lures creation through divine initial aims which are
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adjusted and given through grace in real time.52 The consistent theme through all these
models is that God’s divine action cannot conflict with scientific causality. God’s relation to
time allows for God to operate as cause while the laws of science are still obeyed. While God’s
eternal nature and divine action can take several forms, as we have seen, this is a necessary
criterion for a doctrine of providence. If scientific laws of causality are not maintained, there is
no way for a human being to predict the consequences of one’s actions and participation is
stymied.
Both Helm and Dodds agree that God’s providential plan will not change, including the
end as well as the path to get there. Bracken insists that the path is not predetermined, but,
while somewhat ambivalent on this point, he trusts that God will successfully bring about a
good end. So, while the path changes, and the shape of the end is not determined, providence
is still incapable of failing. The end of providence encourages hope, which, as discussed above,
does not need to be a certain hope in order to motivate participation. So, although all three
insist on an inevitable good end, providence does not need to be risk-free while in progress or
even in completion.
3. Comparing the Range of Providence
Table 6. Range of Providence
Helm’s Calvinist Model

Dodds’ Thomistic Model

Bracken’s Process Model

8. Providence includes all things
(down to atomic level)

7. Providence includes all things
(down to atomic level)
8. But, all providence is for the
sake of human beings

7. Providence includes all things

9. Providence includes the Fall
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10. Providence includes
predestination

9. Predestination includes
general providence

11. Providence includes the
means as well as the end

10. Providence includes actions
as well as their mode:
necessary, contingent, free, by
chance, etc.
11. Christ is the supreme
example

12. Christ is the supreme
example
Not required by model: Not all
acts must be equally
providential
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8. All societies (not just
humans) are brought into the
kingdom of God
9. Providence cannot reach its
end without creaturely
cooperation
10. Christ is the supreme
example of following the divine
initial aims

Regarding the range of providence, Helm, Dodds, and Bracken are again in total
agreement, at least initially (see table 6). All three understand God’s guidance as extending to
all of creation, living and non-living, and down to the smallest bits of creation—be that atoms,
sub-atomic quarks, or actual occasions.53 In order for all of creation to participate in
providence and given how connected human beings are to the rest of creation, all of creation
must be included. The fourth criterion is clearly that providence extends to all things. However,
the way in which “all things” are included opens up a debate between the three models,
especially regarding the manner in which human beings are included. For Helm, all of creation
is included in general providence, and human beings are included in a special way through
predestination.54 Predestination is a sub-category of general providence. For Dodds,
predestination, or the special providence guiding human beings, takes priority over general
providence which assists human beings on the path toward their proper end.55 Consequently,
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general providence is a sub-category of predestination. Finally, for Bracken, there is no
predestination, only a flexible general providence which is oriented toward participation in the
kingdom of God by all creatures.56
Despite these conflicts over the priority of human beings in God’s providential plan, all
three of the models recognize human beings’ unique ability to make decisions, act, self-reflect,
and be responsible. Even in the Calvinist and Thomistic models, where God is properly
understood as the Cause of all that happens, human beings are called to participate or
cooperate with God’s providential plan in a special way.57 In Bracken’s model, while all types of
societies can claim some responsibility, human decisions require special consideration because
they carry moral weight.58 Human participation is the fifth criterion for a doctrine of
providence. The element of participation, found in all three models, identifies the function of
providence within a theological system and is a necessary criterion for identifying providence
in any system.
All three models make a Christological turn in their descriptions of divine providence.
Helm, who notes that not all acts are equally providential, describes Christ’s life, death, and
resurrection as the most providential act.59 Christ is the supreme example of providence in two
senses in these models. First, the coming of Christ is the ultimate example of God’s
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omnibenevolence and desire to guide creation to a good end because Christ frees humanity
from sin. Second, Christ is the perfect example of human cooperation with God’s providential
plan.60 Christ represents what all people could do if not bound by sin. Since the function of
providence is to allow for human participation and eschatological hope, Jesus Christ, as a
perfected human being, must be the perfect example of that participation. Furthermore, his
participation in bringing about the kingdom of God is a source of hope for our own ability to
contribute to the kingdom. Therefore, Christ as the supreme example of providence is the sixth
criterion.
4. Comparing the Effect of Providence on Human Beings
Table 7. Effect of Providence on Human Beings
Helm’s Calvinist Model

Dodds’ Thomistic Model

Bracken’s Process Model

13. Humans are responsible for
sin
Not required: Humans do not
need indeterministic human
freedom
14. Providence provides
freedom from anxiety
15. Providence provides hope
for the future

12. Humans are responsible for
sin
13. Humans experience real
chance and indeterministic
freedom
14. Providence provides hope
for the future

11. Humans and non-humans
are responsible for sin/evil
12. Humans and non-humans
experience real chance and
indeterministic freedom
13. Providence provides hope
for the future

Not required: God does not
need to “respond” to human
beings

14. Prayer can help one follow
the initial aim
15. Prayer can increase the
good energy of a society

16. Providence leads to action
Not required: Providence does
not need to be observable
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The seventh and eighth criteria have to do with the effect of providence on human
beings. This category deals with how providence is experienced by human beings (see table 7).
The seventh criterion, which is shared by all three models, claims that despite the providential
plan, human beings are responsible for sin. Even in Helm’s Calvinist model, in which God
foreordains all actions, sin is the responsibility of human beings.61 Although Helm’s model uses
a compatibilist version of human freedom, humans are still responsible. Nevertheless, it must
be noted that indeterministic freedom is exceedingly important to both Dodds and Bracken,
and this point alone would be enough for them to reject Helm’s model outright.62
Responsibility for sin is necessary for true participation because it implies ownership over our
actions; it ensures that creaturely participation is not merely receptive but active.
The eighth and final criterion once again deals directly with the function of providence.
Providence is a source of hope—eschatological hope in particular. It is the reason to believe
that there is a good end coming, and, consequently, the reason to do what one can to help
bring about that end.
5. Summary of Criteria
The elements that made up the Calvinist, Thomistic, and process models of providence
in the previous three chapters have been whittled down to eight criteria for a doctrine of
providence in table 8 below. The first criterion makes a Christian doctrine of providence
possible, while criteria two through eight contribute to the mutually strengthening functions of
providence which are to allow creaturely participation in bringing about the kingdom of God
61
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and to provide eschatological hope. These criteria were developed to be a minimum criteria,
meaning all Christian models of providence should satisfy the entire list. Of course, Helm’s,
Dodds’, and Bracken’s models meet all of these criteria. In chapter six, these criteria will be
used to identify and develop the place of providence within John Caputo’s theological system.
Table 8. Criteria for a Doctrine of Providence
Category

Criteria for Doctrine

Source of the Doctrine

1. Providence relies on revelation

God and the meaning
of providence

2. God is omnibenevolent
3. God has a different relation to time than creation which allows for divine
action that does not conflict with scientific causality

Range of providence

4. Providence includes all things
5. Providence requires human participation/cooperation
6. Christ is the supreme example

Effect of providence on
human beings

7. Humans are responsible for sin
8. Providence provides hope for the future

In the middle of the story of Job, Job begins to despair and wonder why his life is so
senseless. Running out of hope he says:
For there is hope for a tree,
if it is cut down, that it will sprout again,
and that its shoots will not cease.
Though its root grows old in the earth,
and its stump dies in the ground,
yet at the scent of water it will bud
and put forth branches like a young plant.
But mortals die, and are laid low;
humans expire, and where are they?63
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The doctrine of providence seeks to convey that despite apparent evidence to the contrary, life
is more like the tree. The possibility of a young sprout is the eschatological hope for a
resurgence of life. That hope ignites a cooperative attempt to bring about the new plant as a
joint effort between God (the rain) and creation itself (the stump). Providence provides the
hope and motivates the participation to bring about the good end.

CHAPTER FIVE
CAPUTO AND THE CRITIQUE OF ONTOTHEOLOGY
We have now arrived at the main question. What happens to the doctrine of providence
in John Caputo’s work? Can a weak God or weak theology be providential? Before diving in,
now is a good time review the development so far and point to where the argument is going.
The three models of providence described in chapters one, two, and three have much in
common. All three come from contemporary theologians working within the Christian tradition
who also self-identify as Christian. While variations can be seen between the Calvinist,
Thomistic, and process conceptions of God, all three are confident that whatever God’s nature,
God is capable of guiding creation to a good end and will use human cooperation to do so. In
chapter four, a comparison of their models resulted in eight shared elements across all three
models which together ensure Christian hope and motivate human participation.
In this chapter, the central question of the dissertation is framed through the
introduction of Caputo’s work and the critique of ontotheology. The chapter has three main
sections. First, Caputo’s work will be briefly introduced. Next the critique of ontotheology will
be explained, especially Caputo’s specific concerns regarding ontotheology. Finally, the third
section of this chapter will describe how the critique of ontotheology in Caputo’s work raises
challenges, but also gestures toward an opening, for a doctrine of providence like those
described in chapters one, two, and three.
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In the final chapter, chapter six, the shared elements of the Calvinist, Thomistic, and
process models of providence will be used as criteria to identify and reimagine what the
doctrine of providence could be in Caputo’s work. By preserving a doctrine of providence, the
Christian hope and human participation that providence ensures will also be preserved.
Introducing John D. Caputo
John D. Caputo began his academic career as a philosopher. As a scholar of Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Martin Heidegger, and especially Jacques Derrida, his critique of
ontotheology began as a philosophical endeavor. It could have also ended as a philosophical
endeavor. However, by 2011, having achieved emeritus status at both Syracuse University and
Villanova, Caputo had rebranded himself as a “radical” theologian.1 His take on theology is
chronicled in what he refers to as a “postmodern treatise on the divine names”2 consisting of
The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (2006), The Insistence of God: A Theology of
Perhaps (2013), and The Folly of God: A Theology of the Unconditional (2016). The three books
do not so much function as three separate parts, but rather three articulations of the whole,
expressed in slightly different language each time. The Weakness of God: A Theology of the
Event, Caputo’s first attempt, is the most poetic of the three. The Insistence of God: A Theology
of Perhaps is the most technical with ample references to well-known philosophers and
theologians. The Folly of God: A Theology of the Unconditional is the shortest, offering a
concise summary of Caputo’s theology. Postmodern theology, sometimes referred to as radical
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Christianity, insists on a move from theo-logic (theology) to theopoetics.3 It therefore resists a
certain amount of systemization. Nevertheless, just as one can more deeply appreciate a
beautiful poem after thoughtful analysis, a strong theopoetics is not destroyed by analysis. To
understand Caputo, as a philosopher and a theologian, we must understand the critique of
ontotheology and how it applies to the figures we have been discussing.
Caputo’s Rejection of Ontotheology
The term “onto-theo-logy,” as it was written by Martin Heidegger, was popularized by
Heidegger’s critique of the history of metaphysics. His critique was then picked up by Derrida
and others and applied especially to classical and scholastic theologians. These theologians
conceptualize being in terms of essence and existence, in other words, ontologically and
theologically. Ontologically, a being’s essence is who or what the being is. Theologically, a
being’s existence places the being in relation to the totality, or in relation to God.4 God is also
conceptualized in terms of essence and existence, although God’s essence already implies
God’s existence. To speak of God in terms of being, whether one intends God to be “a being”
or “being itself,” is to close off the possibility of God as completely Other.5 God becomes
comparable to other beings, even if God is always greater than them. This is, in fact, the
simplest definition of ontotheology: “God is the highest being”6 and causes the world.

3
John D. Caputo, The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2013), 20; and Caputo, Folly of God, 93.
4

Iain Thompson, “Ontotheology,” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, ed. François Raffoul and
Eric S. Nelson (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 321.
5

6

Ben Vedder, “Religion and Theology” in Raffoul and Nelson, Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, 332.

Hartmut von Sass and Eric E. Hall, Groundless Gods: The Theological Prospects of Post-Metaphysical
Thought (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 9.

124

When this ontotheological move occurs, there are several related negative results.
While these categories overlap significantly and one could divide them differently, three of
those negative results and their appearance in Caputo’s work will be highlighted. First, God
becomes an explanation. God is not a place-holder to explain existence nor a super-being in
the sky that makes things happen.7 This is a conceptual critique. Second, history is ignored.
When all particular beings in the world are intended to fit into a larger narrative in relation to
the totality of God, the tragedies and losers of history have no voice in the narrative.
Furthermore, the ontotheological model cannot account for the unnecessary and the
contingent.8 This is a historical critique. Third, if God is thought of as a super-being in the sky
and if the all-encompassing nature of God cannot leave room for contingencies or tragedies,
ontotheology can actually do moral violence.9 If there is no room for the Other, and I believe I
speak for God (as a political/religious leader or merely a follower), then I can ignore or dispose
of the Other. This is an ethical critique. All three of these concerns can be found in Caputo’s
work.
Caputo begins his rejection of ontotheology in The Weakness of God: A Theology of the
Event with the 2004 earthquake/tsunami which resulted in hundreds of thousands of fatalities
in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand.10 Caputo describes two “blasphemous images of
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God” that resulted in the immediate aftermath.11 Some used the occasion to suggest that God
is unhappy with human sinfulness and that the natural disaster was a deserved punishment for
those sins. Others preached that God knew the earthquake/tsunami was coming and would kill
innocent people but did not prevent it for reasons that can only remain a mystery to us.12
Caputo promises a third alternative by rejecting the ontotheology which understands God as a
“strong force with the power to intervene.”13 When God is not thought of as a strong force,
worldviews which ignore history and believers who do violence to the Other will no longer be a
part of theism, at least that is Caputo’s hope. We will begin with the conceptual critique of
ontotheology which claims that God is not a super-being.
1. Conceptual Critique
The conceptual critique of ontotheology brings to light the problems of a doctrine of
God which associates God with being and power.14 Aquinas is often identified as the prime
example of this conceptual problem, although there have been many attempts to rehabilitate
or exempt Aquinas from this critique.15 Caputo sums up the claims against Aquinas by
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explaining that although Aquinas makes it very clear that God is not a being, since that would
make God finite, to call God “being itself” fails to fully resolve the problem.16 God still exists
and would continue to exist if all else disappeared.17 He continues, “For Aquinas treats God as
an agent who does things or makes things, a person who makes decisions, a mover who
chooses to move things (the first ‘prime mover,’ of course), the ‘first cause’ of all things.” 18 All
these activities of God imply God has both being and power. And, while Aquinas intends these
phrases to apply to God in only an analogical way, for Caputo and others, the relationship
between God and human conceptions of being/power is still too strong.19
How, then, can one properly conceive of God? Caputo begins with an apophatic
approach. He writes, “The proper concept of God is the concept of that which exceeds any
concept.”20 However, Caputo does not stop there. Negative theology makes the claim that
since God transcends all of our concepts, one always is more accurate in saying God is not this
or that than God is. While an apophatic approach maintains the otherness of God, the God
above all our concepts still sounds supremely strong to Caputo. He suggests that instead of
transcending us above, God calls from below.21 His critique of mystical theology follows the
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same logic. While mystical theology rejects using metaphysical language to talk about God, it
makes the mistake of placing God beyond metaphysics rather than prior to metaphysics. God
does not transcend being; God does not yet exist.22 That being said, Caputo is very fond of the
mystics, and if anyone is consistently described as “on the right track,” it is them.
So, Caputo rejects the God of being and power. But why? Quite simply because that
conception of God is hard for him to swallow. As he writes, “The record of the Supreme Being
of stopping the evil ones in their tracks, of making our enemies our footstool, of shrinking
cancerous tumors, and the like, is so bad, you have to wonder why the theologians keep
bringing it up.”23
In order to combat the conception of God as powerful, Caputo suggests thinking of God
as “weak.”24 The weak force of God is the force of patience, forgiveness, hospitality, gift-giving,
and the kingdom of God.25 Forgiveness, for example, does not coerce and comes without
reason. It rejects retaliation.26 To say God is the weak force of forgiveness means that God
comes to be through forgiveness and is the call to forgive. It is not say God is the power of
forgiveness as if forgiveness could be used as weapon or tool to manipulate people.27
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Caputo’s reimagining of God as weak is not without precedent. He names his primary
sources regarding this the term “weakness” as Gianni Vattimo, Derrida, Walter Benjamin, and
St. Paul.28 Vattimo is a postmodern Catholic known for “weak thought.” Weak thought replaces
strong religion by recognizing the view of the world is limited to interpretations of reality
rather than objective reality.29 Vattimo hopes his hermeneutical perspective will combat the
violence done in the name of absolutes and turn people instead towards greater charity.30
Caputo hopes the same for his weak theology,31 as seen below in the ethical critique.
Derrida uses the word “weak” in describing the “weak force” of the unconditional.32
The unconditional, something like justice, for example, does not have any real power or
sovereignty. Justice itself does not make anything happen. Rather, justice is a call.33 Caputo,
likewise, describes the unconditional named “God” as a call or that which insists.
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Benjamin’s use of weakness comes in his description of “weak messianic power.”34 If
God is not an all-powerful being in the sky, God cannot save us. Benjamin suggests that we are
meant to be the messiah, although we only have “weak messianic power.” By remembering
the dead, we do not bring them back to life or undo the injustices done, but we do offer a kind
of hope and a kind of redemption.35 When Caputo refers to the weakness of God, he means
“that what is done in the name of God is done by human beings in the name ‘God’,”36 in this
case, redemption.
Finally, Caputo identifies St. Paul as a source for the word “weak.”37 In his letters, Paul
explains how the power of God is not what even the believers expected it to be. Rather than
the power of a king, God’s power lies in the cross and kenosis. For Paul and Caputo the image
of Jesus on the cross is the prime example of the way God works in the world. Both agree that
God does not employ traditional feats of power in order to bring about justice. However,
although Paul speaks of the weakness of God, Paul’s description of God’s weakness is
significantly different than Caputo’s, and Caputo is well aware of this fact. When Paul writes,
“For Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but we proclaim Christ crucified, a
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stumbling-block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles,”38 he is describing God as weak. But,
descriptions like these are always followed by explaining that God’s power only appears weak.
In reality, it is humans who are foolish because they fail to recognize the nature of God’s
power and sovereignty. In this passage Paul continues, “For God’s foolishness is wiser than
human wisdom, and God’s weakness is stronger than human strength.”39 Caputo, on the other
hand, is not suggesting that God’s power is misunderstood or delayed. The crucifixion of Jesus
of Nazareth could not be prevented by God nor did Jesus want to be crucified. For the
witnesses to this event, past and present, Jesus’ death is a call to overthrow injustice and
violence, but the crucifixion itself does not accomplish this task.40 Acknowledging this
difference, Caputo cites Dale Martin’s work on Corinthians, noting that the New Testament
scholar reads Paul as contrasting human power with divine power, not power with weakness.41
Paul Helm interprets Corinthians similarly.42 Despite Caputo’s attempt at transparency, his use
of Paul is not without critique. Carl Raschke argues that the postmodern move to a weak God
has no grounding in Paul and that the name of God has always been a name for power. He
writes:
A “weak God” is not really god, or even the simulacrum of a God, even for Nietzsche.
Gods are always about power—unexpected, unexpurgated, explosive, and exponential
38
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power. Krishna revealing himself to Arjuna as the lights of a million suns! Time,
Destroyer of Worlds! The voice from the burning bush! The stranger on the road to
Emmaus!43
Nevertheless, when speaking of the God of Christianity, most theologians would go at least as
far as Michael Dodds who claims that although God is not weak, God at least knows and
understands weakness through the human nature of Christ.44
To recap, the first critique of ontotheology by Caputo is that associating God with being
and especially power is conceptually problematic. Furthermore, God should be rethought as
weak, so long as weakness is not taken to simply mean a hidden power.
2. Historical Critique
The historical critique of ontotheology is a rejection of grand narratives which erase the
losers and anomalies of history and remove the possibility of novelty and the unexpected. In
Hoping Against Hope: Confessions of a Postmodern Pilgrim, Caputo writes that any
postmodern theology, whether it moves towards weakness or not, has to deal with the
disappearance of grand narratives if it wants to be grounded in reality. He writes that all
“stories that show the ultimate point of things,” are met with “incredulity” and with good
reason.45 Everything we know of the world scientifically tells us that one day our sun will
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explode and the universe will either expand or contract into nothingness. How could the grand
narrative survive that?
Caputo’s worries about a grand narrative are not merely scientific though. If they were,
we could find a workaround. Perhaps we will somehow live on virtually or perhaps there is
another universe.46 His real concern is what grand narratives do to the unconditional, namely,
they condition it. The most in-depth discussion of grand narratives in relation to Caputo’s
theology takes place in The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps. Here, Caputo takes a
surprising turn towards Hegel in chapters five and six, although he cautions, “Hegel's God on
earth is still too powerful and ‘providential’ a divine force for my new species of theologians
and for my weak and spectral ‘perhaps.’”47
In chapter five, Caputo uses Hegel as a foil to Kant, whom Caputo feels has removed
the poetry of theology in favor of a strictly ethical religion.48 Hegel, on the other hand,
describes theology as presentation. Something true happens in the stories of Christianity, such
as the Incarnation and Resurrection, which is why we find them so compelling.49 What Hegel
calls a presentation, Caputo calls poetry or theopoetics. A presentation or poem is an
imaginative, non-literal and yet still true depiction which does not rely merely on reason.
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Caputo appreciates the possibility of something happening within these presentations,
and he calls these happenings ‘events’ (or the impossible, or the unconditional). An event, the
impossible, is the sort of thing that one can hardly believe.50 Something new can come to be
that was completely unforeseen by us in the prior state.51 An event means “the existence of
God is liable to break out at any time, in great and world-historical events, like Paul on the road
to Damascus, and in the smallest things, like the rose that blossoms unseen.”52 Still, Hegel’s
conception of Spirit is too strong for Caputo. For Caputo to accept Hegel, the event must
maintain its event-ness even after the fact.53 If the Spirit can see how one thing led to another,
before, during, or even after the fact, it is not an event. In other words, if God is unable to
predict the future due to its genuine openness but can still understand how we got from there
to here looking at the past, that God is too strong for Caputo. In fact, that God has much in
common with the God Joseph Bracken describes, which will be discussed below. For Caputo,
the event is destroyed if precursors can be traced to the final conclusion.
Caputo obviously has Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History” in mind here. Benjamin
critiques what he calls historicism, where the present understands itself as progress on the
past in order to tell the story of the victors. As Benjamin explains, “All rulers are the heirs of
prior conquerors. Hence, empathizing with the victor invariably benefits the current rulers.” 54
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But, in doing so, the nature of the event, not to mention the losers of history, is erased.55
Furthermore, for Caputo to fully accept Hegel, the Spirit itself would have to be up for grabs
and at risk (for Hegel, the Spirit is always a victor).56 In order for there to be an event, and for
the unconditional to really be unconditional, the Spirit cannot be immune to the possibility of
an event which destroys the Spirit or destroys God. Since the name of God is an event, the
existence of God is not a given, like Hegel’s Spirit is, but rather the responsibility of human
beings.57
3. Ethical Critique
As mentioned above, Caputo is critical of theological systems (such as Kant’s or
Levinas’) that reduce religion to ethics. The theopoetics for which Caputo advocates includes
the call to justice and moral action, but also includes non-ethical calls: an aesthetic call, a call
to hope, a call to joy, a call to “love of life itself.”58 Still, ethical problems resulting from
ontotheology are an important motivator for his weak God theology. If God is an all-powerful
super-being organizing the world, Caputo argues that our own ability to participate in bringing
about the unconditional is hindered. When acts such as hospitality, forgiveness, and gift-giving
(the stuff of the event named God), are rewarded by God, they lose their ability to be
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unconditional.59 Furthermore, the super-being God is always revealed to someone and on the
side of someone. Despite the work done in theologies of religion, historically, when revelation
has been claimed by particular groups, it has resulted in religious violence.60 There are those
who know God and are known by God and those who do not and are not. As Mary-Jane
Rubenstein puts it, “The moment I know who the Messiah is and when he is coming, I know
who is in the kingdom and who is out—and will behave accordingly.”61 There is always (if not
theoretically, then practically) an Other who is excluded by the people of the super-being God.
Finally, there is the age-old criticism against the ontotheological God that believers will be led
to quietism. Readers of the models of providence presented in the first three chapters will
know this is denied by proponents of a classical God. For Caputo, this final criticism is not proof
that a Supreme Being does not exist, but it is a very good reason to stop waiting around for
God to take care of the evil in the world.62 As Caputo points out, Christianity has always been
about becoming the body of Christ and making God present in the world.63 It is time to stop
worrying about what God is doing and start doing ‘godly’ things.
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4. Ontotheology in Helm, Dodds, and Bracken
In order to see where Caputo’s theology stands in relation to the previous systems, it
will be helpful to briefly note where Helm, Dodds, and Bracken run into ontotheology in their
work. To begin, Helm immediately falls prey to the conceptual critique by understanding God
as Cause. This instrumetalizes God. God becomes a way to explain the world, even if the
explanation is only that we cannot in this life see the full picture. Helm also must face the
historical critique, as the “Happy Fall” and secret providence of God do not keep a record of
the losers of history. A theological system in which everything is for the greater good only tells
the stories of the saved. Finally, regarding ethics, Helm’s acceptance of manipulation, reward,
and punishment in the God-human relationship would prevent one from acting unconditionally
as Caputo describes.
Dodds holds a similar classical view of God and therefore faces similar critiques. Dodds
understands God as Cause (conceptual critique), as one who smooths out tragedies for the
greater good (historical critique), and as one who rewards and punishes (ethical critique).
However, Dodds’ understanding of free will does give him an ethical edge over Helm.
Bracken’s theological system is the most interesting case, as process theism is meant to
address many of the problems of ontotheology. Nevertheless, Caputo has his reasons for not
becoming a process theologian. Conceptually, process theism moves away from understanding
God as an omni-everything super-being, but it does not totally distance itself from being.
Robert Masson makes an interesting argument that the way Bracken uses analogy to speak of
God suggests there must be something in common between creatures and God in order to
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create the comparison.64 Masson’s point can be seen in Bracken’s positive appraisal of JeanLuc Marion. In God Without Being, Marion’s insight is that God loves before God is.65 Bracken
adds that what is true for God is also true for everything else: being follows activity.66 Thus, we
can speak analogically about God. Masson’s critique of Bracken’s conclusion is that if actual
occasions analogically participate in the activity of God, the societies of actual occasions (or
beings) are also analogically related to God as a being or entity.67 Due to this comparability
between human beings and God, Masson concludes that Bracken is more vulnerable to the
critique of ontotheology than most Thomists, even though process theism is meant to critique
classical theology.68
While Bracken is on better grounds than Helm and Dodds regarding the ethical critique
since the future is open, his system fits what Caputo rejects in Hegel in the historical critique.
Caputo explains that the Spirit is not subject to the event in Hegel. “In my view, what all this
real contingency really amounts to is that the Spirit can achieve its destination (telos) in many
different ways. Whatever arbitrary chance befalls it, the Spirit will always and necessarily
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achieve its destination. There is no chance that it will not.”69 While process theism allows the
future to remain open, even for God, Bracken is still confident that everything will work out
well in the end. Certainly Bracken does not entertain the possibility that God could be
altogether destroyed one day in the future!
Caputo’s Rejection of Providence
Caputo is my central conversation partner in this chapter, but flipping through the
indexes of his “trilogy”70 on the weakness of God, you won’t find the word providence at all.
This is indicative of a larger truth about Caputo’s work—it calls into question the doctrine’s
very existence. Much of Caputo’s work, in an indirect way, is treatise on why providence is a
bad idea. Nevertheless, the concept does come up in the texts directly and repeatedly, if
briefly, for example in The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps where he writes, “To pray
is to say 'come' to what we cannot see coming, none of us, including God. Divine 'providence'
arises from the assumption that somebody must know what is going on, and if not God, then
who? Who, indeed! Suppose no one knows what is going on? That is the event.”71 And, in The
Folly of God: A Theology of the Unconditional, Caputo adds, “Nothing says that the worst will
not happen. No invisible hand ensures a good outcome. No Providence guides is like a ship to a
safe harbor. Nothing says that the good will triumph and the evil will repent their ways or be
punished. The event means the coming of what we cannot see coming and nothing says that it
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will all end well.”72 Caputo describes the name of God as an event to emphasize the radical
unpredictability and open-endedness of the future. If God is an event, then providence is a
fantasy. Still, I want to investigate Caputo’s rejection of providence a bit more fully. While
Caputo’s rejection of providence is related to his rejection of ontotheology, a few additional
points can be highlighted here.
Caputo’s project begins with a rejection of God’s sovereignty. Christianity’s depictions
of God as king, lord, or ruler have often been critiqued for the way they have justified (male)
human powers on earth. But, Caputo states quite bluntly that the problem with traditional
ontotheology is “the paradigm of sovereignty itself” not just the misapplications or
misappropriations of God’s power.73 Consequently, rather than a sovereign God above, the call
of God comes from a weak God below:74 a God of patience and forgiveness which Caputo calls
the “power of powerlessness.”75 The result is a world open to risk. Unlike the strength of a First
Cause, the weak force of forgiveness does not guarantee a good outcome. A weak God does
not sound very providential.
A sovereign-less God means a kingdom of God with no king. So, we might ask what
exactly it is that God is doing, if not ruling. Here we see a possible opening for providence. God
is the call which lures us toward the kingless kingdom. Consequently, God is not a neutral

72

Caputo, Folly of God, 119.

73

Caputo, Weakness of God, 53.

74

Ibid., 36.

75

Ibid., 29.

140

call—the name of God is a call to justice and goodness. In The Weakness of God: A Theology of
the Event, Caputo writes, “God is taken to be, not the reason things are there or the cause that
makes them happen or the power supply that can intervene when things go wrong, but the
reason that they are or can be good.”76 We might respond in positive, negative, or insane ways
to God’s call—and God has no control, no sovereignty over that. Yet, the call itself has a
direction even while the kingdom of God remains hidden, unpredictable, even impossible.
Nevertheless, we must be careful in our imagining of the kingdom because Caputo also
rejects totalizing narratives that too easily erase the particular events along the way. Caputo
rejects a full Hegelianism because some form of providence takes the place of the event. In the
end, everything, though unpredictable initially, fits a comprehensible chain of causes and
effects when viewed from the end. Instead, in Caputo’s “headless Hegelianism,”77 as he calls it,
God does not direct the future providentially by acting as a transcendent cause nor is God able
to weave events together in a providential pattern after the fact. In The Folly of God: A
Theology of the Unconditional, this is the point where Caputo notes straightforwardly that the
weak God, the unconditional, “is not Divine Providence transcribed into space and time but a
more radical roll of the dice.”78
No guarantee of a good ending to tie together our story means no guarantee of heaven
or the kingdom, which is typically the providential end Christians have in mind for human
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beings. All three models of providence we examined included such an end. In Hoping against
Hope: Confessions of a Postmodern Pilgrim, Caputo plays with the idea that perhaps
technology could be our savior and we could enjoy afterlives of uploaded consciousness. But,
as Caputo notes, it seems that not even our universe will last forever, much less our
computers.79 With his realist approach to the inevitable destruction of the universe, I do not
think Caputo is at all worried that there will not be an end. But, the hoped for kingdom of God,
can only be that—hoped for.80 That kingdom may also look a bit a different than our previous
models suggest. While Dodds calls for a “dynamic stillness of abiding love,”81 Caputo calls for a
Mad Hatter tea party.82 Both of these visions of the kingdom of God provide a direction and
view of completion—an end, even if we never reach it in full (and Caputo does not expect that
we will). For the paradoxical “dynamic stillness” to find a place in Caputo’s Wonderland, and
for it to resist becoming a totalizing narrative, its existence must remain at risk. Still, perhaps
Caputo’s notion of the kingdom has something to do with providence.
When we turn in particular to chapter four’s conclusions about what providence does,
we begin to see further openings for providence. Providence, we saw, offers a way for human
beings to participate. It is our opportunity to interact with God and to make something good,
beautiful, or loving. This is similar to how Caputo describes responding to the call. The call calls
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us to what is good and is our opportunity to bring God into existence in the world. When we
answer the call in the right way, “God” can happen.
In the three models of providence examined in chapters one, two, and three,
providence also provides a reason to have hope. When things look like they are going badly,
one can justifiably remain hopeful if one trusts that God is in control and good will be
victorious over evil. Caputo is concerned with hope as well, but he imagines a “groundless
ground” for hope.83 For Caputo, to hope is to be in a precarious situation.84 One cannot hope
when a beautiful and good end is already guaranteed. To lack providence does not negate the
possibility of hope, according to Caputo, but rather it requires that God hope along with us.85
Hope means that although there is no guarantee that anyone will answer the call and bring
God into existence, we are not pre-ordained to fail either.86 Nevertheless, if we recall Langdon
Gilkey’s plea for new work on the doctrine of providence, it is clear he would be scandalized by
the trust Caputo places in human beings to bring about change in the world, and he would be
equally upset by Caputo’s lack of faith in God’s ability to do anything in the world.87

83

John D. Caputo, “Hoping Against Hope: The Possibility of the Impossible” (lecture, Fuller Theological
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Concluding Thoughts
This chapter has brought us to the crux of the matter. Caputo’s weak God theology
avoids the problems of ontotheology but greatly diminishes the possibility of providence in the
process. Nevertheless, we have seen some places where traces of providence may enter back
in and still provide a reason to participate and hope. In the next chapter, the criteria for
identifying providence will be used to reimagine providence in Caputo’s weak God theology in
the openings identified here.
At this point a brief story must be told. In April 2016, I spoke with Caputo about this
project and his rejection of providence. He seemed slightly taken aback by my allegations and
suggested at the time that he does not so much reject providence as he fails to acknowledge it
at all. In later communication, he clarified that he does reject providence since it requires a
divine agent but that he is open to the idea of providence as merely the call for us to make a
plan.88 So, we move forward with Caputo’s blessing.

88

John D. Caputo, email message to author, May 5, 2016.

CHAPTER SIX
REIMAGINING PROVIDENCE
In this chapter, an understanding of providence will be constructed from within John
Caputo’s weak God theology. In order to construct providence in this somewhat hostile
environment, we must be free to reimagine what providence might mean. The reason for doing
this is two-fold. First, as we saw in the previous chapter, Caputo has good reasons for rejecting
the ontotheological God that Paul Helm’s, Michael Dodds’, and Joseph Braken’s models require.
Second, the Calvinist, Thomistic, and process models fail to convince many Christian
theologians, not to mention non-Christians. As Langdon Gilkey pointed out decades ago, we are
in a time when many theologians feel more comfortable ignoring the question of providence
altogether than attempting to address it. Caputo falls into that category. However, the doctrine
of providence is a doctrine central to Christianity and not easily disposed of. In fact, Christian
non-theologians almost always carry a latent understanding of providence as a part of their
faith, even when their understandings flounder when applied to real world situations.
Among Christians, there is strong sense of God's providence but a lack of intellectual
coherence regarding how providence functions in one's life. Often, one or more problematic
stances are taken. In some cases God's action in the world is relegated to the place of chance. If
God’s actions are unpredictable and detached from human intention and participation, the
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result is a theology of anti-planning (quietism).1 Alternatively, all worldly events are sometimes
interpreted as a message from God which leads to both prosperity gospels and the
condemnation of victims of natural or personal disaster.2 These Christians need new ways to
articulate how God is present in their lives. They need a sense of providence which is not only
comforting but also empowering, sensitive, and nuanced. At the same time, Christians are at
risk of losing their sense of God’s guidance in the world completely. The wars of the last
century and the ecological crisis of this century have led many, including Christians, to believe
that the world will not likely come to a good end. At best, the future remains unknown. A
reconstruction of providence needs to speak to the contemporary situation and acknowledge
our own uncertainty about God's ability to bring all to a good end while still affirming that
authentic hope is possible. This is the type of providence we hope to imagine here.

1

As an example of providence leading to quietism, consider my aunt who was diagnosed with skin cancer
a few years ago. While she did get the cancerous area removed, she acknowledged little connection between her
own actions and her health/life. When asked whether the condition was serious and what type of treatment she
would undergo, she said she did not really care whether she lived or died. Besides, whatever God wanted to
happen to her would happen regardless of her actions.
2

Many Christians fall into the prosperity gospel trap. Take, for example, Youtube vloggers Derek and
Sabrina. When pregnant Sabrina’s water broke at 23 weeks, they prayed for an increase in amniotic fluid to carry
them through to at least 34 weeks before delivering. Despite good fluid levels at 30 weeks, doctors told them they
were very unlikely to make it that long before needing to deliver the baby. Nevertheless, Derek and Sabrina
interpreted the fluid levels at 30 weeks as a sign that God was overcoming the boundaries of western medicine
because of their prayers. Furthermore, their good fortune was meant as witness to others that with sufficient
faith God will liberate one from suffering. Their baby, as the doctors predicted, was delivered 4 days later. See
Derek and Sabrina, “My Water Broke at 23 Weeks: PPROM: Things Don’t Always Go as You Plan” (vlog), posted
March 27, 2017, accessed May 27, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30hUBtcwg4I; Derek and Sabrina,
“Week 30 Pregnancy Update: Baffling Doctors: Reality is Setting In” (vlog), posted May 8, 2017, accessed May 27,
2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gs_P-Pzit6U; Derek and Sabrina, “The Birth of Truman John: What a
Ride: Birth at 30 Weeks” (vlog), posted May 9, 2017, accessed May 27, 2017,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Bq3YnwVk88.
Examples of blaming tragedy or natural disaster on human sinfulness unfortunately abound. Almost
every natural disaster is followed by attempts to scapegoat or justify God’s involvement by blaming the disaster
on acts deemed immoral that have no direct relation to the disaster itself.
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“Reimagining providence” means offering a way of living in the world—a way of moving from
despair, apathy, or smugness to action.
Nevertheless, in order to call it providence in a meaningful way, some account of the
criteria for a doctrine of providence, from chapter four, must be given. The first section of this
chapter moves through each criterion and reimagines how it might relate to providence in a
weak God theology. The brief second section discusses the possibility of rejecting providence
rather than reimagining providence. It then summarizes the main features of what a
reimagined providence in Caputo’s weak God theology would look like, if that option is chosen
over a reading of Caputo in which providence is no longer needed for Christianity.
Criteria for Identifying Providence
Since Caputo does not develop a doctrine of providence in his own work, a supporting
player is necessary to inform the construction of providence here. Throughout this chapter,
Michael Welker’s work on the Holy Spirit will be used as a jumping off point for a reimagined
providence. In fact, a turn to the Holy Spirit is already anticipated by Caputo when he writes,
“If you stick to the facts, you soon see that God is spirit, and the spirit is a specter of an
event.”3 Welker’s main concern is not the doctrine of providence either, but his work on the
Holy Spirit offers a way to think about God’s action in the world which is non-totalizing and is
dependent on human participation. Welker, while not considering himself a process
theologian, is influenced by process theism, providing a bridge to the more traditional models

3

John D. Caputo, The Folly of God: A Theology of the Unconditional (Salem: Polebridge Press, 2016), 118.
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of providence described in chapters one, two, and three.4 Likewise, while uncomfortable with
the term “postmodern,” Welker is also influenced by postmodern theology which provides
common ground with Caputo.5 Welker’s primary work on the Holy Spirit is God the Spirit
(1994) which takes a biblical, realistic approach to the Holy Spirit. By “realistic,” Welker means
that there is a sensitivity to the variety of human experiences of God both within Scripture and
various cultures today.6 A realistic theology does not try to homogenize differences in
experience as a way of controlling future claims of God’s presence. No group can claim
exclusive rights to the experience of God, even when experiences seem contradictory. In the
following subsections, we can construct from Caputo, sometimes with an assist from Welker,
responses to the criteria for providence.
1. Providence Relies on Revelation
Before the seven criteria for a doctrine of providence can be met, a theological system
must be shown to rely on revelation. For simplicity, I am calling this prerequisite the first
criterion out of eight. Without meeting this prerequisite, the discussion of providence is not
possible. Caputo’s postmodern, pluralistic approach to theology does still incorporate an
understanding of revelation, which includes a reliance on Christian Scripture, although he does

4
See John Polkinghorne and Michael Welker, Faith in the Living God: A Dialogue (London: Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2001), 4.
5

Welker dislikes the term “postmodern” because it has been swallowed by popular media. Caputo
shares this concern and often refers to his work as “radical” theology rather than postmodern. See Michael
Welker, God the Spirit, trans. John F. Hoffmeyer (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1994), xii; and Caputo, Folly of God, 1.
6

Welker, God the Spirit, 46-47.
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not understand Scripture to be the Word of God to the extent of our previous theologians
(Helm, Dodds, and Bracken).7
Caputo distinguishes his approach to Scripture from both a humanistic, religious studies
approach and a theological approach which claims direct divine revelation. This means that for
Caputo Scripture does not merely tell us about history, but it does not reveal the concrete
doctrines of fundamentalism either.8 Instead, Scripture is itself the call for the event known as
the kingdom of God.9 Its truth, or what it reveals that one might call God, is a poetic truth
which need not be literally true.10 Therefore, while Scripture is revelatory, it is not revelatory
to the exclusion of other sources of revelation. Caputo writes, “The idea of one true religion or
religious discourse or body of religious narratives makes no more sense than the idea of one
true poem or one true language or one true culture.”11 Caputo’s ultimate goal for this poetic

7

Interpretation of Caputo is mixed on this point. For example, B. Keith Putt writes, “Undoubtedly, the
grand inquisitors of orthodoxy find it incredulous that Caputo should be taken seriously when he writes about
God, or Christ, or the Spirit, or the Church; however, anyone who would exercise a willful suspension of disbelief
and actually read The Weakness of God must affirm that Caputo is not skipping playfully around vandalizing the
Bible, ripping its texts to shreds; on the contrary, he writes on his knees, praying for wisdom, listening for the
comforting and convicting call of what he loves most, that Other who may well be named God, or Christ, or Love,
while simultaneously remaining unnamable.” In contrast, Thomas Park offers an entire essay on Caputo’s
rejection of revelation. As will be seen, I agree more closely with Putt. Caputo does reject certain understandings
of revelation, but not revelation as such. See B. Keith Putts, “Reconciling Pure Forgiveness and Reconciliation:
Bringing John Caputo Into the Kingdom of God,” CrossCurrents 59, no. 4 (December 2009): 501, accessed April 2,
2017. ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, EBSCOhost; and Thomas Park, “Faith in God Without Any
Revelation?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78, no. 3 (December 2015): 315-328, accessed April
2, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9491-0.
8
John D. Caputo, Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2006), 117.
9

Caputo, Weakness of God, 118.

10

11

Ibid.

Ibid. See also John D. Caputo, “The Weakness of God and the Iconic Logic of the Cross,” in Cross and
Khôra: Deconstruction and Christianity in the Work of John D. Caputo, ed. Marko Zlomislić and Neal DeRoo
(Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2010), 17. There, Caputo writes, “I would like to have as many truths as possible,
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approach is actually shared by plenty of Christians who would align themselves more closely
with Helm, Dodds, or Bracken, as can be seen when he writes, “By taking the Scriptures as the
site of an event, we find a way to read the remarkable texts of the Scriptures, to take seriously
texts that describe the most impossible things, while avoiding the Scylla of the fiery faithful,
who literalize them into facts, and Charybdis of cold-hearted unbelievers, who dismiss them
out of hand as fiction.”12 The result is scriptural interpretation which is understood neither as
mundane nor magic.
In addition to Scripture, Caputo turns to the Christian tradition as a source of
revelation. By “tradition” Caputo means “the workings of the Spirit in the people of God”
which allow the people of God, and not just the hierarchy, to read the Christian Scriptures
rightly in a given time.13 Properly understood, revelation does not consist of Scripture and
tradition on equal footing, but rather tradition first and foremost, which happens to include
the compilation of writings which are now called Scripture. When the Spirit works through the
experiences of Christians today, their new interpretations of Scripture, history, and tradition
are added to tradition as the ongoing revelation of the name of God.14

so long as all of them are true.” He gives a similar defense of multiple revelations in John D. Caputo, “Only as
Hauntology is Religion without Religion Possible: A Response to Hart,” in Cross and Khôra, ed. Zlomislić and
DeRoo, 115.
12

Caputo, Weakness of God, 119.
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John D. Caputo, “Tradition and Event: Radicalizing the Catholic Principle” (lecture, Challenge of God
conference, Loyola University Chicago, April 16, 2016), posted June 29, 2016, accessed May 27, 2017,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRSkOUJ1b9w&list=PLDVJZ3DnYTd-h8Vx0vlZDDDtdxUGK0fqU&index=6.
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Nevertheless, Caputo could have chosen sources of revelation other than Christian
ones. While not denying the possibility of the name of God being revealed in all sorts of ways,
his references are actually thoroughly monotheistic and Christian. As he attempts to explain,
“Were I born elsewhere, at another time, all this might be different, something else might be
going on. The name of God is a paradigmatic name for me and there is nothing I can do about
it. . . . It is a paradigmatic name for me, for a lot of ‘us,’ meaning for those of ‘us’ who find
themselves situated in one of the cultures of the great monotheisms.”15 The Christian
paradigm, including its vocabulary and thought patterns, shapes the way Caputo names the
event and offers the name “God” as the inevitable name of choice. Caputo’s logic here can be
extended to his reliance on Christian revelation. Given his Catholic upbringing and immersion
in cultures where Christianity is the majority religion, he naturally grounds his theopoetics in
Christian Scripture, Christian tradition, and experiences interpreted through the lens of a
Christian worldview. In regards to providence, though, a challenge is still posed. If Christian
revelation is only one way to experience revelation, one paradigm among several, then a
providential understanding of the world is only one way to understand the world. That does
not make providence untrue, but it leaves open the possibility of non-providential truths.
2. God is Omnibenevolent
The second criterion for a doctrine of providence is that if there is divine providence,
God must be omnibenevolent. While omnipotence, omniscience, and even omnipresence
cause problems in many theological systems, omnibenevolence tends to be the least

15

Caputo, Hoping Against Hope: Confessions of a Postmodern Pilgrim (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
2015), 178-179
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controversial of the omni- descriptions. However, a common sense understanding of
omnibenevolence still seems to imply that God exists. God must exist in order to exist in an allloving way. Consequently, this is one of the criterion that needs to be reimagined within
Caputo’s system.
According to Caputo, while God does not (yet) exist, the name of God still points to
something good. The kind of events the name of God calls for are events of democracy,
“justice, love, friendship, mercy, life,” etc.16 Caputo writes, “The name of God is powerful
because it is the name of our hope in the contract Elohim makes with things when he calls
them ‘good,’ when he calls them to the good, when he breathes the life of the good over
them.”17 Of course, sometimes no one responds to the call or someone responds in the wrong
way.18 Sometimes the impossible occurs, and it is tragic. When the call of God is misheard,
rather than justice flowing like a river19 “perhaps what will flow will be the blood of injustice,
the worst violence, which happens time and again with names like ‘God’.”20 Still, while events
which happen under the name of God are not always good, the call itself is always good.
Interestingly, this is precisely the point where Richard Kearney notes a departure between the
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Caputo, Folly of God, 85.
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Caputo, Weakness of God, 88. See also Caputo, “Weakness of God and the Iconic Logic of the Cross,”
27. There, Caputo writes, “I think of the world as a gift, not an effect, and of God as beneficence, not cause.”
18
John D. Caputo, The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2013), 15; and John D. Caputo, “The Chance of Love: A Response to Olthuis,” in Cross and Khôra, ed. Zlomislić and
DeRoo, 193-194.
19
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Amos 5:24.

Caputo, Insistence of God, 15-16. See also Caputo, Weakness of God, 5. There, Caputo explains that an
event can be evil rather than good.
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deconstruction of Jacques Derrida and the kingdom of Caputo. According to Kearney, the
impossible for Derrida could be any event—good or evil—whereas the kingdom of God in
Caputo’s writings always promises love and justice, although it might not come to fruition.21
The insistence of God, as Caputo puts it, is that God be made real in the world by us,
which means choosing the power of powerlessness—choosing to give a gift, to forgive, to do
something beautiful or loving.22 Consequently, to the extent one can say something
meaningful about God at all, God is omnibenevolent. God is not omnibenevolent in the sense
of an irresistible, all-consuming goodness, though. The omnibenevolent call can be both
ignored and misinterpreted.
What is the nature of this insistence? Without intending a turn to metaphysics, the
characteristics of the insistent call are those traditionally assigned to the Holy Spirit.23 Welker’s
work on the Spirit is helpful here, as he does not intend a turn to metaphysics either. Like
Caputo, Welker is skeptical of omni- words, especially the suggestion that God might be omnicausing.24 The Spirit, according to Welker, is a liberating force which works through human
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Richard Kearney, “The Kingdom: Possible and Impossible,” in Cross and Khôra, ed. Zlomislić and DeRoo,
133. Caputo disagrees with Kearney’s portrayal of Derrida but not with the importance of the promise of
goodness in his work. He writes, “Derrida was not calling for the monster, or calling for something to happen no
matter what, anything whatsoever, even if it includes the monster, which is how Kearney tends to portray him.”
John D. Caputo, “The Possibility of the Impossible: A Response to Kearney,” in Cross and Khôra, ed. Zlomislić and
DeRoo, 149.
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Caputo emphasizes that it is “us” who are called repeatedly. See for example, Caputo, Insistence of
God, 107; and Caputo, Folly of God, 87, 92.
23

While not necessarily referencing the Holy Spirit, Caputo does use the image of a spirit to talk about
what happens under the name of God. For example, he writes, “This name whispers in our ears that we live in
response to the promptings of a distant promise, to the solicitude of a spirit or specter little known, to a real
beyond the real.” See Caputo, Folly of God, 81.
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Polkinghorne and Welker, Faith in the Living God, 80-81.
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beings in a public fashion.25 As a liberating force, it is always good. However, since human
participation is required, we are at risk of misidentifying the work of the Spirit in the world. 26
We may even attribute an event to the Spirit for generations which upon later examination
was not as liberative at it appeared and not the work the Spirit at all.27 These non-liberative
acts were not caused by God, yet God is still omnibenevolent. All that God does is good, but
everything is not caused by God. Through an analysis of the Holy Spirit’s work throughout
Scripture, Welker can find no reason to suggest that God is omni-causing or even omnipresent
if that is taken to mean equally present in all places and times.28 Rather, the Spirit always
works through particular people in particular times and places, albeit in a public fashion.29
Welker writes, “Where the Spirit acts on human beings, the experiences are firsthand ones.
But these experiences are at the same time experiences for others, experiences that bear
witness.”30 In fact, the work the Spirit is meant primarily for the community rather than for the
transformation of an individual.31
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Welker, God the Spirit, 75, 336.
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Ibid., 336.

27

Welker writes, “Forces that are spiritless, disintegrative, and are detrimental to life, indeed even forces
that are demonic powers, can also generate the illusion of freedom and can elicit misleading experiences,
experiences of supposed freedom. By no means need these experiences be merely subjective and short-lived.
They can be supported by a broad consensus and can outlast a series of generations.” Welker, God the Spirit, 336.
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Welker, God the Spirit, 215. See also Polkinghorne and Welker, Faith in the Living God, 80, 123.
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Welker, God the Spirit, 75, 176.
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Ibid., 176.
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While the public nature of the Holy Spirit is central to Welker’s work, the public nature of the call is
emphasized less in Caputo’s work. One might ask if the call or insistence of God might be to forgive oneself or
seek justice for oneself. Still, if the event is to be unconditional, it is difficult to see how it could be self-serving. I
always have something to gain by forgiving myself or seeking justice for myself. Here, then, we see a point of
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For Caputo, God’s goodness is made present in the impossible event. Welker shows
that this is in fact the way God has always worked. God is not a vague presence everywhere,
but a particular happening at particular historical moments in response to specific needs.
When it is really God the Spirit calling or working though human beings, the call is always
loving and good.
3. God Has a Different Relation to Time than Creation
Which Allows for Divine Action that Does Not Conflict with Scientific Causality
Essential to the doctrine of providence is that human participation as well as natural
causal processes are not superseded by God’s action in the world. A zero-sum understanding
of causality only allows for competition between God and creation, whereas providence
requires unified or collaborative action towards one plan. In the Calvinist, Thomistic, and
process models we examined this was achieved largely by specifying the difference between a
creaturely relation to time and God’s relation to time. By showing how God and creatures
operate on different planes, the models achieve a non-competitive view of scientific causality
and divine action.
Caputo solves the operating on different planes problem swiftly and completely.
Human beings, and all the rest of creation, exist and act in time. God does not exist, and
therefore, has no relation to time. Human and divine acts are never competing causes because
God does not cause things to happen. Likewise, God does not compete with physics.

overlap between Welker/Caputo and Bracken. Recall that Bracken claims a good action is typically one that is
unselfish. See chapter 3; Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., Christianity and Process Thought: Spirituality for a Changing
World (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2006), 11; Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., Does God Roll Dice?: Divine
Providence for a World in the Making (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2012), 136.
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Unfortunately, for a doctrine of providence this raises a question as quickly as it answers one.
The criterion for a doctrine of providence “allows for divine action which does not compete
with scientific causality.” This implies that there is divine action of some kind. The other
models of providence coordinated natural causality with divine causality through
foreordination (Helm), through secondary causes (Dodds), or through overlapping fields of
activity (Bracken). How can this occur within Caputo’s system where the only action towards
the kingdom of God is human action? Again, we turn to Welker’s work on the Holy Spirit for a
possible way out.
If we understand Caputo’s “call” as the work of the Holy Spirit, we can use Welker’s
explanation of the pouring out of the spirit to understand human action in relation to God’s
(in-)action. The action of the Holy Spirit, which is the way God accomplishes God’s will, “comes
to expression through the ‘pouring out’ of the Spirit.”32 Beginning with the first references to
the Spirit in the Old Testament, the Spirit is said to “come upon” a specific person.33 When the
Spirit comes upon or is poured out on a person (or group), that person enters a new a field of
activity.34 Here Welker’s interest in process theism is apparent. The field of activity of the Spirit
is a non-homogenous field of renewal in which the person acts on behalf of others for
liberation.35 For the person overcome with the Spirit, a sense of calmness, trust, and
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Welker, God the Spirit, 228.
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Welker specifically cites Othniel, son of Kenaz (Judg. 3:9-10), Gideon (Judg. 6:34), Jephthah (Judg.
11:29), and Saul (1 Sam. 11:6) as examples of the Spirit “coming upon” a specific person. See Welker, God the
Spirit, 53-55.
34

Welker, God the Spirit, 228. Welker uses the term “force field” rather than “field of activity,” but I have
chosen to stick with Bracken’s phrase, introduced in chapter three, for consistency.
35

Ibid., 229.
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persistence is indicative of the new state.36 However, since the action of the Spirit is a public
action, the individual will not always even be fully aware of his/her participation.37 All those on
whom the Spirit is poured participate in the Spirit’s field of activity which is a “worldencompassing, multilingual, polyindividual testimony to Godself.”38 The Spirit acts neither
directly nor once and for all. Rather, “a multitude of diverse concrete experiences of liberation
are indicative of the Spirit.”39
What then, does this human action have to do with God’s action? Do we need
reference to God or the Spirit at all? And, if not, can this be called providence? Recall that for
Caputo the name of God is another name for the unconditional.40 The appearance of the
unconditional is why we must speak of God at all and why we can speak of providence.
Sometimes, human response to the call results in an event. Welker would attribute these
moments to the pouring out of the Spirit. An event goes beyond what could have been
predicted. Even after it occurs, it is described as impossible, unbelievable, or preposterous.
Both Caputo and Welker describe the presence of the divine as impossible. Welker points out
that the action of the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament occurs in times of extreme distress or
danger. The Holy Spirit provides a way out when there is no way out.41 Similarly, Caputo also
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Ibid.
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Ibid., 75, 78. Welker gives the example of Gideon who is skeptical of the Spirit’s presence and asks for a
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Ibid., 235.
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Caputo, Folly of God, 19.
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Welker, God the Spirit, 52.
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speaks of these unexpected moments (which can be positive or negative experiences). He
writes, “That is what Derrida calls the impossible, not logically impossible, like (p & not-p), but
phenomenologically, like something we just cannot believe.”42 Welker does not mean a logical
impossibility either, but rather something impossible in another way. He explains that
“although God’s Spirit unleashes unexpected forces and produces improbable results, this
Spirit acts under the conditions of what is creaturely and finite.”43 Furthermore, the
consequences of the Spirit remain within the realm of the natural. When the Spirit is poured
out, one does not become a magician, and when one is healed or liberated, one does not
become infinite or impervious to future harm. Human beings remain human beings.
A better way to think of the impossible is the story of Pentecost. When the apostles
received the Spirit, an event occurred and the impossible happened. But, the event was not
impossible in the sense of being confusing, illogical, or contradictory. Rather, the event of
Pentecost which resulted in everyone hearing in their native tongue was impossible for exactly
the opposite reasons! It is was unbelievable because it was moment of shared capacity to
understand.44 Pentecost was “spectacular and shocking.”45 “Without dissolving the variety and
complexity of their backgrounds, without setting aside their forms of expression and
understanding as these forms are marked off in relation to other forms, an unbelievable
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commonality of experience and of understanding occurs.”46 Here we can see this second
criterion for a doctrine of providence really at work in weak God theology. The criterion states
that God cannot compete with scientific causality. Caputo and Welker’s notion of the
impossible accomplishes exactly this. The impossible is actually not that which contradicts
physics. It is not impossible in that sense. But, it is also more than one can expect from human
action and, therefore, points in some way to the divine or unconditional. Even after we have
seen it, we cannot believe it.
4. Providence Includes All Things
Caputo’s first theological book, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event, raised
questions for readers about anthropocentrism. If God is a call brought into being by humans, it
seems God does not have anything to do with the rest of creation. Creation, apart from
humanity, can neither hear nor respond to the call. Caputo attempts to answer these
questions in his next book, The Insistence of God: A Theology of Perhaps.47 His answer is
important because all three models of providence are clear that God’s plan extends to all of
creation. This is one of the least debated or variable aspects of providence. Furthermore, as
determined in chapter four, while hope need not apply to all of creation, participation in
providence is not limited to human beings in the three originally examined models.
The first step of Caputo’s turn away from anthropocentrism is to note that human
beings are already connected to the rest of the created world and, in fact, are made of the
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same stuff.48 Jesus, by virtue of his humanity, is a member of the animal kingdom and is not
exempt from animalistic and material needs.49 Consequently, although Caputo’s work focuses
on human beings and their response to the call, he is already talking about the world. One
cannot speak of human bodies without speaking of the world.50 In the end, people, trees, and
planets are all made of the same cosmic dust. As Caputo puts it, we are all “heavenly bodies.”51
The second step is to remind readers that the call, which Christians name “God,”
cannot ultimately be known. Consequently, we might name the call something else; we might
hear the call as something other than “God.” Caputo suggests that the same call could be said
to occur under the name of “life.” “Life” is the insistence of the world. And, although we know
that life must come to end for individuals, we celebrate when life persists, as do other
creatures. Caputo gives the following example: The call a human being hears when observing
the aesthetics of a painting by Picasso is the same call a chimpanzee hears when observing the
power of a waterfall.52 In the end, though, Caputo concludes that we should not get too caught
up in the caller. He writes, “Is it God who calls? Is it the world? Is it life? The point is that this is
not a query requiring an answer but a call calling for a response.”53 Caputo designates this
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broadened understanding of his own theology a “cosmo-theopoetics.”54 It is “a willingness to
say ‘come’ to a cosmic ‘perhaps,’ where it is the world itself that insists, that comes knocking at
our door.”55
These two steps, noting that human beings are already part of the world and noting
that the caller can go by many names, open the door for a model of providence that extends to
all of creation, on earth and across the universe. While only human beings give the call a name,
all of creation can respond to the call when it is understood as the call of the world, cosmos, or
life.
Furthermore, we can again augment what Caputo explicitly writes with Welker’s work
on the Holy Spirit. Welker faces a similar problem as Caputo. How does the rest of creation
receive the Spirit? Certainly we cannot be satisfied with a completely anthropocentric Holy
Spirit! Welker extends the influence of the Spirit through the public nature of the Spirit’s
actions. As noted above, while the Spirit comes upon particular people, and in that sense is
anthropocentric, the Spirit’s goal and influence always extends beyond the individual. In fact,
conversion of the individual is quite often only a secondary effect at best.
When the Spirit is poured out on a person, the response to the Spirit is not only seen in
the community but also in nature itself, as is indicated by Isaiah 11.56 In this passage, the Spirit
brings about a transformation of the natural world which allows the wolf to live with the lamb,
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the leopard to lie down with the child, and so on.57 Welker claims that “flourishing vegetation”
is a sign of the Spirit which indicates right relations between humanity, cultivated land, and
wild land.58 He writes, “The enduring preservation of flourishing vegetation is threatened just
as much by unrighteousness between human beings and by the consequences of that
unrighteousness, as by ‘conflictual relations’ lying within nature itself: for example, wild
animals, locust plagues, sicknesses, and natural catastrophes.”59 Therefore, providence does
not extend to the rest of creation simply because we are ourselves animals but also because
the fate of creation lies largely in the hands of human beings. Never has this been more true
than today, and we can expect that the responsibility of human beings in the determination of
the fate of the rest of creation will only grow.
The Spirit appears in moments of hopelessness and danger, which, Welker notes,
change over time. In the twentieth century, nuclear destruction was the greatest threat. While
that threat still exists, the twenty-first century is perhaps better characterized by the threat of
environmental destruction.60 Environmental degradation is the demon our world is possessed
with today. Unfortunately, attempts to save the environment are often not driven by the Holy
Spirit even when they appear to be. Rather, we have tried to drive out demons with demons
just as Jesus was (wrongly) accused of driving out demons by the ruler of the demons,
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Beelzebul.61 The Holy Spirit acts in these instances “beyond all human attempts to bring
help”62 but not as a hero or institutionalized power.63 If the Spirit reaches creation (and if
providence reaches creation), it will be through concrete acts by individuals who claim no
power for themselves.
Despite our increasing responsibility for creation, at this point in time we hold very little
responsibility for creation beyond our own planet. Even acting under the Spirit, one’s actions
are unlikely to have any impact on distant galaxies. Therefore, while Welker aids our
understanding of how providence extends to animals, eco-systems, natural formations, and
weather patterns on our own planet, Caputo’s own cosmo-theopoetics better extends
providence to creation beyond earth.
5. Providence Requires Human Participation/Cooperation
The fifth criterion, that providence must allow human beings to participate in the plan,
is the foundation of Caputo’s theological system. It is also more easily addressed than the
previous criteria because its focus is on the unique role of human beings. It is ultimately human
beings who are capable of turning the insistence of God into the existence of God in Caputo’s
system. Providence not only includes the participation of human beings but requires it every
step of the way. Caputo’s repeated refrain is that God insists, but we are responsible for God’s
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existence.64 Welker attributes this to the self-giving nature of the Spirit. For the Spirit to be the
Spirit, it cannot speak for itself.65 In other words, it is part of the nature of God to remain
hidden and to only liberate through the actions of human beings who also act on behalf of
others.66
Importantly, though, the necessity of human participation is balanced by the
impossibility of what human beings are called to do. When the call is answered, it still has the
character of an event. As Welker writes, “The Spirit’s action is a process that human beings
cannot ‘make happen’, cannot manage, cannot bring under their control”67 despite the fact
that the Spirit only acts through actual humans beings. When one responds to the call or acts
in the name of the Spirit, the event exceeds what is possible by human standards. There is a
flash of God’s existence. Since the event is impossible and unwarranted by the human actions
themselves, the event of God is grace. Consequently, Caputo’s heavy reliance on human
participation does not result in Pelagianism. As B. Keith Putt writes, “Caputo’s theology of
salvation reprises—admittedly with some questionable inconsistencies—a classical Protestant
perspective, predicated upon the Apostle Paul, that—salvation comes by grace through faith,
not by works or according to some celestial economy, but ultimately from the
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incomprehensible extravagance of a Godly gift.”68 I agree with Putt and only demur to suggest
that for Caputo the theological virtue of hope takes priority over faith, so it is by grace through
hope that one is saved.
6. Christ is the Supreme Example
Since God does not exist in Caputo’s theological system, the role and meaning of Jesus
Christ must be reimagined alongside providence. Caputo refers to Jesus Christ as “Jesus” rather
than “Christ” to emphasize his humanness (or even animal-ness). While it would be incorrect
to call Jesus “God” in Caputo’s system, Jesus does represent responding to the insistence of
God. The event we call “God” happens through Jesus’ response, and in that sense God exists
through Jesus, but that does not make Jesus divine. Therefore, we cannot answer the question
of whether Christ is the supreme example of cooperating with God in providence.
Nevertheless, as we will see, Jesus, particularly on the cross, is still the supreme example of
responding to the call and bringing the event of God into the world.69
According to Caputo, Jesus reveals what resurrection means as he is dying on the cross.
Central to the meaning of resurrection is the value of life for the sake of life. Therefore, living
for a reward in heaven or to avoid a punishment is contrary to the idea of resurrection.70 As
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Caputo writes, “We live in order to live; we live life for life, not for something else.”71 To
receive more life, new life, is grace.72
Caputo is not very concerned with a literal resurrection of Jesus. For Caputo, the
resurrection occurs in the event of forgiveness on the cross when Jesus forgives those who
have crucified him in a moment where he clearly has nothing to gain.73 It is forgiveness
absolutely freely given and therefore a perfect response to the insistence of God. The Spirit of
God was brought into existence in that moment and, as an act of the Spirit, it was one of the
most public acts there has ever been because it is still being recalled and witnessed two
millennia later. If we are to talk of the post-resurrection Jesus, Welker is helpful. According to
Welker, Jesus is alive, not as a natural human body, but in the Spirit.74 This transformation
from body to Spirit means the resurrection is nothing without the witness of followers because
the Sprit does not speak for itself.75
The witness of the event begins immediately with the robber to Jesus’ side who is
liberated through Jesus’ impossible forgiveness.76 Of course, we know the other robber is still
able to resist the insistence of God. While the event changes the world in an impossible way,
the resurrection that occurs is not life-everlasting in the typical Christian sense. The call of the
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name of God/life does not lead to life going on and on. “We love life not despite but under the
very condition of its mortality, of being a transient gift, a lily that lasts but a day, a lily of the
field that cares not for itself, that neither sows nor reaps but is adorned with the very glory of
God.”77 Just as the work of the Spirit does not remove our finitude according to Welker,78 the
event does not remove our mortality according to Caputo.
Jesus’s resurrection is a reminder to look for resurrection, in the form of forgiveness,
justice, beauty, etc., in our daily lives rather than at the end of life. Caputo writes, “The space
of the world is bent and inflected by a religious genius like Jesus, by his words and deeds, by
the event that takes place in and through his life and death, which ripples across the world in
the memory and the promise of his name.”79 The resurrection of Jesus is a rebirth for this
world rather than a promise for the next. Caputo refers to this as a quotidian grace, a concept
fleshed-out by Ivone Gebara, although Caputo does not cite her.80 Caputo explains that
quotidian grace can attune us to the insistence of God and enable us to see the fragments of
the kingdom which are happening now.81 Gebara, similarly, passes over the notion of an
eschatological resurrection in favor of everyday resurrections.82 She writes, “Salvation will not

77

Ibid., 237.

78

Welker, God the Spirit, 203.

79

Caputo, Insistence of God, 239.

80

Ibid.

81

Caputo, Weakness of God, 167.

82

Ivone Gebara, Out of the Depths: Women’s Experience of Evil and Salvation, trans. Ann Patrick Ware
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002), 129-131. Gebara argues that eschatological understandings of resurrection
which depend on an omnipotent God are often used to maintain the status quo of power relations in the world.

167

be something outside the fabric of life but will take place within the heart of it.”83 This is a
salvation that only occurs in fragments; it is not eternal or universal.84 Her examples include
“beautiful music that calms our spirit, a novel that keeps us company, a glass of beer or a cup
of coffee shared with another . . . a baby long awaited or a love letter that brings us back to
life.”85 Within Scripture as well, salvation comes through the ordinary: sharing food, welcoming
children, respecting women and strangers, and socializing over a meal.86 Caputo’s own list of
moments in Jesus’ life which revealed the kingdom of God highlights many of the same actions
as Gebara’s:
The kingdom takes form in the theopoetics of Yeshua, in the memory and the promise
of what he said and did, in his words of unconditional forgiveness, of mercy for the
least among us, of freedom for the oppressed, of good news for the poor and the
coming year of the jubilee. The kingdom comes by reaching out to the outcasts, sitting
down to table with the outsiders, healing the lame and making the blind to see, driving
out the demons that possess us all.87
These are all moments where someone responded to the insistence of God and the event of
the name of God broke through. And, these are precisely kinds of acts Jesus called for and
lived.
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7. Humans are Responsible for Sin
This criterion is straightforward in Caputo’s system. As Caputo states quite clearly,
“When I deny that God is an agent-being who does things, I am saying that the only thing we
know about agency is human beings doing things under certain names, in response to certain
claims made upon them.”88 He continues, “The weakness of God means that what is done in
the name of God is done by human beings in the name of ‘God’.”89 Since God cannot intervene
in the world and can only insist, God cannot be held responsible for the evil that human beings
bring into the world. Sin, at least some sins, bring about irreparable damage. God can neither
prevent these acts nor correct them after the fact. Caputo adds, “And if sometimes some good
somewhere comes out of it, it would be an obscenity to suggest that that is either an
explanation or a justification.”90 The permanence of human sinfulness is precisely what makes
forgiveness an event.
Likewise, Welker speaks of the hiddenness of the Holy Spirit.91 The Spirit is quiet, and
consequently many people have stopped even looking for the Spirit.92 Since the Spirit does not
impose itself, “the silent, powerless servant of God [the Holy Spirit] does not bring a specific
political or moral program to bear.”93 The work of the Spirit ends up looking different
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everywhere it emerges because rather than having a specific agenda, the Spirit allows itself to
be mediated through particular individuals, times, and cultures.94 The upside of this approach
is diversity. The downside is that the Spirit cannot solve our problems once and for all and we
are still able to sin. Welker explains that sin counters the work of the Spirit. “According to the
understanding of the biblical traditions, ‘sin’ is that action, that behavior, or that posture and
exercise of influence by which—over and above every concrete delinquency and misdeed—the
foundations of life-promoting behavior and the possibilities of repentance are destroyed.”95 In
other words, to sin is to resist the event and therefore to fail to respond to the call for beauty,
justice, hospitality, etc. Welker specifically names the destruction of the environment as an
example where sin has closed off even the hope for a healthy planet.96 He comes to the same
conclusion as Caputo—that forgiveness is the only way forward.97
8. Providence Provides Hope for the Future
The final criterion for a doctrine of providence is a sticky one for Caputo, but not
because he ignores or rejects the subject. Hope is of the utmost importance in his work. It is a
central theme and a concept he is constantly defending. Our three original models revealed
that a doctrine of providence must provide hope for the future. This was accomplished in most
cases by ensuring a good end despite human sinfulness and the tragedies of finite life. Caputo,
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though, offers no guarantee of a good end and no after-life to escape from finitude. And, yet,
he claims that his theological system is about nothing if it is not about hope.
Caputo ends his spiritual autobiography, Hoping Against Hope: Confessions of a
Postmodern Pilgrim, with a chapter entitled “Dreaming, Praying, Hoping, Smiling.” In the
section on hoping, Caputo proclaims that it is not just we who hope, but God also. Reflecting
on that hope, he writes, “Hope means that things are neither steered mightily unto good by an
invisible wisdom nor hollowed out at their center by some primordial catastrophe and doomed
to fail. Hope means that things are just unstable, risky, nascent, natal, betokening neither an
absolute plenum nor an absolute void.”98 In Caputo’s system the doctrine of providence
cannot provide hope founded on a guaranteed good end, but it can provide hope, for us and
for God, by refusing to accept a closed future. Choosing to hope means choosing to listen for
the calls and respond rather than accept that only what is possible is possible. Perhaps the
impossible is also possible. Perhaps something unbelievable will happen.
Caputo sees this as a more authentic hope, a stronger hope, a “hoping against hope,”99
or maybe even the hope of hopes. Hope itself is an impossible event that rearranges the world
and of which one cannot make sense.100 In the end, we hope because we hope. We have hope
in life because life is worth hoping for. “The life of hope is hope in life itself.”101
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Reimagined Providence
Providence typically refers to a guaranteed plan that God has for creation that will
ensure that all things come to a good end. Since there is no guarantee of a good end in
Caputo’s theological system, providence must be reimagined or rejected. On the one hand, by
using the eight criteria for a doctrine of providence, we can see that a doctrine of providence is
still possible within Caputo’s weak God theology. Providence can be reimagined within this
system, although providence will look different than it does the models previously explored.
On the other hand, Caputo’s work could also be used to propose a Christianity free from
providence.
Rejecting the God of ontotheology naturally seems to lend itself to rejecting providence
as well. Caputo’s weak God theology does not offer the foresight, guidance, or guarantees that
providence typically implies. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why reimagining providence
may be more appropriate than rejecting providence. First, although the details of providence
are altered, as we have seen all throughout this chapter, something within Caputo’s system is
still serving the function that providence serves in more traditional articulations of theology. In
this chapter that “something” has been identified as the call or the Spirit, which enables
human participation in the kingdom of God and allows for hope. Approaching the question of
rejecting or reimagining providence from the perspective of systematic theology, it is
reasonable to call that which functions as providence by the name “providence,” and thus
reimagine providence. Second, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, many Christians
are firm in their desire to hold on to a notion of providence, even when their understanding of
providence cannot hold up to scrutiny or does not sufficiently enable participation and ensure
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hope. Consequently, approaching the question of rejecting or reimagining providence from the
perspective of pastoral theology, one is again led to reimagine providence for those Christians
who already hold the doctrine dear. While either option, rejecting providence or reimaging
providence, is a valid interpretation of Caputo’s work, the rest of this section and the
conclusion will focus on reimagining providence.
In reimagined providence, God has no plan. In fact, there is no God. God does not exist.
And yet, although we cannot say much about the caller,102 there is a call. Responding to the
call brings about an event which opens up the impossible. The call calls us to justice,
hospitality, forgiveness, to the stranger, and to life. But, of course, a call on its own is
powerless and unable to act directly in the world. In this reimagined providence, all agency
must come through creation—there is no direct intervention by God. Human beings must fully
participate in bringing about the kingdom of God, if there is to be one.
The call functions like the Holy Spirit. It is where God is happening in the world.
Without forcing anything, the Holy Spirit allows us to hear how we might bring God into the
world. When human beings respond to the call, the impossible can occur. The impossible is an
event that, even after the fact, is unbelievable. Jesus offering forgiveness while dying on the
cross is the sort of unbelievable event worthy of the name of God. Consequently, the hope
that providence normally provides through certainty and stability becomes hope in the
impossible when providence is reimagined. Therefore, it is a hope against hope or a hope
without a foundation or reason. We might call reimagined providence a preposterous
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providence. Nevertheless, the hope which reimagined providence provides motivates further
action, further responding to the call, and further participation. The experience of life makes us
want more life, simply for the sake of life.
If we choose to reimagine providence rather than reject it, we find that in Caputo’s
system providence focuses less on the eschaton than the original three models we examined in
chapters one, two, and three. While it does dream of the kingdom of God, the work of
providence is not in dreams, but in the quotidian. Reimagined providence acts only in the
present. It is the call and response to aesthetics, ethics, beauty, and life in the day-to-day.
Reimagined providence is an invitation to life in the Spirit—to life lived in response to the call.

CONCLUSION
PREPOSTEROUS PROVIDENCE
The previous chapter laid out a reimagined doctrine of providence, which while meeting
all of the criteria gleaned from the original three models of Paul Helm, Michael Dodds, and
Joseph Bracken, nevertheless looked substantially different. In John Caputo’s theological
system, God does not have a plan. Human beings participate by responding to or resisting the
call to justice, hospitality, and other dimensions of the kingdom of God. Hope is not grounded
in the certainty of a good end, but rather in the grace of the event.
Caputo believes that this approach better allows for the celebration of life for life’s sake
while also accepting death. We may want some evidence, however, that this approach is
actually good for something—that it actually helps people live in the world. In other words,
where is the evidence that the reimagined providence described in chapter six actually
functions as providence is meant to? Does reimagined providence provide hope and motivate
participation in bringing about the kingdom of God? Does this model of providence disclose
possibilities other models of providence obscure? Caputo writes, “We will only be able to tell
afterward if God has come. So theology will always be after the fact, and God’s providential
foresight will all be reconstructed retroactively, after we see what has come, even while the
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name of God will always contain the inexhaustible reservoir of the unforeseeable to-come.”1
So, we will have to look backwards in order to see any evidence of providence. Consequently,
this conclusion will utilize a case study to look backwards for the kind of providence we might
find in Caputo’s theological system. Through the case study, I will also show that the model of
providence developed in chapter six offers an interpretation of the world which is superior to
the Calvinist, Thomistic, and process models explored earlier.
I have chosen Hurricane Katrina for this case study. Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans
almost twelve years ago and seems to provide just the right amount of temporal distance to
begin to see the workings of providence. In reimagined providence, providence will come in
the form of impossible events. Events which are still unbelievable even twelve years after their
occurrence. We are looking for the preposterous. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that
none of the original three models of providence claim one can expect to see an overarching
pattern to one’s life or human history (even if they claim there ultimately is an overarching
pattern).2 Being able to recognize providence is not a criterion for the presence of providence.
Furthermore, Michael Welker observes that sometimes the work of the Holy Spirit (and work
of providence) is misidentified for generations.3 Consequently, an analysis of providence
during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina can only be provisional.
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Case Study: Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina hit the coast of Louisiana on August 29, 2005 with winds reaching
140mph. 4 Widespread flooding and displacement resulted, especially in New Orleans.5 Twelve
years after this natural disaster, most are aware that the damage was magnified by a failure to
prepare and properly secure the levee system. As Ivor Van Heerden explains only a year after
the hurricane, there was a “systemic failure on the part of our society.”6 To make matters
worse, President George W. Bush and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
failed to provide adequate aid in a timely manner while racial divisions in New Orleans
prevented just distribution of that aid.7 Even the natural elements of the disaster were
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highlighted. See Michael Eric Dyson, Come Hell or High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster (New
York: Basic Civitas Books, 2006), 109-127. Dyson’s book also examines issues of race.
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exacerbated by global warming.8 Theologically, then, Hurricane Katrina cannot be considered
merely a natural evil, as it is also the result of sin.9
With these basic facts on the table, we can consider the Calvinist, Thomistic, and
process models of providence described in chapters one, two, and three by Helm, Dodds, and
Bracken. The shortcomings of these models are largely due to their reliance on an
ontotheological conception of God. Consequently, considering the ways in which Caputo
critiques ontotheology also reveals the shortcomings of these models of providence. First,
Caputo critiques ontotheology on conceptual grounds. Caputo’s reflections on the 2004
earthquake/tsunami offer us a starting point.10 There, Caputo suggests that if there is
providence, it will not be found in a God who could have prevented the tragedy nor in a God
who believes the tragedy is a just punishment for human sinfulness. These are problematic
conceptions of God because they call God’s omnibenevolence into question. From a Calvinist
perspective, God could have foreordained from the beginning of time that Hurricane Katrina

8

The number of severe storms has increased along with global warming. In fact, 2005, the year Hurricane
Katrina hit, was the first year the National Weather Service named storms all the way from A to W…and they still
had five storms to go. While the relationship between global warming and meteorology is complex, research has
indicated that we can expect both stronger and more frequent storms as the atmosphere and oceans warm. The
rising sea level, caused by the melting ice caps, also increases the destructive power of coastal storms. John
McQuaid and Mark Schleifstein, Path of Destruction: The Devastation of New Orleans and the Coming Age of
Superstorms (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2006), 345-362.
9
It is impossible to ever definitively label a particular act by a particular individual as sinful, since one’s
motivations, intentions, worldview, and possibilities are never fully known. However, the circumstances which
elevated the destructive impact of Hurricane Katrina did develop within a context of social sin where the actual
and potential needs of the residents of New Orleans and the surrounding areas were disregarded.
10

See chapter five; John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2006), xi; and John D. Caputo, “The Insistence and Existence of God: A Response to DeRoo,” in
Cross and Khôra: Deconstruction and Christianity in the Work of John D. Caputo, ed. Marko Zlomislić and Neal
DeRoo (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2010), 323.
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not happen at all.11 From a Thomistic perspective, God could have intervened through
secondary causes to mitigate the damage.12 From a process perspective, God could have lured
actual occasions to use their creativity in unselfish ways, thus creating a ripple effect
throughout overlapping societies and ultimately overcoming the social sin present in those
societies.13
While all three models raise questions about God’s involvement, Helm’s Calvinist model
of providence is the most problematic because it is the only model which suggests tragedy
might be used as form of punishment.14 This interpretation was widespread after Hurricane
Katrina.15 The most well-known example comes from The 700 Club host, Pat Robertson, who
suggested that Hurricane Katrina was due to America’s support of abortion and the difficulty of
getting nominated to the Supreme Court as a pro-life candidate.16 While this line of thinking is
meant to motivate action and reform, it is difficult to square with God’s omnibenevelonce,
which is central to the doctrine of providence. It seems an omnibenevolent God would try to

11

Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God without Time, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),
129. See also Helm, Providence of God, 71, 190.
12

Dodds, Unchanging God of Love, 196.

13

Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., Does God Roll Dice?: Divine Providence for a World in the Making (Collegeville:
Liturgical Press, 2012), 129.
14

Helm, Providence of God, 215.

15

Dyson refers to this line of thinking as punitive theodicy and provides a number of examples of its
occurrence after Hurricane Katrina. Dyson, Come Hell or High Water, 179-181.
16

Joe Brown, “Religious conservatives claim Katrina was God's omen, punishment for the United States”
Media Matters for America, posted September 13, 2005, accessed April 6, 2017,
https://mediamatters.org/research/2005/09/13/religious-conservatives-claim-katrina-was-gods/133804.
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stop tragedies from occurring. Even if good comes out of the tragedy (Helm, Dodds, and
Bracken all insist that it will), it cannot undo the tragedy of the lives lost and destroyed.
The potential for greater good to come out of tragedy leads us directly to Caputo’s
historical critique of ontotheology. This critique asks us to reflect on how the victims of
Hurricane Katrina will be remembered. Caputo is concerned that totalizing metanarratives can
erase the pain and suffering of the past. The lives lost become “worth it” because of a greater
good that is gained. Somehow all events, those which appear good and those which appear
bad or sinful, are contributing to a narrative in which good triumphs. While acts of heroism and
beauty abound in the midst of any tragedy, including Hurricane Katrina (some examples are
given below), it is difficult to see how any of them can undo the damage of 2,000 lives lost.17
Finally, Caputo offers an ethical critique of ontotheology. If all of our good actions are
ultimately rewarded by eternal life, we are unable to act unconditionally. This means that one
can never engage in an act of freely given hospitality, forgiveness, or justice. This is a problem
if Caputo is correct that it is precisely these unconditional acts which bring God into the world
and trigger events that open the impossible. Again, Helm’s Calvinist model runs into the
greatest obstacles of the three because it relies on a compatibilist understanding of human
freedom. While one does not necessarily act in order to receive a reward (Helm would be very
cautious around that kind of Pelagian language), if one is coerced by God, one cannot act
unconditionally either. Preserving the possibility of acting unconditionally allows for openings

17

“Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts,” CNN Library, updated August 23, 2016, accessed April 6, 2017,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/index.html.
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of grace in the midst of an irredeemable tragedy such as Hurricane Katrina. We are given the
opportunity to act as Jesus did on the cross when he forgave unconditionally.
The problem goes deeper than simply human freedom, though. Caputo worries that
when one views one’s actions as judged by God, particular groups naturally begin to claim
authority over the revelation of God’s will. This in turn leads to violence against other groups.
It was not just Pat Robertson who claimed authority over God’s revelation in aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina.18 Of course, Helm, Dodds, and Bracken would absolutely condemn religious
violence and the extreme us-versus-them mentality that some religious leaders promoted after
the hurricane. However, Bracken escapes this critique more successfully than the others by
rejecting special providence and the idea that human beings, or a particular subset of human
beings, are saved in a special way.
Caputo offers an alternative way of thinking about providence in relation to disasters
such as Hurricane Katrina.19 While one could read his work as an attempt to dissolve the
question of theodicy and, by extension, providence, his work can also be read as a reimagined
providence. What might that look like? We know the occurrence of the disaster was partly
natural and partly due to human sinfulness. If God can only insist but does not exist, God can

18

To cite just two more examples: ultra-orthodox Rabbi Ovadia Yosef claimed Hurricane Katrina was
“God’s retribution” against the black population of New Orleans because “they had no God” and failed to study
the Torah, and evangelical leader Michael Marcavage blamed the Southern Decadence festival which was
cancelled in 2005 due to the hurricane. These are extreme examples and certainly not representative of Jewish or
Christian responses generally. See Associated Press, “Shas Rabbi: Hurricane is Bush’s Punishment for Pullout
Support,” Haaretz, September 7, 2005, accessed May 30, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/news/shas-rabbihurricane-is-bush-s-punishment-for-pullout-support-1.169253; and Michael Marcavage, “Hurricane Katrina
Destroys New Orleans Days Before ‘Southern Decadence’,” Repent America, August 31, 2005, accessed May 30,
2017, http://www.repentamerica.com/pr_hurricanekatrina.html.
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do nothing about the natural evil component. Human beings, on the other hand, are
responsible for sin and actually can affect the natural as well. As research on the effects of
global warming continue, human beings have an increasing level of control and responsibility
for what appears to be natural—including the strength and frequency of storms.20 Human
sinfulness, which for Caputo means resisting the call, is easy to see in Hurricane Katrina. The
call of the name of God was resisted in the insufficient levee system, the systemic racism, the
inadequate reaction of FEMA, and the unwillingness of society to address global warming.21
Some of these failures to respond to the call might also qualify as events of a negative sort. It is
preposterous that New Orleans was not better prepared for Hurricane Katrina, especially since
the storm was not even as bad as the “perfect storm” scientists had modeled and predicted. 22
It is also preposterous that the USS Bataan, a military ship equipped to offer fresh water, food,
and medical services and which followed the storm in order to assist in an emergency, was left
hamstrung due to never receiving an order to act from the federal government.23
Despite those evil events, the world-shattering nature of something like a hurricane
opens many opportunities for responding to the call to go on living.24 The preposterous events
20

Again see McQuaid and Schleifstein, Path of Destruction, 345-362.

21

Again, while it is difficult to assign individual blame for any of these destructive or negligent acts, these
acts occurred within a culture of social sin where care for the poor/vulnerable, dignity of the human person, and
care for creation were not given sufficient priority.
22
The original computer-generated “perfect storm” used by FEMA was a category 5 hurricane named
Pam. Disaster planning in New Orleans, however, focused on the possibility of a category 3 hurricane. Hurricane
Katrina was category 4. Cooper and Block, Disaster, 15.
23

24

Dyson, Come Hell or High Water, 119-120.

Caputo refers the tragedy of the sinking of the Titanic as a site of responding to the call, noting
especially the band which kept playing until the end. See John D. Caputo, The Folly of God: A Theology of the
Unconditional (Salem: Polebridge Press, 2016), 41-43.
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which occurred also include stories of preposterous perseverance in the face of death and
destruction. For example, Byron LaFrance and his brother returned to their abandoned street
and rebuilt their homes without any electricity or city services.25 Another survivor, Rowena
Duplessis, faced not only Hurricane Katrina, but also the death of her husband and suicide of
her son within one year. She lost her home in the hurricane and the trailer she moved into was
robbed. Yet, she continues to find hope and the resolve to continue living.26 Psychologist Lisa
Miller attributes Duplessis’ response to forgiveness and gratitude,27 which could both be
responses to the call Caputo describes. Perhaps recognizing the preposterous nature of moving
forward after so much loss, Duplessis attributes her strength to the grace of God.28
Many more examples of people responding to calls could be given, but the aspect of
reimagined providence that is most helpful when thinking about Hurricane Katrina is that
reimagined providence remains unfinished. The call of God is still coming, and the responses
which may open up new preposterous events may still be to come as well. We do not know if a
wonderful turn of events might breathe new life into New Orleans or anyplace else. Since we
are talking about things that are preposterous anyhow, it is never too late for everything to
suddenly look different. When looking back at a tragedy like Hurricane Katrina where so many
things went wrong and so many people and groups resisted the call, the open future is
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McQuaid and Schleifstein, Path of Destruction, 336.
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certainly a source of hope. There is still time to build the kingdom of God; we can still
participate in providence. Furthermore, unlike in more traditional models of providence where
tragedies must somehow be redeemed for a greater good, in reimagined providence the
tragedy can be remembered as simply a tragedy.29 It is not incorporated into the kingdom of
God, but rather it stands as a reminder that the fullness of the kingdom of God was not and is
not here yet.
The Spirit of a Weak God
The global warming crisis which has increased the possibility of super-storms is far from
over. Human beings will face the cascading effects of environmental degradation for the
foreseeable future. Of course, just as the nuclear threat gave way to the climate change threat,
new threats are also likely to define future generations. As new threats emerge, even if God is
understood as weak, human beings will likely continue searching for signs of providence and
models of providence that meet the challenges of the day. Fortunately, a weak God still has a
Spirit that calls. The Spirit cannot guide hurricanes or stop them from coming, but human
beings can respond to the call. God will depend on creation’s response, but we can still hope
that creation will respond. When it does, Caputo tells us an event we might call “God” will
open up in ways beyond our imagining. It will be an experience of grace—an experience of
providence.

29

Our job as the messianic generation is to chronicle the tears of the past and to offer a kind of
redemption simply by remembering. See Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” in Walter Benjamin:
Selected Writings Volume 4: 1938-1940, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, trans. Edmund Jephcott et
al. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 390.
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The Spirit of a weak God combats the problems of ontotheology including an
omnipotent super-being God who allows evil in the world, a totalizing view of human history,
and an unethical use of religious truth which excludes the Other. Divine providence, though,
need not be a casualty of the critique of ontotheology. The resulting theological interpretation
opens the door for a reimagined model of providence which is preferable to Calvinist,
Thomistic, and process models of providence. The Spirit of a weak God empowers human
participation through the call to the impossible, unlike ontotheological models which stifle
one’s ability to act unconditionally and raise serious questions about theodicy. The Spirit of a
weak God also secures hope through the grace of the event. Unlike ontotheological models of
providence, the building of the kingdom will not result in a totalizing, metanarrative. Tragedy
will not always result in a greater good. Nevertheless, although victory is not guaranteed and is
certainly not possible without our response, hope remains. Caputo might say along with Julian
of Norwich, “All shall be well, and all manner of things shall be well…perhaps.” If Christians still
hope and participate in the building of the kingdom, perhaps that is providence enough.
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